Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

Oral Answers to Questions — TRADE AND INDUSTRY

Development Areas (Financial Inducements)

Mr. Strang: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he will now make a further statement on the financial inducements he proposes to provide for private industry in the development areas.

Mr. Molloy: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he will maintain incentive grants for industry moving to regions with problems of unemployment; and if he will make a statement.

The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and President of the Board of Trade (Mr. John Davies): I would

refer the hon. Members to the statement made by my right hon. Friend, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on 27th October and the White Paper on Investment Incentives.

Mr. Strang: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of the serious concern that exists in the development areas because of his decision to replace tax allowances with investment grants? Is he aware that this concern stems from the fact that many firms will be worse off, including firms in the shipbuilding industry and foreign companies coming to this country? Would he consider allowing a system of investment grants to exist alongside his system of tax allowances, so enabling firms to choose the best system for themselves, since this would be compatible with his philosophy that private industry knows best?

Mr. Davies: I am aware of the concern felt by certain firms that the proposed arrangements will he less advantageous to them than existing arrangements. However, taken as a whole, I am convinced that the package proposed will prove advantageous to the development areas. It would be impossible and excessively costly to have the two systems working in parallel.

Mr. Molloy: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the statement of his right hon. Friend and, indeed, the White Paper is causing considerable concern in the areas involved and that some despair has been caused to both sides of industry? Would he agree that the policy of


the previous Administration in this context was not only economically wise and embraced the ethic of the Good Samaritan but was approved by all sections of industry? Should not he adopt the measures of the Labour Government in this connection and propose to relieve himself of some of the disingenuous and, indeed, vulgar and contemptible remarks—[Interruption.]—which he made in his speech last Wednesday?

Mr. Speaker: Order. Long supplementary questions mean fewer Questions being asked.

Mr. Davies: I am of the opinion that the balance of the present package is more advantageous to the development areas and that there would be no purpose in going back to the former system. Contrary to what the hon. Gentleman said. I believe that the arrangement now envisaged is more favourable to the generality of development areas; and the hon. Gentleman will have particularly in mind the interests of the service industries in this respect.

Mr. Waddington: I congratulate my right hon. Friend on the change of policy towards the development areas. Will he take an early opportunity to clarify the situation for the intermediate areas, about which there seems to be some doubt?

Mr. Davies: The intermediate areas receive certain advantages, which will be intensified by this new package of arrangements. However, I will certainly look at the matter again to see whether there is anything further that can be done. My hon. Friend will be aware that the Government are proceeding to a deep study of regional policy and that this may bring further matters to light.

Mr. Varley: Would the right hon. Gentleman tell us more about the wider use of the Local Employment Acts as envisaged in the White Paper, to which he referred? For example, what does he intend to do with his Independent Advisory Committee? Are its terms of reference to be changed? Does he intend to rely more on the Local Employment Acts and Ministerial discretion? What savings does he envisage?

Mr. Davies: As I said, I am conducting a major study into all aspects of regional policy. This will include such matters as those to which the hon. Gentle

man referred. I expect, however, that the use of the Local Employment Acts will be intensified. Certain improvements in the application of the Acts have been announced by my right hon. Friend.

Mr. Blenkinsop: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry whether he will now announce the changes he proposes to make in development area policy and, in particular, the changes in financial assistance at present being given to encourage industry to develop on Tyneside and in other similar development areas with heavy unemployment.

The Under-Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (Mr. Anthony Grant): My right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced the Government's proposals on investment incentives on 27th October. I am confident that these will encourage industrial development in Tyneside and other parts of the development areas.

Mr. Blenkinsop: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the Chairman of the Chamber of Shipping has declared that the Minister is throwing the baby out with the bathwater and is extremely concerned at the effect on the whole shipping and shipbuilding industry which had a chance of developing under the previous proposals?

Mr. Grant: I realise that there are anxieties, but I believe firmly that the Government's new package will assist the development areas overall.

Dame Irene Ward: Has the Secretary of State yet received the deputation from Alderman Grey and Mr. Dawson of the North-East Development Council who have specific proposals to make on behalf of the North-East Coast, which are not politically motivated? May we have an assurance that the requirements which are put forward by that body, which are nonpolitical, will be accepted without any further delay, because we are getting tired of delay?

Mr. Grant: I can assure my hon. Friend that the distinguished gentlemen have seen my right hon. Friend and that he took close note of what they said. I am advised that they went away very satisfied.

Mr. Varley: Does the hon. Gentleman accept that the success of the development area policy in part has to be judged


by a strict observance of I.D.C. control? Will he give the House an obsolute assurance that if he receives an application for an industrial development certificate for a major motor car assembly plant outside a development area or an intermediate area, he will refuse it?

Mr. Grant: The hon. Gentleman has the experience to know that I could not possibly give such a blanket undertaking of that nature. However, I will look at each I.D.C. request on its merits, and I hope to pursue a flexible and thoroughly satisfactory policy.

Mr. Jay: Can the hon. Gentleman assure us that he has no plans for reducing the size of the present development areas?

Mr. Grant: The position, as I think my right hon. Friend said earlier, is that we are reviewing the whole situation of development areas and intermediate areas and will make an announcement in due course.

Mr. Blenkinsop: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of that reply, I give notice that I propose to raise the matter, particularly with reference to Tyneside, as soon as possible.

Edinburgh, Leith and Portobello (Development Area Status)

Mr. Strang: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he will now give Edinburgh full development area status.

Mr. Murray: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he has now reconsidered the effects of the exclusion of Leith and Edinburgh from full development area status; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Anthony Grant: We are continuing our examination of the position of Edinburgh, Leith and Portobello in the course of our review of regional policy. An announcement will be made in due course.

Mr. Strang: Is the Under-Secretary of State aware that adult male unemployment registered at the Edinburgh, Leith and Portobello employment exchanges is now rising faster than in the rest of Scotland, and that if present trends con

tinue it will exceed the overall Scottish average within two years? Will he give an assurance that he will announce his decision on Edinburgh's inclusion in the development area before the Christmas Recess and, when he announces that decision, will he make available to the House all the information and considerations which led him to make that decision?

Mr. Grant: I am not in a position to give the hon. Gentleman such an assurance, but I can assure him that I am aware of the difficult position of that area and the snags that are being encountered there. All I can say is that we are reviewing this as a matter of urgency and will make an announcement in due course.

Mr. Murray: Does the hon. Gentleman appreciate the seriousness of the exclusion of Leith from the surrounding Scottish development area? Is he aware that Leith, with Granton, is the only port in Scotland, that is not within the development area, and that Robb Caledon of Leith are the only shipbuilders in Scotland not to be within a development area?

Mr. Grant: I appreciate the difficulty in Leith. Indeed, had I had doubts they would have been relieved, because I have had a most eloquent plea from the hon. and learned Gentleman and his chamber of commerce only recently, and I will take careful note of what they have said.

Industrial Reorganisation Corporation

Mr. William Hamilton: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he will now make a statement on the future of the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation.

Mr. John Davies: I have nothing to add to my statement of 30th October.—[Vol. 805; c. 564–71.]

Mr. Hamilton: Did the right hon. Gentleman read the assessment of the situation in the Business Supplement of the Sunday Times yesterday, which said that there was no possible organisation to take the place of the I.R.C.; and that Mr. Jim Slater, well known to right hon. Gentlemen opposite, had said that it was important that there should be some organisation other than market forces to


take care of the situation in relation to strategic firms such as Rolls-Royce? What other organisation has the right hon. Gentleman in mind?

Mr. Davies: A number of organisations, particularly in the City of London, have an active rôle in industrial mergers. It is true to say that, among the numbers of industrial mergers that have taken place over recent years, the vast proportion have been undertaken by bodies other than the I.R.C. It would, therefore, be wrong to imagine that there is a lack of organisations which specialise in this field of work. I believe that the disappearance of the I.R.C. will pose new problems for these organisations, but I very sincerely trust they will be able to face them.

Sir B. Rhys Williams: Would it be welcome to my right hon. Friend if some of the major institutional shareholders in the City of London woke up to their responsibility and sought to exercise a genuine supervisory function?

Mr. Davies: I am sure that institutional shareholders in the City of London will have noted what my hon. Friend said and will be acting upon it.

Mr. Benn: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell the House whether he, as Minister, would be prepared to entertain from firms like Rolls-Royce, referred to by my hon. Friend the Member for Fife, West (Mr. William Hamilton), proposals for support where the City was not able or ready to give financial help, and where there was a national strategic interest in the continuation of the firm?

Mr. Davies: The right hon. Gentleman will be aware, none better, that in the case of Rolls-Royce there are already arrangements concerned with launching aid, in relation to aero engines, which provide for facilities to be given by the Government. These can always be contemplated in the event of such need.

Solid Smokeless Fuels

Mr. Blaker: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry whether he will make a statement about his review of the position regarding the supply of solid smokeless fuels for the coming winter.

Mr. Emery: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry whether he will estimate the amounts of solid smokeless fuel that are now available; and what shortage of supply he estimates for the winter months.

Mr. Pavitt: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he will make a statement on the availability of smokeless fuel in clean air designated areas.

Mr. John Davies: The current unofficial strike has increased the chance of local shortages, and I am watching the situation closely in consultation with producers and distributors.

Mr. Blaker: Quite apart from the current strikes, is my right hon. Friend aware that since the likely shortage of coke was revealed last spring the Blackpool Corporation has substantially reduced its requirements for coke for the coming winter but can still get a guarantee of no more than two-fifths of its minimum requirements? Is he also aware that the Chairman of the National Coal Board, in spite of having had a letter from me on the matter, for nearly two months has not given me a substantive reply?

Mr. Davies: I am aware that in many areas there is great concern, and there will undoubtedly be shortages. My hon. Friend refers to economies in the use of smokeless fuels made by certain local authorities. These and other authorities have been extensive in the help they have given. I take note of what my hon. Friend says about the Chairman of the National Coal Board: I was not aware that he had failed to answer my right hon. Friend.

Mr. Emery: Can my right hon. Friend say whether advice is still being given to local authorities and other bodies to convert from solid smokeless fuel to other fuels? If so, what is the extra cost involved? I believe that with certain local authorities the extra cost is quite considerable.

Mr. Davies: There may be an additional cost. But what is involved is primarily a question of anticipating changes that would in any case have had to be made in due course, so at some


stage the cost would have had to be incurred.

Mr. Pavitt: Is the Minister aware that in the light of the submissions made by his right hon. Friends and the facts we have all known for the last twelve months, it would look very cheap if he sought to ride off on the excuse of the miners' strike as the cause of shortage this winter? Would he urge his right hon. Friends in the Government to take action to ensure that, on health and other grounds, we do not have the threatened shortage?

Mr. Davies: I am afraid that the shortage as such will not be avoided. I am not seeking to shrug off the situation on to the miners' strike. I simply said that the present unofficial strike action was likely still further to worsen the situation.

Mr. Michael Foot: As the right hon. Gentleman has mentioned the strike situation, can he say what steps will be taken by himself or other members of the Government to try to secure a settlement of the dispute, or whether the Government propose to repeat the triumph they have had in the sewage crisis?

Mr. Davies: That is another matter. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will put down a Question on the subject.

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what action he has taken to co-ordinate the actions of all the organisations concerned so as to secure that adequate supplies of smokeless fuels are available at reasonable prices to all householders whose houses are located in smokeless zones.

Mr. John Davies: Local shortages of solid smokeless fuels are inevitable especially in view of current unofficial strikes. The problems now facing the distributive trade can only be handled effectively by the trade itself; and, as my right hon. Friend knows, all local authorities have been asked to check the probable supply position in their area. I am not responsible for retail prices.

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Does my right hon. Friend accept that many homes in these areas are equipped with apparatus which will use only these fuels, and were so equipped in the faith that Govern

ments would secure a supply of these fuels; and, in those circumstances, while accepting that he has no responsibility for the distributive side, will he ensure that the producers of these fuels will get together to secure adequate supplies?

Mr. Davies: I am in constant consultation with the producers of the fuels concerned, and they with one another. They are doing, and have done, as much as they can, and will continue to do so. The fact is, however, that there will be shortages. I am informed that any endeavour to overcome shortages in certain areas by moving materials away from other areas would be virtually impossible.

Mr. Orme: As the right hon. Gentleman keeps referring to the miners' unofficial dispute at the moment, would he recommend to his right hon. Friends that they ask Sir Jack Scamp to act as an arbiter in the current wage claim, because the miners happen to be low-paid workers, the same as the local government employees?

Mr. Davies: Sir Jack Scamp was not requested by the Government to act as an arbitrator in the former case.

Mr. Edwin Wainwright: In this free-for-all which is suggested by the Government, and which seems to be in operation, would the right hon. Gentleman have an inquiry? What is the price at base for these smokeless fuels, and what is the delivery price? Would the right hon. Gentleman make certain, because of the shortage, that the price increase does not go sky high?

Mr. Davies: I will certainly look into that question and communicate to the hon. Member the results of my inquiry.

Power Stations (Sulphur Pollution)

Mr. Eadie: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he will make a statement on the further use of the invention claimed by a firm, whose name has been sent to him, for the elimination of sulphur pollution from power stations.

The Under-Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (Mr. Nicholas Ridley): I am still awaiting further information from the hon. Member. When this is received I will be glad to answer the Question.

Mr. Eadie: Would not the hon. Gentleman agree that such an invention would be of great help to us when we are now so pollution minded? Would he not further agree that the by-products of sulphur could easily be an additional aid to industry?

Mr. Ridley: While I agree that an invention in this field would be valuable, I must add that it would be equally valuable if the hon. Gentleman could remember the name of the firm he alleges has made the invention.

Later—

Mr. Eadie: On a point or order. I seek your guidance, Mr. Speaker. I know that since you have occupied the Chair you have always tried to protect the rights of back-bench Members in relation to the Executive. On Question No. 5, I put to the Under-Secretary of State a question about the process of extracting sulphur. He failed to inform the House that he had lost information which I sent him, and, moreover, he took the opportunity, quite improperly, I think, to score a debating point. Furthermore, I think there was a betrayal, to some extent, of confidentiality in this case, because he sent his Parliamentary Private Secretary to me, and I thought that we had a private conversation in relation to the matter. I do not seek to criticise the Under-Secretary of State for losing the paper. That could easily happen. I do take objection, however, to his attempting from that Front Bench to score a debating point in the circumstances. If the Minister wants to gain the respect of the House he must be frank and forthcoming. While the Hon. Gentleman's Parliamentary Private Secretary was beside me, there was lost another paper from an hon. Member who happened to be sitting beside me. Therefore, I ask your protection from the Front Bench seeking in such circumstances to making debating points against back benchers.

Mr. Speaker: I can only say to the hon. Member that if he complains of a Minister scoring a debating point he has done his best, under the guise of a point of order, to score a debating point in return.

Mr. Michael Foot: Further to that point of order. Is it not the case that if

a debating point has been scored by an hon. Gentleman opposite it is unique in the history of this Administration? Secondly, is it not the case that my hon. Friend the Member for Midlothian (Mr. Eadie) raised a legitimate point of order on the question of the confidentiality of discussions between people in this House? If such a thing has occurred, is it not proper for my hon. Friend to raise the matter to see whether the Minister will look into it to see whether an apology is not owed to my hon. Friend?

Mr. Speaker: I missed that second point. It is a convention of this House that it keeps in confidence what passes between Members on the basis of confidence.

Mr. Ridley: Further to that point of order. No communication has been received from the hon. Member for Midlothian (Mr. Eadie) about the name of the firm to which he referred in his Question. In order to try to be helpful my Parliamentary Private Secretary contacted the hon. Gentleman to see whether he could give us a clue as to which firm it was. As the hon. Gentleman was unable to tell us, it seemed to me that it was perfectly fair to give him the Answer which I gave him on a supplementary question.

Investment Incentives

Mr. Sheldon: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he will now make a statement on the future of investment grants.

Mr. Emery: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry whether he will now make a statement about investment incentives.

Mr. John Davies: I would refer the hon. Members to the statement made on 27th October by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Mr. Sheldon: Since the Government have accepted that there has been a reduction in incentives for investment in plant and machinery in both the development and non-development areas, what action does the right hon. Gentlemen propose to take to stimulate investment, here and now, in what is today a crucial field in the British economy?

Mr. Davies: The Government do not recognise that there has been a reduction in incentives. On the contrary—

Mr. Sheldon: Answer the question.

Mr. Davies: On the contrary, we believe that the broad spread of arrangements which the Government are putting forward will act as an additional inducement to investment in the areas concerned.

Mr. Emery: Is it not true that with the reduction in corporation tax certain firms, as long as they are highly profitable, will obtain a better return than the present method of investment incentives affords?

Mr. Davies: I know that in certain cases this can, indeed, be the case.

Mr. Varley: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us what steps his Department is taking to collect information about the number of firms in development areas, for instance, that are not going ahead with new projects, and thereby providing new jobs, as a result of the replacing of the investment grant scheme?

Mr. Davies: Yes, Sir. This will form part of an extensive and continuous study that we are making of our regional policies, and we shall at the same time be registering those firms which decide, because of these arrangements, to go into the areas in question.

Mr. Biffen: Will not my right hon. Friend agree that we now have sufficient data to indicate that wholesale subsidising of investment leads to an improvement neither in the overall level of investment nor in profitable investment?

Mr. Davies: Certainly our overall appreciation of the situation on the investment grants was that it secured an inadequate advantage in relation to the amount of public money expended.

Mr. Dell: Will the right hon. Gentleman try to persuade the Chancellor of the Exchequer to publish the calculations upon which his statement is based—that the differential in favour of development areas is not impaired? What reply has been given to the C.B.I. in respect of transitional arrangements, which I understand the Confederation considers to be inadequate?

Mr. Davies: I will certainly put that point to the Chancellor. As regards the C.B.I. representations, questions about transitional arrangements are satisfactorily answered, and they will be the more satisfactorily answered when a statement is produced detailing precisely on what terms investment grants will be paid on contracts entered into up until 26th October

Mr. Sheldon: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. In view of the unsatisfactory nature of that answer, I beg to give notice that I shall try to raise the matter on the Adjournment at the earliest possible opportunity.

Reclamation Industry

Mr. Blaker: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry whether he will make a statement on the policy of Her Majesty's Government regarding the reclamation industry.

Mr. Ridley: We recognise the important part which the reclamation industry has to play in recovering raw materials for industry. Our aim is to create conditions which will help this and other industries to operate competitively and efficiently.

Mr. Blaker: Is my hon. Friend aware that that statement will be welcome to the industry? Is he aware also that, in addition to helping in the battle against pollution, the industry saves £1,000 million a year in imports? Will my hon. Friend confirm that the new Government's policy is to cease the discrimination against the industry which the former Government practised?

Mr. Ridley: I agree with what my hon. Friend says and I can assure him that we have moved some way already, by the changes in investment incentives, towards abolishing discrimination. There will be further progress in the matter of the selective employment tax when my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer gets round to dealing with that, too.

Mr. Darling: When do the Government intend to remove the controls on the export of steel work scrap and thus provide a free market for the scrap producers?

Mr. Ridley: This matter is being studied at present.

Merger Proposals

Mr. Douglas: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he will give details of merger proposals put to him by the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation since 20th June, 1970.

Mr. John Davies: No, Sir.

Mr. Douglas: Is not that a most unsatisfactory Answer? In view of the Secretary of State's strictures on the City last Thursday evening, will he tell the House of his overtures to the private sector to see whether the private sector—the City—could amass sufficient sums to help the organisations that need this help? What organisation does the private sector intend to create to replace the I.R.C.?

Mr. Davies: I am sure that the City, with its usual versatility, will respond to the need. I doubt that it has set up any specific new organisation since Thursday evening last.

Rolls-Royce Limited

Mr. Douglas: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he will make a statement on the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation's holding in Rolls-Royce Limited.

Mr. John Davies: The Industrial Reorganisation Corporation made a loan of £10 million to Rolls-Royce in May, 1970 to help finance the company's operations. The Corporation undertook to consider a further loan of £10 million in 1971.

Mr. Douglas: What overtures did Rolls-Royce make to the City before it undertook to get this loan from the I.R.C.? Will the City provide the further £10 million rather than its coming from public funds?

Mr. Davies: I am unable to say what dicussions the Rolls-Royce company entered into with the City. I am aware only of those arrangements entered into by the I.R.C. I am conscious that discussions are at present being undertaken in the City on this subject.

Mr. Benn: Will the Secretary of State confirm what he said a moment ago, namely, that the second £10 million would be a sum which could be paid under launching aid without being related to

any particular engine? Does this extend beyond the aircraft industry to other industries as well?

Mr. Davies: The second £10 million is one of the commitments of I.R.C. which the Government have plainly said that they will honour, consequently it would not necessarily fall to be considered within the framework of launching aid.

Nuclear Power Stations

Mr. Edwin Wainwright: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he will list the names of the nuclear power stations now under construction, the dates of completion, the number of men employed during construction, and the number of men required after completion; and if he will make a statement of the Government's future programme.

Mr. John Davies: I will ask the Chairman of the C.E.G.B. to write to the hon. Member giving him the detailed information about nuclear power stations under construction. As to the future power station building programme, two of the four stations announced by the previous Government last year are to be nuclear. It would be premature to make a statement about the possible programme beyond that.

Mr. Wainwright: The Secretary of State will be aware of the damage done to some steel components by the carbon dioxide coolant used in the Bradwell type of reactor. Has this imperfection been overcome? What developments have occurred in selling reactors abroad, especially in connection with the one now in negotiation with Australia?

Mr. Davies: I will communicate privately with the hon. Gentleman about the remedies found for the defects to which he referred. As to the latter part of his supplementary question, discussions are still in course. It would be wrong to infer from what the hon. Gentleman said that the extent of trouble, which I admit, with the commissioning of nuclear generating plant should be regarded as being in any sense a general condemnation of the wisdom of such installations.

North Sea Gas (Safety)

Mr. Barnett: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he will


make a statement on the report of the safety of North Sea gas.

Mr. John Davies: The Government welcomes this report, which is reassuring about the safety of natural gas. Work is well in hand to implement the main recommendations.

Mr. Barnett: I welcome the recommendations about safety and the conclusions, and I congratulate Professor Morton on his report. As it was March when the Committee was set up and July when it reported, is it not important that we should know when the recommendations are to be implemented, in particular the recommendation for a joint safety committee with regard to safety in the home? When is it likely that these recommendations will be implemented?

Mr. Davies: Five out of the 14 recommendations have already been implemented. Work on the rest is well advanced. I will communicate with the hon. Gentleman about progress on the recommendation to which he refers in particular.

Mr. Lane: Is my right hon. Friend satisfied that the Gas Council is taking sufficient steps to publicise the main lessons of this report and to avoid unnecessary anxiety among the millions of people whose homes have still to be converted to natural gas?

Mr. Davies: I am satisfied that the Gas Council and the gas boards are doing a great deal of work in this field. Wherever conversions are involved, they make a special point of making people aware of the problems involved and the safety precautions that are necessary, as revealed by the report.

Yachts (Public Financing)

Mr. William Hamilton: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what steps he intends to take to prevent abuses in the operation of the Industrial Development Act, with particular reference to the public financing of yachts to be used for business purposes.

Mr. Anthony Grant: Investment grant is not paid unless all the requirements of the Act are satisfied.

Mr. Hamilton: Does that answer mean that the yacht "Cadabra" which was built for Mr. B. D. Hulme fulfils all those conditions and that in fact it is a floating showroom rather than a luxury cruiser built at the taxpayers' expense.

Mr. Grant: The Answer means that there have been no cases drawn to my attention of infringements of the Act. If the hon. Gentleman has any evidence which he wishes to submit, I will gladly consider it.

British Leyland (Longbridge Works)

Mr. Carter: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he will make an official visit to the Longbridge car works of British Leyland.

Mr. Ridley: My right hon. Friend has no plans to do so at present but it is an important plant that would naturally be borne in mind when programmes of visits by Ministers of the Department are being considered.

Mr. Carter: I thank the Minister for that reply. Is he aware that it will be viewed with disappointment in the Long-bridge works, because the shop stewards and other workers with whom I spoke over the weekend, after the memorable speech of the Secretary of State last Wednesday, wanted to question him closely about the problems of industry, particularly those of the car industry? Is the hon. Gentleman further aware that he could have gained a great deal of information from the people in the car industry—management included—during such a visit with regard to the rather severe legislation now being imposed in some foreign countries that adversely affects the export performance of the British car industry?

Mr. Ridley: It is the hon. Gentleman's job to question my right hon. Friend. As he has spent 10 days in these works, I am sure that he is very well equipped to do so. He will understand that we operate a representative system in Britain and that he has full facilities for pursuing his opportunities in the Chamber.

Mr. Barnett: The hon. Gentleman will doubtless be aware of the rumours that are circulating in the City and elsewhere about Government policy to bring about bankruptcies amongst companies of a


large size. This company is one of those that has been mentioned. Will the hon. Gentleman kill that rumour?

Mr. Ridley: The Government hope that the number of bankruptcies will be kept to the absolute minimum. However, the situation we inherited from the last Government is not very favourable in this respect.

Computer-aided Design Centres

Mr. Carter: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry whether it is his policy that the computer-aided design centres now under the auspices of the Ministry of Trade and Industry should be allowed to expand.

Mr. Ridley: The C.A.D. Centre at Cambridge is the Department's only establishment devoted solely to computer-aided design. It is performing valuable work, but we shall keep its activities under review to ensure that the benefits remain commensurate with the costs.

Mr. Carter: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that this establishment and others of a similar nature were established by the Ministry of Technology with the enthusiasm and co-operation of private industry and that to subject them to the same kind of axing as has been going on under the new régime would meet with the disapproval not only of those who work in these establishments but also of private and public industry?

Mr. Ridley: The hon. Gentleman will know that there is a very important private firm very much in the field as well. We wish to encourage all design by this method, but the hon. Gentleman will accept that there is no point in undertaking these design studies by computer if they do not in the long run become profitable.

Power Stations (Fuel)

Mr. Edwin Wainwright: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if, before he gives any further consideration to the Central Electricity Generating Board's application to convert the coal-fired power stations, Aberthaw A, South Wales, Richborough, Kent, and North-fleet, Kent, to be oil-fired stations he will have further consultation with the National Coal Board and the National Union of Mineworkers.

Mr. Ridley: My hon. Friend the Minister for Industry announced the decision to allow these conversions in the reply given to the hon. Member for Don Valley (Mr. Kelley) on 23rd July.—[Vol. 804, c. 207–8.]

Mr. Wainwright: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that there is much dissatisfaction in coal-mining areas because of the lack of consultation on these conversions? Will he bear in mind that any future conversion from coal should be to gas, which can easily be reconverted to coal-firing? Is he aware that the statement by his right hon. Friend about lame ducks is causing anxiety? There is a great deal of dissatisfaction in coal-mining districts, because the Government have not made any decision about what they intend to do for the intermediate or grey areas.

Mr. Ridley: All these conversions have been the subject of consultation with the N.U.M., as will be any future conversions. In the case of two of these stations there are facilities for reconversion to coal should there ever be a surplus of coal again.

Mr. Mason: I hope that the hon. Gentleman will reconsider his statement that consultations took place. Is he aware that I informed the House during the debate on coal a fortnight ago that in the matter of these three power stations, the Government deliberately avoided talking to the N.U.M.? The announcements were made and the union was not consulted. It was a change of policy. As for Richborough, it is a complete switch to oil fueling and cannot return to coal-firing. This involves the loss of a market of 500,000 tons.

Mr. Ridley: With regard to Rich-borough, the right hon. Gentleman knows that the coking coal from that part of Kent is in very short supply and has a very assured market for the future. I did not say that it had been converted so that it could use coal again. It was the other two stations to which I was referring. My hon. Friend the Minister for Industry discussed these matters with the N.U.M.

Mr. Mason: On a point of order. I am sorry, but I hope that the hon. Gentleman will consider first the initial reply he gave—

Hon. Members: Not a point of order.

Mr. Mason: All right. Mr. Speaker, I wish to inform the House that we shall check the record to make sure that the hon. Gentleman has misled the House and I hope that we can prevail upon you to persuade him to make a personal statement. The National Union of Mineworkers was not consulted about these three power stations, and the hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friends are aware of it.

Mr. Speaker: That is a point of disagreement between the two Front Benches.

Mr. Wainwright: On a point of order. In view of the very unsatisfactory nature of that reply, I give notice that I shall raise the matter on the Adjournment as soon as possible.

Derelict Land (National Coal Board)

Mr. Cormack: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry how many acres of derelict land are owned by the National Coal Board

Mr. Ridley: I am asking the Chairman of the National Coal Board to write to my hon. Friend.

Mr. Cormack: I shall await that letter with interest. Will my hon. Friend bear in mind that the areas in which most derelict sites lie have contributed significantly to the country's prosperity? I hope that in Conservation Year my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Environment will consider setting a target date for clearing such derelict sites.

Mr. Ridley: I will pass on what my hon. Friend said. The difficulty about giving him information is that much derelict land which has been made derelict by the Coal Board does not belong to the Coal Board. Also it is very difficult to distinguish what is derelict land so as to give a meaningful reply without giving a long answer.

Opencast Mining

Mr. Cormack: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry whether he will refuse permission to the National Coal Board to embark on further projects for opencast mining.

Mr. Ridley: No, Sir. Each application will be considered on its merits.

Mr. Cormack: While I appreciate the reasons behind that reply, may I ask my hon. Friend and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State to bear in mind that these areas have suffered significantly in the past, and will my hon. Friend try to make sure that where opencast permission is given, it is a case of "quick in and quick out" and that the areas despoiled are reclaimed as quickly as possible?

Mr. Ridley: The site to which my hon. Friend may be referring has been the subject, I think, of three public inquiries, and it is considered that when the work is finished it will improve the amenities in the area and reduce the amount of dereliction. However, I agree that the sooner the work can be finished, the better for all concerned.

Shipbuilding and Ship-repair Industry

Mr. Arthur Blenkinsop: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what action he proposes to take to implement the recommendations contained in the recent report on the shipbuilding and ship-repair industry.

Mr. Ridley: The Report's recommendations about the industry's structure and productivity were for action by the industry itself. Those which are for action by Government will be considered when I receive the further information from the industry suggested in the Report.

Mr. Blenkinsop: Does the hon. Gentleman not recognise the urgency of this matter? Is he not prepared to take some steps to bring the whole of it within the ambit of the Shipping Industry Board and tell us something about the future of the board?

Mr. Ridley: That matter does not arise on this Question, but I can assure the hon. Gentleman that we have pressed the association to clarify the points which I mentioned in my original Answer and are awaiting the reply. The ball is in their court.

Dame Irene Ward: Would it not be a good idea to arrange through the usual channels for us to have a special debate


on shipbuilding and shipping interests, so that we can have all the facts put before us and find out where we are going and what the industries want?

Mr. Ridley: I would welcome such a debate and I think that the usual channels, as always, listen to my hon. Friend—if, indeed, channels do listen.

Mr. Benn: If the Government decide to give support to the ship-repairing industry, could the hon. Gentleman tell the House under what powers the help will be given?

Mr. Ridley: That is a hypothetical question to which I cannot give an answer now.

Air-Sea Rescue Force

Mr. John Rankin: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he will take steps to create a modern Government-backed air-sea rescue force equipped with long-range, high-powered helicopters to replace the existing services.

Mr. Anthony Grant: Her Majesty's Coastguard and Service helicopters are already an integral part of the present air-sea rescue arrangements. Rescues which can be effected only by long-range helicopters are fortunately very rare.

Mr. Rankin: Whether or not they are very rare is surely beside the point. They happen. Will not the Minister give thought to that fact, in view of the tremendous disaster involved, which was emphasised recently in the Orkneys which caused a great deal of concern to many people? Would the hon. Gentleman have another thought about the suggestion in my Question?

Mr. Grant: I certainly take this matter very seriously indeed, as I know the hon. Gentleman does. The fact that I said that these long-range disasters were happily rare does not mean that they are not extremely important. Indeed, I pay tribute to the work done by the Royal Danish Air Force in the recent disaster to which the hon. Gentleman referred. We are considering carefully and urgently the question of helicopters and their use for this purpose, and I hope to make a statement as soon as possible.

Gas and Electricity (Price Increases)

Mr. Judd: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry on how many occasions since 24th July he has intervened to prevent proposed price increases by the gas and electricity supply industries.

Mr. John Davies: I have once invited a board to defer a proposal.

Mr. Judd: Why is it that the right hon. Gentleman has not vetoed price increases in this sphere? Does he recall the specific pledges made by his right hon. Friends on this issue of price increases in the public sector? Is he aware that many of the least affluent members of our community feel betrayed by this Government and, together with many others, regard the so-called pledges in the recent election as nothing more than cynical and despicable opportunism?

Mr. Davies: I recognise the wide spread concern that there is over the various increases in prices. I also realise the degree to which this is due to the pace of inflation at the moment. I would stress that I have no formal powers to prevent price increases.
As regards the undertakings given by this Government, it will be recalled that Mr. Macleod said in this House that we would scrutinise very closely all proposed price increases in the public sector and that these increases would be allowed only when there was a proven case for them.

Mr. Emery: Can my right hon. Friend say what proportion of these increases has been due to the very considerable increases in wages given within these industries, illustrating the wage inflationary position? Can he also say that it will be very much better if those industries are able to stand on their own feet, with a sensible pricing policy?

Mr. Davies: It is certainly true that a large part of the recent coal price increase was involved with the wage settlement. But I think it is only right to point out that in the case of gas and electricity, domestic rates have not gone up for a considerable time—for at least two-and-a-half to three years.

Milk Road Tankers

Mr. Pavitt: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he will introduce legislation to enable investment grants to be given in respect of machinery used to clean milk road tankers.

Mr. Anthony Grant: No, Sir. As stated in the White Paper on Investment Incentives published on 27th October, we shall in the remaining life of investment grants avoid, as far as possible, making changes in the policy under which they are at present being made.

Mr. Pavitt: Will the Minister reconsider that reply? Why should the beer industry be dealt with so much better than the milk industry? More people are interested in milk than in beer. Will he disregard any investments made by the brewing industry in his party and look after the milk industry for a change?

Mr. Grant: The last thing that I want to do is to pontificate on any dichotomy between beer and milk. I do not think it would be right to, so to speak, botch up a scheme, especially in the dying time of the investment grants system, but I can give the hon. Gentleman this comfort, that I understand that machinery used to clean milk road tankers will qualify for the new depreciation allowances which, subject to legislation, will apply to expenditure incurred after 26th October.

British Steel Corporation

Mrs. Sally Oppenheim: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (1) whether he will direct the British Steel Corporation to give guaranteed delivery dates for reinforcing steel;
(2) if, in view of the shortage of reinforcing steel which has caused increased imports and has affected building costs and building programme targets, he will give a direction to the British Steel Corporation to increase production.

Mr. Ridley: No, Sir. These are matters within the commercial responsibility of the British Steel Corporation.

Mrs. Oppenheim: I thank my hon. Friend for his answer. Does he realise that the refusal of the British Steel Corporation to give guaranteed delivery dates for steel reinforcing rods means that

building contractors with penalty clauses in their contracts are forced to import these rods at a greatly increased price? Can he say what tonnage of steel reinforcing rods was imported between September, 1969, and September, 1970, and what is the value of those imports?

Mr. Ridley: The policy of having cheaper steel than those prices which prevail in Europe has resulted in a tremendous drop in imports from 323,000 tons in 1968 to 87,000 tons in the first half of this year. That is what has accentuated the shortage of steel reinforcing rods and is one of the reasons why my right hon. Friend thought it would be right to allow the recent price increase.

Mr. Lipton: Will the Minister consult with the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry on whether steel production could be increased if the steel industry were denationalised?

Mr. Ridley: I should have thought that there was no doubt at all that this present shortage would not have occurred if it had not been for the political mucking-about of the Labour Party.

Mr. Allason: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what plans he has for the reorganisation of the British Steel Corporation.

Mr. Gregor Mackenzie: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he will now make a statement on his policy regarding the structure of the steel industry.

Mr. John Davies: I am not yet in a position to make an announcement.

Mr. Allason: Does my right hon. Friend consider that the Constructional Engineering Division of the British Steel Corporation is essential? What guarantee is there that it undertakes fair trading? Is not this a gigantic, large-scale, direct-labour organisation?

Mr. Davies: I should not like to anticipate the results of the very profound discussions in which I am involved with the British Steel Corporation at the moment. The aim of the discussions is to try to develop a structure for the industry which will assure it of a prosperous and satisfactory future. But the discussions are exceedingly complex. It


should not be forgotten that this is one of the largest industrial enterprises in Europe.

Mr. Michael Foot: If the right hon. Gentleman is engaged in profound and complex discussions about the future of the steel industry, would he tell the House what consultations he has had with the workers in the industry who produce the steel? Will he give a clear guarantee that before bringing to the House any proposals for changing the structure of the industry he will have consultations with the workers in the industry? Will he also confirm that the management in the industry is thoroughly opposed to what the Under-Secretary of State described a few moments ago as "mucking about" with the industry and that it is strongly in favour of the view that there should be no upheaval in the structure of the industry?

Mr. Davies: I assure the hon. Gentleman that I will, of course, have discussions with the trade unions involved before any attempt is made to finalise arrangements to the point of bringing them to the House or elsewhere. On the question of the shape and structure of the industry, it would not be correct to say that the management of the industry is of the opinion that it should be left exactly as it is.

Mr. Lawson: Will the right hon. Gentleman assure the House that whatever policies he eventually adopts will be based on facts which will be presented to the House for judgment and that he will not act on the basis of the doctrine which is so characteristic of him?

Mr. Davies: If the doctrine in question is to try to secure the prosperity and health of the industry, I assure the hon. Gentleman that I shall act on that principle.

Berkhamsted (Overflying)

Mr. Allason: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what steps he is taking to prevent the constant overflying of Berkhamsted from Luton Airport, contrary to flight instructions.

Mr. Anthony Grant: Luton Corporation, with the advice of the Department, has devised a minimum noise routeing which, when closely followed, avoids Berkhamsted. Small deviations, how

ever, can give rise to complaints and such deviations cannot be accurately monitored with current radars. Consideration is being given to the provision of a navigation beacon to assist compliance but there are technical and amenity problems to be overcome.

Mr. Allason: Is my hon. Friend aware that when complaints are made to Luton about deviation from flight paths they are treated practically with contempt? Is it not time that the Luton Airport Consultative Committee had some teeth so that the Luton Corporation might be required to take notice of complaints?

Mr. Grant: I am sorry to hear that that has been my hon. Friend's experience. I can understand his anxiety. No doubt what he says will be noticed by the authorities. However, the prescribed route which the airlines have agreed to attempt to follow in the interests of amenity involves three changes of direction in quick succession. If any change in the procedure or in routes is suggested, it is for the Luton Corporation to initiate it. I will convey what my hon. Friend said to that body.

Industrial, Technological and Scientific Research and Experiment

Mr. Molloy: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what rôle his Department will undertake in financial contribution as well as practical aid in industrial, technological, and scientific research, and experiment; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Ridley: The hon. Member will now have seen the White Paper on the re-organisation of Central Government (Cmnd. 4506) which sets out the rôle of the Department.
I shall be reviewing the various programmes, including those concerned with industrial, technological and scientific research, in the light of this.

Mr. Molloy: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that part of the policy of the former Ministry of Technology was to co-ordinate British resources and British resourcefulness and that this has been a great boon to industry, commerce and medicine as well as to defence? Therefore, will he not act too rashly in destroying something which has made a massive contribution to the recovery of British


industry and would have been of great assistance in future?

Mr. Ridley: The present Government never act rashly. We will make sure that the results of the review which we are carrying out are to the benefit of industry and of the taxpayer.

Mr. Benn: Will the hon. Gentleman publish a Green Paper, as the previous Government did, so that there can be some debate of proposals made before decisions are reached, particularly if they concern the Atomic Energy Authority?

Mr. Ridley: It is premature to consider what colour paper to publish before we have decided what our policy will be.

Caledonian/British United Airways (Transfer of Routes)

Mr. Barnes: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he will make a statement on his plans to effect the transfer of certain British Overseas Airways Corporation routes to Caledonian/British United Airways.

Mr. John Davies: I shall make a statement when I have decided which routes are to be transferred.

Mr. Barnes: Does not the Bill which the Minister has produced to effect the proposed transfer make it possible to transfer any B.O.A.C. or B.E.A. routes by order? Can the right hon. Gentleman give an assurance that the proposal to transfer £6 million worth of B.O.A.C. business to Caledonian/British United Airways will be a once-for-all transfer?

Mr. Davies: The Bill in question is of a special kind. The Government have introduced it, not because they have any doubt that they may use their powers for the purpose indicated in the statement of 3rd August, but to forestall any arguments which might delay the effective transfer of the routes. With regard to the transfer of the routes. I could not give an undertaking that never again would I take a step of this kind.

Mr. Mason: The right hon. Gentleman will agree that the Government have no legal powers to take routes from B.O.A.C. and B.E.A., especially significant transfers of this kind, and that only because B.O.A.C. and B.E.A. have

resisted the overtures from the Government for these routes have they had to produce the declaratory provisions Bill, which cannot be legal until it has passed through the House.

Mr. Davies: I have no doubt that the Government have the power and are legally within their rights to transfer the routes. I equally recognise that both corporations concerned have a responsibility to contest anything which they believe they have any chance of forestalling. It is for this reason that the legislation has been produced.

North Humberside

Mr. James Johnson: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he will now give North Humberside full development area status.

Mr. Anthony Grant: No, Sir. North Humberside was designated an intermediate area only last March, and it is too early for the incentives to industrial development to have made their full impact.

Mr. Johnson: Has the hon. Gentleman forgotten the massive case put up by the civic deputation from Hull way back in August to the Parliamentary Secretary to the then Ministry of Technology on empty office blocks and worsening unemployment figures, which are worse than those for Liverpool, which is a special development area? If he cannot do anything for us, would he say something at some time about what the Government intend to do for areas of intermediate status, about which they have said nothing?

Mr. Grant: The hon. Gentleman can rest assured that we take notice of all representations made, but he will appreciate that we have to consider the whole country. The hon. Gentleman mentioned unemployment. I know that unemployment is a problem in his area, but it is also a problem in other parts of the country, most notably Tyneside, to which reference has been made today. I must look at the whole country. It is too early to give any decision.

Concorde

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry


what were the noise levels recorded on the occasion of the visit of the Concorde aircraft to London Airport in mid September; and how many complaints were received.

Mr. John Davies: The Concorde prototype was diverted to Heathrow on 13th September because of deteriorating weather conditions. The unusual circumstances of approach on 13th September attracted 121 complaints. On take-off a noise level of 112 PNdB was registered at the monitoring point and attracted two complaints.

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Can my right hon. Friend assure the House that modifications which I believe are being incorporated in the aircraft will ensure that on the next occasion that it comes in to Heathrow the noise will be less?

Mr. Davies: I can assure my right hon. Friend that this version of the Concorde, which is the prototype version, is not equipped with the engines which it would have in normal service when clearly the intention would be to incorporate engines which conformed to the present requirements for aircraft operation.

Mr. Dalyell: Would the Secretary of State agree that the noise problems of

Concorde have been exaggerated by American-orientated interests?

Mr. Davies: There have undoubtedly been exaggerations of the noise problem of Concorde. It is a fact that this is one of the severe problems which we have to face with this aircraft, but there has been a tendency to overplay it.

Mr. Nott: Would my right hon. Friend not agree that people living around London Airport are clearly faring rather better than people in West Cornwall, in that the latter are suffering quite serious damage to their property, their cattle, and other possessions, several times a week as a result of the supersonic overflying of Concorde?

Mr. Davies: I am, of course, very conscious of the concern which people have about the test flying of Concorde. It is, on the other hand, wise to bear in mind that this is a very great project which must be proved, and while there is inconvenience, the rewards for its success are also very great.

Mr. Rankin: What fraction of all those who heard Concorde was the number of people who complained?

Mr. Davies: I am inclined to think it was infinitesimal.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA

3.34 p.m.

The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Sir Alec Douglas-Home): I beg to move,
That the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 (Continuation) Order, 1970, a draft of which was laid before this House on 27th October, be approved.
The purpose of this Order is to continue in force Section 2 of the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965. As the House is only too well aware, this Act gives Her Majesty in Council power to take whatever measures are necessary to deal with the situation in Southern Rhodesia brought about by the illegal declaration of independence on 11th November of that year.
It is a melancholy reflection that peoples who have for so many years had so much in common, as have the peoples of Britain and Southern Rhodesia, are still caught up in a dispute which is today unresolved. I will not rehearse this sad story. I have no wish to rake over the past. The unilateral declaration of independence ought never to have happened. It was an error of judgment. When it did, it was, in our view, on this side of the House, a mistake to internationalise the question. This was essentially a British problem, and it ought to have remained a problem between Britain and Southern Rhodesia. Anyhow, year by year the relationship between Britain and Rhodesia has deteriorated until in the last 12 months the Rhodesian régime have taken steps purporting formally to repudiate the Queen's sovereignty by introducing a republican constitution, and in so doing sought to sever the last remaining links with the Crown. Whatever views may be held on the Rhodesian situation there can be nobody in this House who will not regret that this should have happened, and many now in Rhodesia, although, it must be confessed, they are not articulate, are known to feel the same way.
In consequence we face a situation which is even less amenable to solution than it was when a similar Motion to this was debated last year or when the last attempts were made at a solution aboard the "Tiger" and the "Fearless".
Should we regard the rift as impossible to bridge? That it is much more difficult

to bridge than it was a year ago or when those previous talks were held there is no doubt. Apart altogether from the republican status assumed by Mr. Smith for Rhodesia, Mr. Smith's new constitution presents a much greater obstacle to agreement than did the constitution on which we were to work before, but, however long the odds against a settlement I do not believe that any new Government can simply let the matter lie where it is without a new attempt to see if a settlement is possible. The consequences of final rupture—because that is what it would be—are so serious for Rhodesia, for the Europeans and the Africans in that country, and for the future of southern Africa as a whole, that one more try should be made even though the evidence is that the chances of success are remote.
To this end I last week sent on behalf of the Government a communication of a preliminary nature to Mr. Smith, through the channel of our Ambassador in Pretoria and Mr. Smith's representative there. This is simply a first exploratory step in a process of trying to establish whether there is a realistic basis for a negotiated settlement at all within the ambit of the five principles subscribed to through the years by a majority on both sides of this House. This exploratory stage may take some time, because it is necessary that Her Majesty's Government and Mr. Smith should agree on the basis and purpose of talks before a detailed negotiation could begin. We must be sure that Mr. Smith and Her Majesty's Government are talking about the same thing.
I have told the House of the method of communication which we think it is right to use, at any rate at a start. The substance of the exchanges must be kept confidential until there are sure signs of success on the one hand or failure on the other. That is wise in any negotiation, but in a situation which is so highly charged with emotion as that of Rhodesia it is clearly essential.
If any further justification is needed for an attempt to end the folly of political separation between Britain and Rhodesia it is the distortion of the economy of that country which is taking place and the penalties of boycott which fall so hard on the African majority in Rhodesia. The penalties fall on them


first, and on them more hardly than anybody else.
Rhodesia is a country crying aloud for investment and expanding foreign trade, and if there was a settlement with Britain its huge potential would at once begin to be asserted and realised.
A successful negotiation would also bring benefits going far beyond Rhodesia itself. It would help to reduce the tensions which are poisoning relationships within Southern Africa and between Southern Africa and the countries to the north. It would be the biggest step that could be taken towards promoting the dialogue between black and white Africa and the process of constructive change which is the only way in which apartheid and racial discrimination will in the end be broken down.
Violence is an alternative preferred by some, although it is difficult to believe that people can think in that way. To give way and conclude that violence is inevitable is to despair of the future of Southern Africa. So we must proceed on the path of reconciliation. A settlement with Rhodesia would help enormously in that process.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: If we accept the right hon. Gentleman's point that a settlement on the five principles would ease the tension in Central Africa, is it not equally clear that a settlement which is not in accord with the major principle of uninterrupted progress toward majority rule is much more likely to exacerbate relationships, and that failure to achieve anything as a result of the talks is also likely to exacerbate tension in Southern Africa?

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I always give way to hon. Gentlemen if I can. I am not sure that I should have done so this time, because he has really repeated what I have said. There will not be a settlement except within the five principles. Therefore, if there is a settlement, it will be within the five principles. We had better proceed on those lines.
The Order makes it clear that in the Government's view sanctions should continue during this attempted negotiation. I am very well aware that they are costly to this country—I think that the cost to the Exchequer is about £40 million this

year—and to Rhodesia. I know the argument used that if they were lifted people in Rhodesia would be relieved of the burden of disloyalty of which they are accused when speaking against the present state of affairs. I have weighed these arguments very carefully, as anyone is bound to do, but on balance I am certain that it is best that each side should start the negotiation from the position it now holds. If we can return into legal and honourable relationships with Rhodesia, then of course sanctions could end and we could begin, and quickly, a many-sided and fruitful partnership with Rhodesia from which all would gain. It is for that that we must therefore work.

Mr. Denis Healey: First, let me say how much I agree with what the right hon. Gentleman said about sanctions continuing before and during negotiations. But would he not agree that he must also make it clear that sanctions will continue after the negotiations if the negotiations do not succeed? Otherwise, he is giving Mr. Smith an incentive to fail in order to bring sanctions to an end.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I do not think that the right hon. Gentleman is correct. I have firmly taken the view that if one is going into negotiations one must not anticipate failure; one must go into it believing that it can succeed. If the negotiation fails, then of course we must reconsider the situation and explain the position to the House and say what action the Government propose to take.
There were certain side effects of sanctions affecting people in this country which the Government felt should be ended because they were so palpably unfair. It was clearly ridiculous, for example, that surcharges should have been imposed on mail received by people in Britain from relatives in Rhodesia, with whom they could have no other contact, especially while other types of mail bearing official franks escaped this surcharge. The whole episode is well got rid of. It may have seemed a small thing, but it seemed very inhuman and unjust to those who suffered. That is why we believe that it is right to make this change, and the Post Office under its regulations was able and ready to do so. The surcharges have therefore been stopped.
We also considered urgently another of the consequences of the illegal situation in Rhodesia, which I shall mention only briefly because we shall debate it later today—the invalidity in this country of certain divorce decrees granted in Rhodesia. This has naturally caused suffering and distress to those affected, particularly to those who wish to marry again in Britain. Fortunately we can mitigate this hardship, and we shall this evening be debating the Southern Rhodesia (Matrimonial Jurisdiction) Order in which, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General will explain, we are not legalising any action taken in Rhodesia but are extending the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom courts so that they can deal with these matters. We will be ready to consider any further need for mitigation for humanitarian reasons where this can be achieved without affecting the general structure of economic sanctions.
It may be that in this debate some will argue that a further attempt to negotiate with Rhodesia is useless. It may be that some will say that we should cut out all responsibility for everything Rhodesian, and that now is the time to do it. But I ask them to recognise the prizes to all races of success and the resumption of international recognition for Rhodesia.
As I told the right hon. Gentleman, today I cannot look beyond our attempt to discover a basis for negotiation. Some will ask, as he did, what would happen if the talks failed, but I cannot enter the talks anticipating that that will happen. Should it happen, we must consider our action and report our conclusions to the House.
As a party and Government, we have given public commitments, and it is in accordance with them that I move the Order. It recognises the need to start the negotiations from the present stance adopted by Rhodesia and by the United Kingdom. This debate has enabled me to say that the first step has been taken to see whether a dispute which is widely deplored can be put behind us and partnership with Rhodesia once more restored. I hope that there will be a positive response from Mr. Smith and from the Rhodesian people.

3.50 p.m.

Mr. Denis Healey: Before taking up some of the important points made by the Foreign Secretary on the question of talks about talks, may I say how much we on this side welcome, and with what relief we welcome, the Government's decision to renew the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965, so that sanctions may continue against the illegal régime. The House will recall that the party opposite refused to support the Labour Government when they did the same in previous years. But the right hon. Gentleman was right last year, on 16th October, to warn those of his hon. Friends who planned to vote against renewal of the Act that their action
would inevitably be seen there as giving the green light to Mr. Smith to go right ahead to declare a republic and adopt his constitution, which includes separate development.
Some of his hon. Friends ignored the right hon. Gentleman's appeal. Mr. Smith did go ahead. The constitution was made law. The possibility of any successful negotiation with Salisbury on the basis of the five principles has been made infinitely more difficult, if not impossible.
The House now faces the situation predicted by the Foreign Secretary last year when he said:
If Mr. Smith's proposed constitution for Rhodesia were adopted, of course Britain could not be a party to it.
He went on to describe that constitution as one
on which a break with this country will be irreparable and formalised."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th October, 1969; Vol. 788, c. 623–6.]
Those were the words of the right hon. Gentleman who is now Foreign Secretary.
We all know that, in the last 12 months, Mr. Smith has deliberately cut his last links with Britain and with the Crown. He has decided to model his régime on the cruel and inhuman pattern established by apartheid in South Africa, and he is moving towards a situation in which 5 million British subjects will be placed under the yoke of a foreign Power in Pretoria. I hope that at some stage this afternoon a member of the Government will make clear what view they take of this development. The right hon. Gentleman has just stressed that he regards the Southern Rhodesia problem as essentially a British problem, but he will know that


it has recently been reliably reported that there are now between 3,000 and 4,000 troops and police of a foreign Power operating on British territory in Southern Rhodesia in support of a régime which is in open rebellion against the Crown.
Has the right hon. Gentleman raised this violation of British territory with the Government of South Africa? What is his view on it? Is he in favour of it? Is he indifferent to it? Or is he opposed to it? The House has a right to have an answer to these important questions, above all from the representative of a Government who regard the Southern Rhodesia problem as essentially a problem for Britain and not for anyone else.
Next, I take the case of the arrest of Mr. Benjamin Ramotse. It was established at a trial in South Africa on 28th September this year that Mr. Ramotse was arrested on the territory of our Commonwealth partner Botswana by Mr. Smith's police and was handed over on that territory to the police of the South African Government, to be brutally tortured, and, after a delay of two years, Mr. Ramotse was brought to trial and given a heavy sentence.
Despite its total dependence economically on South Africa, the Government of Botswana have had the courage to raise this matter with the South African Government in a formal note. Yet the initial offence was committed not by the South African Government but by men for whom Her Majesty's Government have responsibility and for whom the Foreign Secretary has just asserted his responsibility in the strongest and clearest terms. What protest has the right hon. Gentleman made? What support is he giving to the Government of Botswana in the inquiries which that Government are making of the South African Government at this time? I hope that we shall have some sort of comment on this before the debate is over.
I stress this sinister new development, the moving of Southern Rhodesia into the orbit of a foreign Power, because so much in the past has been made of the kith and kin argument, the fact that many of us and many Rhodesians fought together in the war, against a common enemy. I myself served with Mr. Winston Field, who later became Prime Minister of Rhodesia. But since U.D.I., all this

has been changing. In an article in the Sunday Times a fortnight ago, the noble lord, Lord Alport, said that in the last few years there had been fundamental changes not only in the policy of the white minority in Southern Rhodesia but in its very composition. In the last 10 years, over one-third of the 220,000 Europeans had emigrated—these were mainly British—and their place has been largely taken by an influx of immigrants, the majority of these, besides including some embittered emigrés from Zambia and Kenya, being mainly Afrikaaners, Portuguese, Italians and Germans.
Everybody who has studied this matter will agree that the biggest change which has taken place in Southern Rhodesia in the last 12 months is that represented by the introduction of the new republican constitution and the Land Tenure Act which accompanies it. It is no exaggeration to say that the changes wrought by these two measures are bigger than all those carried out in the previous seven years since the Rhodesia Front came to power.
The new constitution has one prime purpose, which is frankly stated in its preamble. Its purpose is to make majority rule impossible for all time. I think that I should read this preamble, for nothing will show better the obstacles facing the right hon. Gentleman if he wishes to find a way towards a negotiated settlement on the basis of the five principles. The introduction to the proposals for a new constitution published by the Rhodesian Government begins as follows:
The Government of Rhodesia believe that the present Constitution is no longer acceptable to the people of Rhodesia because it contains a number of objectionable features, the principal ones being that it provides for eventual African rule and, inevitably, the domination of one race by another"—
an ironic phrase—
and that it does not guarantee that government will be retained in responsible hands. Therefore it is proposed that there should be a new C onstitution which, while reproducing some of the provisions of the existing Constitution, will make certain major changes in order to remove these objectionable features.
What are these changes? I summarise them as follows. First, the Africans, although they have a majority of over 20 to one already, and the birth trend suggests that it will be a much larger majority as time passes, will never be given a majority of seats in the Rhodesian Parliament. The maximum they


can ever hope for is parity. But this depends on the Africans paying as much income tax as the Europeans. They have been given 16 out of 66 Parliamentary seats already, but they will have no increase in representation until they are paying 26.5 per cent. of all the income tax paid in Rhodesia, and that is 45 times as much income tax as they are paying now, and assuming that European income tax payments do not rise faster than African income tax payments.
In fact, at the present rates of relative growth, it would take the Africans 230 years to reach their existing quota of seats, and 500 years to achieve parity with the Europeans; and they can never be allowed more than parity under the constitution, the clauses of which, incidentally, are heavily entrenched. Secondly, the Government are able to adjust income tax rates in favour of indirect taxation to prevent this ever happening at all. Indeed, they have already changed the basis of taxation so that a great deal more falls on indirect taxation than on income tax.
Thirdly, to ensure that parity never comes about, they are now increasingly attempting to tribalise the Africans. They are adopting a policy of separate development, or apartheid. Under the Land Tenure Act they are dividing the country equally between whites and Africans. The good land is going overwhelmingly to the whites. A large part of the African land is being taken from them immediately as national parks. This Land Tenure Act allows individual ownership to Africans of only about 4 per cent. of the total land in Southern Rhodesia, whereas the Europeans have the right to own about 40 per cent. individually of the land in Rhodesia.
When we add to this the fact that the European child has 10 times as much money spent on his education as the African child, and that under the system of job reservation it is very difficult for the handful of African graduates ever to take fit employment in Southern Rhodesia at all, it can be argued that the new Southern Rhodesian constitution is well to the right of that in South Africa at present.
Certainly the right hon. Gentleman was not exaggerating when he told the House last October:
I do not have to go into details of Mr. Smith's income tax regulations or educational

policy to make the point. If the constitution goes through Mr. Smith's Parliament …
as it has gone through—
… he will introduce two rolls—one can and one European, with no common roll—and that, as far as we know from the constitution, in perpetuity.
The right hon. Gentleman was correct.
Therefore, there is no question that our Parliament or anyone in this country could be a partner in such an enterprise."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th October, 1969; Vol. 788, c. 623.]

Mr. Hugh Jenkins: Does not the lamentable tale told to the House lend colour to the view that these negotiations should be launched for the purpose of breaking off sanctions? Will my right hon. Friend seek from the Government side something which we on the back benches may not be able to elucidate, and that is an absolute assurance that it is not their intention to enter into these negotiations solely for the purpose of finishing sanctions—successful or unsuccessful?

Mr. Healey: My hon. Friend's natural impatience encourages me to anticipate the winding up section of my speech, but I can assure my hon. Friend that I will not sit down without making this point.
It must be clear—I know it is clear to the Foreign Secretary—that in this situation the prospects of a basis being found for negotiation are almost nonexistent.

Mr. Patrick Cormack: Would the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Healey: With respect, may I get on a little. I will give way later on. I want to allow plenty of time for back bench opinion, particularly on the Government side, to express itself.
I would not blame a new Government, particularly a Government who have pledged themselves to do such a thing, seeking to find whether there is a basis for some discussion within the limits of the five principles. But I hope that the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues on the Front Bench at any rate will agree with me that, even though the failure of such talks is certain, they could gravely damage Britain's image at the United Nations and in the Commonwealth unless it was quite clear they were


taking place within the framework of the five principles, for which the Foreign Secretary himself was, as we all know, responsible.
I make this point in spite of what the right hon. Gentleman said when he opened the debate, because he will know that on 28th October Mr. Smith said that Britain will have to climb down further than Rhodesia in order to secure a settlement. Mr. Smith went on to say:
Rhodesians are under no obligation to accept Britain's five principles and have only one principle for a settlement—that it should be in Rhodesia's interests.
What echoes that remark awakens in us. I am sure we have heard it before, and in another context. But plastic Napoleons talk very much the same all over the world.

Mr. Cormack: As the right hon. Gentleman has said that he believes that my right hon. Friend has spoken in absolute sincerity and good faith, may I ask whether he really considers that his speech is being helpful, when we must assume for our part on this side of the House that he would like to see a just solution to this wretched problem? Does he consider that to go over all this ground again is being helpful to Her Majesty's Government?

Mr. Healey: I would not have made the remarks I have unless I thought that these points were not only helpful but vital to be made at a moment when the British Government are seeking to open negotiations with the Smith régime for a settlement within the framework of the five principles. With great respect to hon. Gentlemen, particularly on the back benches on the Government side, before they cheer too heartily at the prospective opening of talks about talks, they must familiarise themselves with what has happened in Southern Rhodesia in the last 12 months—the new, and, in the view of the Foreign Secretary himself a year ago, insuperable, obstacles which they have raised to any agreement on the basis of the five principles.
The question we must ask ourselves is why, in this situation, is Mr. Smith apparently willing at least to talk about talks. I am sure the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary was right in suggesting that the main reason is that sanc

tions are now beginning to bite seriously. [interruption.] Before hon. Members on the Government back benches sneer, let them recall what the Foreign Secretary said in his opening remarks—that the Southern Rhodesian economy has been seriously distorted and not for the better, by sanctions. Real inconvenience is being caused; and above all, the growth rate in Southern Rhodesia is well below what is needed to meet the population increase. There is now a severe shortage of foreign exchange. Foreign investment in critical areas is now declining. A recent shortage of ammonia, due to a European Government preventing an attempt to break sanctions, is now hitting agriculture throughout the territory. There is a severe shortage of rolling stock.
I am not suggesting, nor have I ever suggested, that the impact of sanctions, given the leak through South Africa, is ever likely in itself to produce a settlement. But I said last year—the right hon. Gentleman did me the kindness of quoting what I said—that they are an absolutely indispensable element in producing a situation in which the position can be changed for the better. Indeed, I was interested to notice that the diplomatic staff of the Daily Telegraph—who act as a transmission belt between the Foreign Secretary and the Tory masses—said the other day:
Observers believe that economic troubles are likely to induce Mr. Smith to give a more favourable reception to the new approach planned by Mr. Heath's Government.
Mr. Douglas Brown, writing in the Sunday Telegraph, added weight to this opinion.
It may be so, but certainly nothing but the prospect of the maintenance of economic sanctions is likely to produce any change in the attitude of the Smith government. That is why sanctions are so important to anybody who hopes for a negotiated settlement, and above all, to those who hope for a negotiated settlement. Therefore it is vital not only to keep sanctions on before and throughout negotiations—as I understand it, the Foreign Secretary undertook that he would keep sanctions on before and throughout the negotiations—but if the negotiations are to have any chance of success, he must make it clear now that sanctions will continue after the negotiations if the negotiations are not successful.
The right hon. Gentleman has great experience in international negotiations. He knows as well as anyone in this House, and certainly as well as any trade unionist on this side of the House, that it is the knowledge of what will happen if negotiations fail which is always the main weapon in negotiations. A clear pledge is needed from the Government on this now, if they are really seeking success. As I understood it, that is what the right hon. Gentleman said when he spoke to the Conservative Party conference at Blackpool a month ago. He said:
When I was last in Salisbury, Mr. Smith and I both thought that the right way to handle the matter of sanctions was at the end of a successful negotiation, not before"—
not before the end of a successful negotiation. He went on to say:
The leader of the party, the Prime Minister, and I, have also stated publicly before the election, at the election and since the election that we will not lift sanctions pending a renewed negotiation.
All that I ask the right hon. Gentleman to do is to say "pending a renewed successful negotiation", to make clear what he implied in his speech to the Conservative Party conference at Blackpool last year. If he gives any hint that sanctions may go after the negotiations fail, he is giving Mr. Smith the clearest conceivable incentive to aim at failure in the negotiations, because it is sanctions and only sanctions which have led Mr. Smith as close to the negotiating table as he may be at this moment.
All of us on this side of the House support the Government in renewing the Southern Rhodesia Act. Certainly we support the maintenance of sanctions. We also support the determination not to reach a settlement except within the basis of the five principles. It is nice, for once, to have the chance of a bipartisan policy with right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite on an important matter of African affairs. But I cannot help suspecting that we are supporting the right hon. Gentleman rather as a second supports a boxer between rounds. I hope very much that he will stick to the position that he put clearly at the beginning of the debate: no settlement except within the basis of the five principles. I ask him to accept the logic of the argument that he has no chance of a settlement unless he makes it clear that sanctions will continue after

negotiations unless a settlement is reached. I hope, too, that we shall have in the course of this debate answers to the questions that I have raised, including those that I raised on the South African intervention in the affairs of a British territory.

Mr. Arthur Lewis: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I think that you will agree that this is a genuine point of order. It has been reported by the Reverend Michael Scott that there are some 74 hon. Members who have a direct or indirect vested interest in the whole South African question, including the Southern Rhodesian question. It is the usual custom and practice for an hon. Member to declare any interest when he addresses the House. That has not been done so frequently in the past. There are many cases where the interest is only indirect and may not have a bearing on the point at issue. The question that we are debating today has a vital bearing upon those hon. Members who may have shares, shareholdings or directorships in South African companies. I would ask you to rule that if any hon. Member, speaking from either side of the House, has such interests, he should declare them, so that hon. Members generally know to what extent any hon. Member addressing the House has a vested interest in the matter that we are debating.

Mr. Speaker: Order. Hon. Members declare an interest in matters in which they have personal interest. But hon. Members may have a personal interest in some questions if it is shared by other hon. Members and is a matter of general policy.
May I remind the House that many right hon. and hon. Members wish to speak? Reasonably brief speeches will help.

Mr. Norman Buchan: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. I was rather confused by your Ruling. The personal interest referred to by my hon. Friend the Member for West Ham, North (Mr. Arthur Lewis) was not the kind of interest of view shared by others, but direct financial interest, which my hon. Friend linked both with Southern Rhodesia and the whole of Southern Africa. That is the point that my hon. Friend asked to have brought home to the minds of hon. Members opposite who may wish to speak in the debate.

Mr. Speaker: I thought that I ruled clearly. Hon. Members may have a financial interest in some questions being debated in the House. If they share that interest with another group of British citizens, including groups of hon. Members and it is a matter of general policy, there is nothing illegitimate about that.

4.16 p.m.

Mr. Sandys: In deference to your wishes, Mr. Speaker, I will be very brief. My views on Rhodesia are already fairly well known to this House. No one has more strongly denounced the futility of sanctions than I have.
The right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) spoke about the problem of negotiating a settlement with Rhodesia. Most people would agree that the negotiations with the Smith Government conducted by the late Labour Administration were hopelessly mishandled.
If the then Prime Minister, when he went to Salisbury before U.D.I., had offered Mr. Smith the precise terms which he offered him a few years later on board H.M.S. "Fearless", there is no doubt that Mr. Smith would have accepted them with alacrity, and the independence of Rhodesia would have been achieved in an orderly legal fashion in accordance with terms which apparently were subsequently acceptable to the Labour Government.
Sanctions had the exact effect that some of us predicted again and again in this House. They consolidated European opinion in Rhodesia behind the most extreme elements in Mr. Smith's party. They made Rhodesia more and more dependent upon South Africa. It is no good the right hon. Gentleman complaining about it now. It is the policy of his Government which produced that result. Not only has it made Rhodesians increasingly dependent economically upon South Africa. It has driven them more and more into adopting South African racial policies.
The right hon. Gentleman is right when he says that sanctions have bitten. Of course they have. It is inconceivable that they would have no effect. But, as my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary pointed out, while all have suffered, those who have been most hurt are the African population for whose benefit the sanctions were introduced.
In addition to all this, we have gravely damaged our relations with one of our oldest friends, Portugal. We have also thrown away valuable markets in Rhodesia. These have been taken over by other countries, which have perhaps imposed sanctions less strictly. I refer to such countries as France, Germany and Japan. They have replaced us in markets which were important to us, many of which we shall not be able to regain.
My right hon. Friend said today that he was trying to negotiate an honourable settlement with Mr. Smith's Government; and he asked us, in the interval, to accept the continuance of sanctions for a little while longer.
I am extremely impatient to see the end of this tragic dispute and to see the restoration of normal friendly relations with Rhodesia. But since I am quite sure that my right hon. Friend feels exactly the same, and as I have complete confidence in him and in his judgment, I have decided, with considerable reluctance not to oppose this Order and, if necessary, to vote for it.

4.20 p.m.

Mr. Michael Stewart: The right hon. Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) has announced his intention to support the Government on this Order and, if necessary to vote for it. But I wonder whether his reason for doing so is exactly welcome to the Government. The right hon. Gentleman said that he would give his support because he believed that the Foreign Secretary and his colleagues think about the matter in the same way as himself. What is the right hon. Gentleman's way of thinking about it; that he is prepared to put un with sanctions a little longer.

Mr. Sandys: I said that I am impatient to see an end to this tragic dispute and to see a settlement reached which will restore friendly and normal relations with Rhodesia. I said that I believed that those were also the hopes and wishes of my right hon. Friend. If the right hon. Gentleman will look in HANSARD tomorrow he will see that that is precisely what I said.

Mr. Stewart: I am not disputing that and I am not misrepresenting the right hon. Gentleman. He also said that he was getting impatient.
What we really need to know is what the attitude of the Government will be in the end. Will it be that put forward in good faith by the Foreign Secretary, or will it be the attitude that we have just heard expressed, namely, "Let us go through the motions and then have a flimsy excuse for getting rid of sanctions"?
The right hon. Gentleman spoke of—

Mr. Sandys: rose—

Mr. Stewart: I will not give way again.

Mr. Sandys: I said nothing of the kind. The right hon. Gentleman is putting words into my mouth.

Mr. Stewart: The right hon. Gentleman talked about ending this tragic dispute. But it is clear that it can be ended in only one way: by the acceptance of a settlement based on the five principles. That was not clear from the right hon. Gentleman's speech. This is not a dispute simply between Britain and the régime in Rhodesia. The black population, the great majority of the Rhodesian people, is also a party to this dispute. Indeed, in view of the vital nature of racial questions today, all Africa and all mankind are parties to this dispute
This is why I could not agree with the Foreign Secretary when he said that he thought the last Government were wrong to internationalise the matter. By its nature, it had to be a matter of international concern. What else would any British Government have done? Would right hon. Gentlemen opposite have tried to crush the rebellion by force; would they have gone into negotiations without any sanctions or threat of sanctions of any kind; or would they—the greatest absurdity of all—have tried some economic measures against the régime single-handed without the co-operation with the rest of the world?
Accepting the necessity to engage in any kind of measure against the rebellious régime, it was essential to make it an international matter. The fact that we have this Order before us shows that the Government have grasped that point. Any objection to the Order would be an acceptance of all that the Smith régime stands for, and what it stands for was graphically described by my right hon.

Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey).
This is no longer a régime which argues that it is in some way the trustee of an ignorant, unsophisticated population which will in time be advanced to full rights. It is now a régime—in my judgment, it always has been—which rests on the doctrine of the permanent inferiority of one race to the other.
The Government say that they will endeavour to resume talks with Mr. Smith. The danger here is that that will simply encourage the rebel régime to think that it has only to go through a certain amount of procedure and sanctions will be called off. However, I accept what was said by my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East that, with a new Government coming in, if they are determined, they must have a go.
I want to take up and emphasise what my right hon. Friend said about the Government's attitude to sanctions if the negotiations fail. The plain question put was: if these negotiations fail, is it the Government's resolve to continue with sanctions until a settlement based on the five principles is reached?
The Foreign Secretary said that he would not answer that question because it was a mistake to enter negotiations contemplating that they might fail. But which is worse: to enter into negotiations contemplating that they might fail, or to enter into negotiations in a posture which well-nigh ensures that they will fail? That is what the Government will do if they do not make it quite clear that sanctions will not be removed if the negotiations fail; they will, in the Foreign Secretary's phrase in an earlier debate which was quoted by my right hon. Friend, be removed at the end of a successful negotiation.
At any rate, sanctions are to be retained for the present. I would not ask the Government to do anything about sanctions that their predecessors were not prepared to do. But retaining sanctions is not simply saying. "We are retaining them; we are not going through a formal procedure of calling them off." They have to be continuously and energetically maintained. The policy and practice of the Labour Government was to maintain as careful supervision as they could over sanctions-breaking into Rhodesia and


to take up cases of sanctions-breaking, first, with the country concerned, and, secondly, if necessary, with the United Nations. Are the Government prepared to do that? Does their retention of sanctions mean a genuine and energetic determination so that, as far as possible, they are enforced?
There are serious leaks—not only through Portugal and South Africa. In my view, the time was probably ripe for an attempt to give this question further publicity in the United Nations and, if possible, to intensify the enforcement of sanctions. But merely to say, "We will retain them", without any resolve to try to intensify their enforcement would be a meaningless gesture.

Mr. John Farr: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Labour Government's policy was a hopeless failure, because all the shops were well stocked with manufactured goods a year or two ago? The only difference from three or four years before is that, instead of being British goods, they were Swiss, French or Japanese.

Mr. Stewart: I will come to the effecttiveness of sanctions in a few moments.
So far the Government have given one rather disquieting side of their enthusiasm to maintain sanctions; namely, their action about stamps. This is in a totally different category from their action about marriages. Their action about marriages, rightly, as we have been told, does nothing to legalise any action by the rebel régime. The question of the stamps is an admission that an attempt by the Smith régime to usurp one of the best known and most visible signs of sovereignty, the Queen's head on a stamp, is something that the Government are prepared to accept. It seems to me that one use which people in this country might make of the fact that they have correspondents in Rhodesia is to urge them to return to their allegiance to the Crown and, what is even more important, to return to their duty to mankind.
The hon. Member for Harborough (Mr. Farr) raised the question of the effectiveness of sanctions. I know the considerable evidence that can be quoted about serious leaks, but there is one impressive piece of evidence which comes from the Smith régime itself. It is an offence

punishable by heavy fines and imprisonment under Mr. Smith's régime to publish facts about the country's economy which the régime considers damaging; not to publish facts that are untrue, but to publish facts that the régime does not want to have published.
If sanctions are as ineffective as claimed, why this heavy penal legislation? It is an interesting example of the fact that if a white man begins by tyrannising over blacks, in the end he is driven into a position where he has to tyrannise over his fellow whites as well, and this was strikingly brought out in an article, which I expect many hon. Members read, in one of the Sunday newspapers.
I spoke just now about the efficacy of sanctions and, above all, about the justification of them in view of this country's position in the world. Unless they are continued until in the end a just settlement, in the full implication of that word, is achieved, and unless this country makes it quite clear that it desires them to be continued, and will make its best efforts to see that they are observed not only by us but by others, we shall signal to the whole world that in effect we are approving what the Smith régime is doing. The results of that will be far more serious than the £40 million of our economy every year that sanctions now cost. They will be far more serious than any of the other difficulties that arise from this admittedly harsh and intractible problem, because this is one of the questions on which the future of mankind hangs.
To our Government I say, not only maintain, but persist and intensify, and to the régime in Rhodesia the only thing that one can say is the comment once made by Thomas Jefferson about the institution of slavery in the State of Virginia:
I tremble for my country when
I remember that God is just.

4.33 p.m.

Mr. R. H. Turton: I welcome the announcement of preliminary steps towards negotiation made by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary. I think that they will be very difficult, and that the difficulties have been added to by the speeches of the right hon. Members for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) and Fulham (Mr. Michael


Stewart). After all, they are the guilty men who have been responsible for driving the Rhodesians towards South Africa, and they are the greatest friends of the extreme right wing in Rhodesia as a result.
Where I differ from my right hon. Friend is on the question whether we should continue sanctions while we negotiate. On 15th July, 1968, my right hon. Friend said:
In our opinion"—
he was talking about the action which the then Government proposed to take in response to mandatory sanctions—
they add up to a complete boycott of investment, trade and contacts between people. Therefore, it is idle to pretend that they are not designed to force a political settlement by breaking the Rhodesian economy. It is to that aspect of sanctions that we on this side of the House have consistently objected, and therefore we shall vote against this Order …"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 15th July, 1968; Vol. 768, c. 1177–8.]
I regard sanctions as irrelevant to a settlement.
Equally, I regard sanctions as a matter of conscience. I believe that it is un-Christian and counter-productive for one nation to set a complete boycott on another nation. What are we trying to do? Nobody believes at the moment that we can bring Rhodesia back to dominion status. The right hon. Member for Leeds, East talked rather like some colonial despot, as if he could bring Rhodesia back by objecting to what they were doing. That is past. The mismanagement by the Socialist Government over the last few years has made it impossible to bring Rhodesia back into the Commonwealth. That again is inescapable.
All that we can achieve if, as I hope, we can get an agreement within the five principles is that we can be friends again and that we can help each other towards those ideals in which, in the past, the leaders of Rhodesia, men like Sir Roy Welensky, believed: further, that we can do as we did with America. It took nine years for Britain to recognise the North American colonies. This process of squabble under the previous Socialist Government has now lasted for five years. Are we to wait another four years before we take the sensible step of recognising Rhodesia?
Let us see what we ought to be doing. If we believe in a multi-racial society, surely we ought to be trying to press Rhodesia forward to that by our own policy? I suggest to my right hon. Friend that there are four lines of policy that it is our duty as Britain, with a worldwide responsibility, and being a Christian nation, to take in her approach to Rhodesia.
First, we should admit that many mistakes have been made by us and by them in the past. Second, if we are to get sufficient Africans in a position to be given responsibility we should aid Rhodesia with a crash programme of secondary education. At the moment, under the present régime primary education in Rhodesia is far ahead of primary education in any other part of Africa, but secondary education is lagging behind, and therefore Britain should say that she will make sacrifices to see that secondary education amongst the Africans is speeded up.
Third, we must recognise that unless there are opportunities for the educated Africans such a crash programme would add to their disappointment. We must therefore undertake to aid co-operative farming schemes among Africans, and that type of industrial development, which will provide opportunities for a number of educated Africans, Fourth, and this is perhaps the most important of all, I believe that what restricts a good deal the ability of the Africans to take responsibility is ill-health. At the moment about 75 per cent. of the African population in Rhodesia suffer from bilharzia. The medical and pharmaceutical professions in Britain have made such advances that that disease could be eradicated if we were to send out a team of doctors with the necessary drugs to tackle the problem there.
If our negotiating team started on those lines, showing how we could help Rhodesia to go forward to a new constitution under the five principles, and really become, as it was planned to be in the days of Federation, a multi-racial society, I believe that that would be far more likely to succeed than any continuance of a sanctions policy. I believe that it would be a more Christian policy than giving financial assistance to those who are trying to subvert the economy in various parts of the world.

4.51 p.m.

Mr. Frank Judd: No one would question the sincerity of the right hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton). With the personal integrity that one has to come to respect from him, he has advanced with great sincerity an argument genuinely held by a number of people not only here but elsewhere—that one way of securing emancipation and progress in Southern Africa is to encourage the economic and social development of Southern Africa as rapidly as possible, thereby drawing into the economic and social system a growing number of Africans who will begin to take their rightful place within society.
Unfortunately, there is no evidence that this policy achieves its objective. In South Africa itself during the past 10 years, we have certainly seen economic growth. It can be argued that there are, in total, a larger number of Africans in the urban areas of South Africa now than there were at the beginning of the decade, but in terms of the proportionate increase in the size of the total African population of South Africa, there is now a smaller proportion of the African population in the more sophisticated urban areas, the more economically developed areas of South Africa, than there was at the beginning of the decade.
What is also unfortunately true is that, during this decade, although there may have been an increase in the numbers of Africans participating in the more developed economic activity of South Africa, at the same time there is every sort of evidence of the strengthening grip of apartheid and the police state during the same period. Therefore, while I respect the sincerity of the argument of the right hon. Gentleman, I am afraid that there is no evidence that any hon. Member can rely on that this argument achieves the emancipation of the African.
The operation of sanctions to date shows that they have inhibited the growth of the Rhodesian economy, have led to inflation and have put great difficulties upon the tobacco farmers, that Rhodesian Railways are encountering increased technical problems in operating efficiency, and that the country has tremendous problems in trying to secure the foreign exchange it needs to maintain its economic activity.
While all this is true, it is obviously also true that sanctions have not brought

the régime to its knees. If we are to examine this situation today, it is terribly important that we should analyse why sanctions, internationally applied, have failed. If the international community, having embarked on a policy of economic sanctions against this unrepresentative régime, representing less than a quarter of a million people, less than a twentieth of the total population, fails to succeed through that policy, the lesson for the international community is grim indeed.
What chance has the international community, operating at the United Nations or elsewhere, of succeeding in enforcing collective international opinion where it believes that there is an injustice which must be answered, with anything short of force in future? This is a very grim lesson. It probably means that there is no prospect for effective international sanctions in future if we cannot succeed in this test case of Rhodesia.
On analysis, it is clear that the principal reason for the failure of sanctions lies directly at the feet of the Government of Portugal and South Africa. Both these significant nations, in the context of Southern Africa, have deliberately determined, as an act of priority in their foreign policy, to undermine the will of the international community in its sanctions policy.
If we accept this—no one can really dispute it—it surely brings home to us the impossibility of trying to reach our objectives over Rhodesia in isolation. It might have been possible once to approach the crisis of Rhodesia in isolation, but the situation has now qualitatively changed, and the political, economic, strategic and military position of Rhodesia is inextricably involved now in the economic, political and strategic position of the Portuguese territories and South Africa itself.
If we accept this—few would want to dispute it—both sides of the House must then accept the illogicality of trying to achieve our objective in Rhodesia at the same time as encouraging increased economic involvement in the republic of South Africa, let alone considering the possibility of resuming arms sales to the Republic, the illogicality of trying to achieve our objective in Rhodesia while failing to bring pressure on Portugal or to register our concern that Portugal,


as a N.A.T.O. partner, theoretically defending freedom, is indulging in cruelly repressive wars of colonial repression in her territories in Africa. We must accept the illogicality of trying to achieve our objective in Rhodesia while hesitating to condemn forthrightly and completely, as my right hon. Friend said, the presence of South African security forces within Rhodesia.
The Foreign Secretary, in a former capacity as Prime Minister, in one of his first speeches, made a very fine and statesmanlike contribution, I thought, to considering the world situation and facing the realities with which we are confronted. I hope that I am quoting him accurately—he will correct me if I am wrong when I say that, in that early speech, he said:
I believe that the greatest danger ahead of us in the world today is that the world might be divided on racial lines. I see no other danger, not even the nuclear bomb, which would be so catastrophic as that"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th November, 1963; Vol. 684, c. 52.]
Surely, to anyone looking at the Southern African situation at the moment, it is clear that this confrontation between the races is unfortunately and sadly increasing there. It is also true that there is tremendous sophisticated, military and police power at the disposal of the white minority, and that the majority of Africans in this situation have extreme difficulty in ever hoping to oppose effectively the power of the minority.
At a time when we hear a great deal of concern expressed about the Communist threat in the Indian Ocean area, surely we should accept that failure to identify beyond doubt with the legitimate struggle of a majority of the people of Southern Africa for their basic freedoms, for the principle of majority rule, is to play into the hands of the Communists in Africa, with God knows what prospects for the future of world stability.
It has been suggested that it is possible to identify clearly with that majority in their legitimate struggle within the context of the five principles. Some of my hon. Friends will endorse this point, but I wish to make it plain that, although we may feel sad about it, there are people who doubt the possibility of this because it is necessary to re-examine the five principles to see some of their implications.
It is the intention that there should be unimpeded progress to majority rule, as enshrined in the 1961 constitution, and this would have to be maintained and guaranteed. There would have to be an immediate improvement in the political status of the African population and there would have to be guarantees against retrospective amendment of the constitution. Her Majesty's Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.
Let us consider, first, the issue of guarantees. Would any hon. Member honestly and sincerely argue that it would be possible to have the sort of cast iron guarantees necessary against going back on the principles of any settlement without infringing the sovereignty of Rhodesia? I believe that once Rhodesia was independent, it would be in a position to repeat what we have already seen done in the history of the Republic of South Africa, and that is the complete and cynical throwing aside of any principles enshrined in any settlement. I find precious little evidence in the record of Ian Smith and his illegal régime to suggest that we could have any ground for trusting them to fulfil the terms of any agreement beyond the time of that agreement being initialled and signed.
The right hon. Gentleman sounded courageous when he said that it would be wrong to go into negotiations anticipating failure. I ally myself completely with those who argue that the basis of any sensible negotiations must be that the people with whom one is negotiating realise that one has thought the matter through sufficiently well to know what one will do if the negotiations do not work out. If we say that we are not anticipating failure then, whether or not we intend it, that statement will be interpreted by millions of people throughout the African Continent to mean that we are putting a premium on coming to terms, on any face-saving basis possible, with the illegal régime. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] In an already delicate situation between this country and the majority of the people of the African Continent, this is a most unsatisfactory state of affairs.
The right hon. Gentleman's words about sanctions contained a certain


ambiguity. My hon. Friends have already suggested that Ian Smith might feel that he would have nothing whatever to lose by standing out, because even if the negotiations were to fail, we would set about dismantling our sanctions policy. Considering the right hon. Gentleman's words, one must accept that that will be felt in the African Continent. We should, therefore, contemplate what would be the logical result of dismantling sanctions. The results can be spelt out in a few words and no doubt hon. Gentlemen opposite have thought them out just as I have.
First, we would immediately begin to get increasingly involved economically in the life of Rhodesia. Second, we would begin to get, as a result of that, an increased vested interest in an economic and social system which is based on exploitation, repression and police state methods. Third, this increased economic involvement would lead to increased pressure for recognition, and I suspect that that recognition would be difficult to resist. Fourth, we would then have taken one further step towards being identified with an unrepresentative, repressive white minority in the South African Continent. There is no reason, therefore, why we should hesitate to make it plain at this stage that unless we can get a satisfactory settlement—and I have expressed my doubts about that—we would continue our sanctions policy without hesitation.
The right hon. Gentleman referred—I respect his view but I wish to examine it more closely—with some horror, and I believe it was genuine horror, to the increased emphasis now being placed by some people on violence as the only means of solving the situation in Southern Africa.
I put it to him that some people in this country who find themselves unable to dissociate themselves from supporting the freedom fighters recoil from the concept of violence every bit as much as the right hon. Gentleman does. However, we must analyse what violence is.
Looking at the situation in Southern Africa, some people analysing what has happened in the last 10 years might say that in respect of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, the Administration in South-West Africa and the illegal régime which we are discussing in

Rhodesia, the fundamentally important point about them all is the violence which they themselves epitomise.
We are speaking of systems which enable people to be imprisoned without proper trial, which enable torture to take place and which enable invasion by the Administration of principles of free education as we understand them here. I will repeat a story which I heard the other day. I promise to give only this one example to bring home the point I am making. It concerns an otherwise peaceful Rhodesian who had been involved for some time, together with other Rhodesians, in undertaking some political organisational work which would have been thought fairly harmless in our free political society in Britain.
He was arranging meetings at which Mr. Nkomo was to speak. Because of his involvement in arranging these matters on a number of occasions, it was decided by the authorities that his activities were no longer acceptable. The police arrived at his home one day while his wife was out shopping. He lived some distance from the town. The police informed him that they were taking him into custody, and he asked whether it would be possible to wait until his wife returned because he had young children in the house. He was told that that would be impossible.
At that point the police openly drew their revolvers because they were afraid that he might resist arrest—I wish to be fair in relating this story. In the end, to cut a rather painful long story short, he was driven off by the police in a car, while his wife was still in town shopping, away from his home to the police station. He had to leave his young children, one aged 4, behind, sitting weeping on the garden path. There they sat as their father disappeared in police custody.
In this situation, where is the violence? Some of us have sadly come to the conclusion that faced with this sort of powerful repression—as we have watched courageous attempts for the last 20 years, attempts in non-violent terms perhaps unrivalled in human history; attempts at peaceful resistance by the majority of the people of Southern Africa—it is now not for us to condemn them if they feel that they have no alternative but to turn to less pleasant, indeed more violent, attempts.
Many of them now feel that they must go against what have been their own deeply held philosophical convictions. While it would have been extremely wrong for anyone in the comfort of this House or this country to take the initiative in encouraging the people of Southern Africa to take this form of action, just as it would have been wicked to encourage the freedom fighters in Czechoslovakia a couple of years ago or the people of Hungary in 1956, once the people involved, having tried every other technique at their disposal, have come to the conclusion that they have no alternative, it is a very real moral predicament for us in this country, and in the West generally, to decide what our reaction should be.
In this situation I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that if people on the spot decide that this is the only way in which they can defend their cause, we must be prepared to identify with that struggle. I cannot say how sad I am—

Mr. John Biffen: The hon. Gentleman makes a fairly important point when he advocates identification with the guerrilla fighters in Southern Africa. Would he spell out what that means in terms of a policy he would recommend to this Government or any alternative United Kingdom Government?

Mr. Judd: Yes, and without hesitation. We should follow the example of the Government of Sweden who have decided that they are prepared to supply medical equipment and educational equipment to the liberated areas of the Portuguese territories, and to support the rudimentary administrations there. It starts by realising that we cannot out of hand condemn the people who have taken this course of violence, but must be prepared to explain to the British public why they see no alternative in the present situation.

Mr. Ronald Bell: Would the hon. Gentleman apply his line of reasoning to causes with which he disagrees as well as to causes with which he plainly agrees?

Mr. Judd: In debate we have to be specific. We are dealing with a situation in Southern Africa in which the overwhelming majority of the people there are denied a peaceful road to the achievement of their legitimate goals—

Mr. Biffen: rose—

Mr. Charles Pannell: Oh, no.

Mr. Biffen: With respect to the right hon. Member for Leeds, West (Mr. C. Pannell), this is an important matter. On the specific point concerning Southern Africa, would the hon. Gentleman himself advocate, and advocate the Government's advocating, the supply of arms to the guerrillas?

Mr. Judd: At this stage I would not advocate that, but I believe that we have a moral responsibility to look to the civil needs of the people involved in the struggle. In the same way I am not advocating—I am completely and fundamentally opposed to—the supply of arms to the Republic of South Africa, because I see this essentially as a civil war, but I accept that just as we should not be prepared to deny medical and educational equipment to South Africa, so I do not see why we should not at this stage provide educational equipment, medical equipment—[HON. MEMBERS: "Money?"] I would be prepared for these needs to supply money at this stage to the forces fighting.
In this situation there is one other point we must all accept, and I ask hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite to understand that there has been a good deal of honest heart-searching on the part of many of us on this side before coming to this conclusion. If we have reluctantly come to the conclusion that we must be prepared to understand, interpret and, where necessary, identify with the legitimate struggle of the majority in the predicament in which they find themselves, it means that we must continue with all the resolve at our disposal to bring to bear on the unrepresentative minority régimes the external pressures that are necessary as a possible alternative means of solving the problem. If we on this side believe this, and if we see the picture in this perspective, it is even more incumbent on hon. and right hon. Members opposite to do everything possible at their disposal to bring to bear those external pressures.

5.5 p.m.

Sir Derek Walker-Smith: I followed the first part of the speech of the hon. Member for Portsmouth, West (Mr. Judd) with attention


and interest, because although I was not in agreement with all that he said—I did not expect to be—I felt that the disagreement fell within the normal range of Parliamentary difference. In the last part of his speech I felt that the hon. Gentleman fell sadly below his earlier standard. I greatly regret that he has seen fit to utter, in the very cradle of parliamentary democracy words, which will be widely interpreted as an incentive to violence and sympathy with terrorism. I believe that that part of his speech will be keenly resented and widely and extensively repudiated by the sense and sentiment of the House.
I do not intend to follow the hon. Gentleman further into these matters, but propose instead for a moment to do something which, perhaps strangely, has so far been absent from the debate. I propose to refer to the terms of the Section which this Order proposes to continue. The terms of the Section fall into two categories; the economic category, which has figured in the debate, and the constitutional category to which little reference has so far been made.
The fact is that paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 2(2) of the Act of 1965 make it possible for Orders in Council to make constitutional arrangements for Southern Rhodesia. My right hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton), in an admirable speech, referred to dominion status, but it is not, of course, dominion status that is contemplated. It is colonial status which figures in the Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Order of 1965, which I imagine right hon. Gentlemen opposite are only too anxious to forget.
The powers that we are being asked to continue are wholly academic. Successive Prime Ministers having provided, in Sir Winston's phrase, for the dissolution of the British Empire, we have dismantled the apparatus of empire. The inhibitions on colonial government are even greater and more compelling than those described by Burke in the 1780s in the context of American Independence: what he called
.. the immutable condition and eternal law of extensive and detached empire.
The inhibitions that Burke had in mind, of course, were those of time and distance:
Months pass and seas roll between the order and the execution.

Today all that is different. Although we are dealing with twice as great a distance, we are not dealing in months but in hours.
Now it is not a question of time and distance but a more radical question. The inhibitions on imposing a colonial form of government, as it was sought to do in 1965, are more radical: they are inhibitions of ways and means. In 1970 we lack the power, even if we had the will, to impose colonial rule, and it is not something that can be reassumed at will to suit an individual occasion. We cannot exercise colonial rule without a colonial structure. Still less can we put the clock back half a century and bring in a centralised form of government that has not been known for 50 years.
So all that part of the Section and all that part, therefore, of the Order, is really only window dressing. It belongs to the period of 1965 when the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Huyton (Mr. Harold Wilson) was talking of a solution in weeks, not months. But the weeks have become months, the months have become years, and five years is long enough to recognise the unreality of direct government from Whitehall. Therefore, this part of the Section and this part of the Order are not the heart of the matter, because they are only academic, but it is a well known principle that it tends to bring the law into contempt to legislate for powers that cannot be effective.
I come then, to the nub of the matter, to paragraph (c), which is the provision on which depends the continuance of the Sanctions Order, its principal product—the Southern Rhodesia (United Nations Sanctions) Order, 1968. We considered the Sanctions Order in 1968, those of us who were in the House at that time. We had to consider it in the context of its legality, its necessity, its utility and whether it was right. I thought then that in the context of those things we should oppose the Order, and I did so. So did 246 of my right hon. and hon. Friends. I have thought about it again in the light of the same principles, and I am of the same mind.
I make quite clear to the House, as I have before, the background from which I approach the matter—certainly not as an apologist for the régime, certainly not because I have any sympathy with apartheid or similar racial


manifestations. On the contrary, I have friends and associates—personal, professional and political—of many races in many lands. Overseas I am a member of the Bar of what is perhaps the most multi-racial country in the world, and proud to be so. Here in London I am a member of an institution which has done much to teach the great principles of the rule of law to Commonwealth students of every race and creed.
My approach is legal, constitutional and practical as to what is best for Rhodesia and what is best for Britain, against the general background that agreed settlements are better than dictated ones. On this approach I have come to the inescapable conclusion that the continuance of sanctions is neither helpful nor justified. In the last Parliament Sir Lionel Heald and I argued that the original reference to the United Nations was misconceived in law. The hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) took the same view and it was powerfully echoed in authoritative quarters on the other side of the Atlantic. I will not go into that argument again now. I believe that it is true and it has never been met.
As right hon. and hon. Gentlemen know, sanctions derive from Chapter 7 of the Charter of the United Nations. Originally the right hon. Member for Huyton said that the reference was not under Chapter 7. He had to say that, because the conditions of Chapter 7 had never been satisfied—an indispensable preliminary to a valid imposition of international sanctions. Sir Lionel and I asked that the advisory opinion of the International Court should be taken under Section 65 of its Statute, but characteristically nothing was done.
I cordially agree with my right hon. Friend the present Foreign Secretary that
The first of the reasons why we on this side will have nothing to do with these mandatory sanctions is that, by handing over decisions to the United Nations, the British Government have surrendered control and direction of the policy, and the mandatory sanctions laid down in the Order are vindictive."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 17th June, 1968; Vol. 766, c. 748.]
So much for the constitutional and legal side.

Mr. Elystan Morgan: Does not the right hon. and learned Gentle

man's argument about legality fall down flat when he considers that the legality of the Order can stem only from the legality of the parent Act, an Act whose legality he does not challenge?

Sir D. Walker-Smith: The hon. Gentleman is getting a little confused. Of course within our domestic jurisdiction Parliament has the right to pass any legislation which it pleases. We are not discussing that. We are discussing what we ought to do; and what we ought to do depends on whether or not there is a validity in the original reference from which these international sanctions sprang.
I believe that on practical grounds the balance of argument is also against. I do not want to go into the detail of it with the House. We have discussed these matters before. There are many reasons for taking that view. In many respects, the sanctions Order is itself unenforceable because, as for example in Article 5, it purports to regulate conduct within Southern Rhodesia and that we could do only if the Government here exercised not only de jure sovereignty but de facto sovereignty, which quite manifestly they do not.
Next, there has been a general consensus of opinion this afternoon in regard to the effect on Rhodesia, and it ties in with What Sir Roy Welensky is reported as saying in The Times of today. The fact is that sanctions have been painful, in Rhodesia. Of course they have—painful to all races, and painful in particular to the Africans. Although painful, they have not been decisive, as the hon. Member for Portsmouth, West admitted. They have not brought the régime down and they are not likely to. Even if they did, it is not apparent that there is anybody to take their place or at any rate anybody who would take a more liberal view than they did.
Then, the House is not only entitled but obliged to consider the effect on Britain, because we who sit in Parliament represent Britain. The effect is £40 million a year, we are told. The danger, perhaps now an established fact, is that our trade will be permanently lost to the less vigilant or less scrupulous nations of the United Nations. Who is to benefit? Not the Rhodesians. Not the British. The only beneficiaries are likely to be those


who are mainly the beneficiaries in all the unhappy conflicts in the world today—those who practise neither parliamentary democracy nor racial tolerance.
I have in the course of my observations referred once or twice to what I have said on previous occasions; and for that I apologise. May I now with fitting humility ask a question in the words ascribed by Shakespeare to Metellus Cimber all those years ago:
Is there no voice more worthy than my own,
To sound more sweetly in great Caesar's ear?
I think that I have found such a voice. I take these words from HANSARD for 17th June, 1968:
When we see the British Government surrendering control of the situation to others; when we see the danger of the increasing use of force and the increasing number of terrorists in Central Africa, and that terrorism condoned by others; when we see that the victims of sanctions in Rhodesia are bound to be the Africans inside Rhodesia and the Africans in Zambia; and when we see that the effect on Rhodesia is to drive the Rhodesians more and more into South Africa's arms, we feel that the policy of mandatory sanctions must be condemned, and as an Opposition can have no part in it at all."—[OFFICIAL, REPORT, 17th June, 1968; Vol. 766, c. 753–4]
The voice to sound more sweetly was that of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary. I agreed with it then and I agree with it now. I believe that the logic of the case is that sanctions, be they international or be their national, in principle and in practice have been weighed in the balance and found wanting and should now be discontinued.

5.19 p.m.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: Although we are speaking in the debate from unaccustomed positions, I fear that in relation to our arguments there is much that is stale and rather time-worn in what has preceded and, I suspect, in what will succeed us in the debate. Inevitably, many of us over the years have formed firm opinions about what ought or ought not to be done in the Rhodesian situation and we have outlined the arguments, sometimes ad nauseam, in the past.
There was one point which arose in the course of the Foreign Secretary's speech where I thought that he failed to see, not what are the dangers and diffi

culties of entering into discussions, but what will be the position at the end, whether or not we succeed. At one stage the right hon. Gentleman said that the previous Government had made a serious mistake in internationalising this matter. For the reasons which my right hon. Friend the Member for Fulham (Mr. Michael Stewart) indicated, if the policy of sanctions was to be pursued it was inevitable that we had to seek the support of the rest of the international community, so to that extent we had to internationalise.
In addition, this is a matter which we could not in the nature of things keep to ourselves. It is not simply a question of the relationships between Her Majesty's Government and the Government in Rhodesia. There are implications for people, particularly in Central Africa, far outside the nice diplomatic confines of the ordinary diplomatic overtures. This is a matter which deeply touches people of all races, but particularly Africans, in Central Africa.
Although I recognise that the gulf between hon. Members opposite and some of my hon. Friends and myself on this issue is irreconcilable, and although I recognise their sincerity, as I know that they recognise ours, I want to undertake the perhaps hopeless task of trying to see the issue for a few moments through the eyes of Africans.
We shall not simply come to any nice settlement with Mr. Smith and expect that that will not have some repercussions upon African opinion in Central Africa, which in turn must have the profoundest effects upon our relations with those States. Those, too, have to be weighed in the balance when we come to consider the risks and advantages of a settlement.
Somebody said something about our trade with Rhodesia. What is to happen to our trade with Zambia and Nigeria? What is to happen to the trade that we could have with Kenya? What would happen to the white populations in Kenya and Zambia if we failed to appreciate that for Africans this is a matter of the deepest moment?
I do not think that I can better help the House than by reciting a conversation I had with the very wise and shrewd United States Ambassador to Zambia on the first occasion that I went to Zambia.


I had reached Zambia from other parts of East Africa where I had noticed, as I am sure hon. Members who have visited the areas will know well, the extrovert nature of the African, the easy friendliness with which he engaged one in conversation, and the way in which he discussed his problems.
On reaching Zambia what I noticed particularly—this was two years after U.D.I.—was that there was a kind of sullen suspicion by the ordinary African in the street at any white face. Even Africans working in hotels had the appearance that somehow there was a gulf fixed between white visitors and themselves.
In the public offices were displayed the types of notice which were displayed in public offices here during the war—"Remember that idle conversation may get back to the enemy. Watch your tongue. Be careful about suspicious contacts with strangers". There was that kind of closed mentality. I said to Bob Good, the United States Ambassador, when I first met him, "What is it that explains this curious insensitivity, which I have not found anywhere else in the other parts of East Africa that I have visited?". He said "What you have to understand about Zambia is this. The Zambians are a wedge stuck into the rest of white Africa and they feel enclosed. They feel that they only escaped the kind of fate that affects their brethren in Rhodesia and South Africa by the skin of their teeth. Only by the breakdown of the Central African Federation were they kept out of this kind of white dominance. For them, it is a matter of personal feeling that their support should be given to those in white Africa who are fighting for the equal standing of the Africans". Therefore, there always will be this concern—a deep concern which some hon. Members opposite dismiss as emotionalism.
Some of our deepest understandings, some of our most tender feelings, are at root emotional and not rational. Some of our attitudes to religion, to culture and to art, and, most of all, our attitude to each other—personal relationships at their deepest level—are emotional. Simply to dismiss it as though this was part of the human understanding that had no place in politics is to fail to understand a real and vital fact. Africans cannot accept that they should sit by

whilst there is perpetuated in Southern Africa the dominance of the white race. They will not accept it.
If this House approves a settlement purporting to be within the five principles, which patently it is not, we cannot expect that that will not have the deepest repercussions in the rest of Africa; and, according to the latest reports to the Africa Bureau about the depth of economic involvement in white Africa as against black Africa, our potential is greater in black Africa than it is in white Africa. So at the level where most hon. Members opposite seem to make their decisions, even at that level, we have much to cause us to be careful in entering into these discussions.
The Foreign Secretary says that there is no question of coming to an agreement which is not within the five principles. I treat that with some scepticism. I remember that my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition on two occasions was prepared to make overtures for a settlement on the basis of the six principles, which I for one found difficult to reconcile with the six principles. But if it was impossible to feel that the proposed "Fearless" settlement was within the five principles, how much more difficult is it going to be now that the Rhodesians have openly and publicly committed themselves to a constitution which enshrines perpetually the fact that Africans can never move to majority rule. Anything less will not satisfy the Africans in Rhodesia, and still less will it satisfy the Africans in other States where they already enjoy majority rule and where they believe that they are pursuing a better and happier life as a result. Therefore, I view this whole approach with some cynicism.
The Foreign Secretary says that we must make a last attempt I suppose that in the nature of party politics he must feel that he will be better at negotiating with Ian Smith than his predessors were. Even if that be true, I suspect that he will be just as unsuccessful, and if he were to be successful at a purported agreement on the five principles, clearly we would be in for a major tragedy. But what is to happen if he fails? Suppose that even the skill of the right hon. Gentleman is not enough to overcome the race prejudice of Mr. Ian Smith? What


is to happen to sanctions after that? What will happen to the mood and opinions in Central Africa? The right hon. Gentleman said that a settlement on the five principles would ease the tensions which are poisoning the Southern African situation. But a failure is likely to exacerbate those tensions still more. Then everybody on both sides of the argument will have tried to get a settlement and will not have got one. Then the African will know that there is no hope.
The only argument which the right hon. Gentleman and The Times between them can set against those who have approved of terrorism is that it is the argument of pessimism, that it indicates that there is no hope. What is to happen when the right hon. Gentleman goes through the motions of seeing the delegation from Salisbury and, at the end, comes to this House and says, "We have tried but it is not possible within the five principles to come to any settlement"? What effect will that have on the Africans in Rhodesia? What effect will it have on the freedom fighters along the Zambesi? It must confirm what they believe now, but which at least some Africans do not believe. It must confirm their worst fears that there is only one way in which they can succeed in attaining for themselves the dignity which we have, and which the right hon. Gentleman says we have because of our parliamentary institutions.
I only remind the right hon. Gentleman that we established those Parliamentary institutions also out of violence. We fought in the past in order to achieve the dignity and the status that we have now, speaking in freedom and enjoying this division of opinion in peace. That is all that the African is asking for. If he attains it—and it seems to me that he must attain it soon—and if he cannot attain it by agreement, the only course for him will be violence.
Although I understand why the right hon. Gentleman has embarked on this round of talks again, it was profoundly dangerous to do so. It will exacerbate and not diminish the tensions which already exist in Central Africa.

5.33 p.m.

Mr. J. Enoch Powell: The hon. Member for York

(Mr. Alexander W. Lyon) is undoubtedly right in saying that in the debate on this Motion we necessarily traverse again a good deal of well-trodden ground. He is right, too, in saying that it is a subject charged and shot through by emotion of many kinds. Nevertheless we have to endeavuor as best we can to bring reasoning and reality to bear upon it.
The House is being asked today for the sixth time to enact or to continue what is an essential absurdity and one which has become more blatant with the passage of those five years. It is quite true that the present Order happily does not renew the patently absurd declaratory first Section of the Act of 1965. But, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith) made clear, those parts of the Act which it does renew still involve the same basic unreality of asserting that Her Majesty's Government and this House retain a responsibility for Southern Rhodesia because the writs of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom runs there. It does not run there. That is imagination and not fact.
The fact was disclosed a few days ago when the hon. Member for Portsmouth, West (Mr. Judd) had a Written Question to my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. My hon. Friend replied:
Her Majesty's Government have no power on the ground to control the activities of the Rhodesian police."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 2nd November, 1970; Vol. 805, c. 263.]
That is the world of reality. It is to a world of make-believe that the 1965 Act and the parts which are being renewed today belong.
The decision whether to do this or not rests firmly with this House. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary made that quite clear. I think he did not refer at any point in his speech to the United Nations. He certainly did not seek to argue that the hands of this House are bound by any resolution of the United Nations. Clearly, therefore, he believes, and his advice is, that it is in our power to do or not to do, to renew or not to renew, to maintain sanctions or to abandon sanctions. Had he not believed that, my right hon. Friend must of necessity have come to the Box and said to the House, "I am placing this Order before you this afternoon but, of course, the


House has no choice but to accept it because it is mandatory upon this House and upon the Government". The whole tenor of the debate to this moment from its opening by my right hon. Friend implied perfectly clearly that we are not bound as indeed it would be intolerable that we should be bound—that we have to take our own decision and cannot refer the power or the responsibility for our decision anywhere else.
The ground which is urged for renewing sanctions and the powers under which they are operated is that Her Majesty's Government wish to engage in a negotiation with the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia—that they want, in my right hon. Friend's words, "one more try". The first question, therefore, is whether the prospects—and I will consider them a little at large later—for a settlement, for a successful negotiation, are dependent upon the continuance of sanctions or are even enhanced by the continuance of sanctions. For my part, it appears to me that the continuance of sanctions so far from being a trump card, a powerful bargaining lever, is not one at all.
Here is a process which has been put into effect over five years with increasing endeavour. Over those five years it has not only had no effect, but the régime in Southern Rhodesia has moved steadily and inexorably towards the ultimate breach, which they have now accomlished in every possible form which was open to them. I do not believe that the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey), who opened the debate for the Opposition, can seriously believe that that progress of events was affected one way or the other by a dozen or two dozen hon. Members of this House going or not going into the Lobby in past years against sanctions. Sanctions have failed at every stage to bring pressure and duress to bear upon those who are in charge in Southern Rhodesia. It seems to me hard to argue that because we are armed with them in 1970 or 1971 we have a bargaining counter, a lever, a force. It might be easier to argue the contrary.
But my right hon. Friend's difficulty is even greater than that. "One more try": those are his words. The implications of those words have been brought out in more than one speech in this

debate. My right hon. Friend is not saying to the House or to the benches behind him, "I am going to initiate, if I can, a new round of negotiations with the Smith régime. But make no mistake: I shall be back again with this Order next year, and the year after, and the year after that until, if I ever do, I get a settlement on the five principles". I respect the care with which my right hon. Friend phrased what he said, but the reality is that, if the Government claim these powers in order to make "one more try", by implication when that try is over, whatever be the outcome, they will not again ask for sanctions to be authorised by the House. Whatever formula then is used, my right hon. Friend will, in effect, be going to Mr. Smith and saying, "Mr. Smith, this is your last chance. This time you had better settle—or we shall have to consider removing sanctions". What an arm-breaking clinch! What an irresistible argument! Yet this is deeply implicit in the stance which Her Majesty's Government have taken and in the grounds on which they ask the House to pass the Motion.
We must go beyond that argument, transparent as it is, and look at the realities of a prospect of a settlement. What do we in this House mean by a "settlement"? It can be an ambiguous word—and, I shall presently suggest, a dangerously ambiguous word—but at any rate both sides of the House are agreed on what we mean by it. We mean a constitution of Southern Rhodesia, agreed between Her Majesty's Government and whatever authority there be in Southern Rhodesia, which would enable this House to enact on the Statute Book of this country an independence constitution for Southern Rhodesia, as we have enacted it for so many territories in the past. We have all said that there can be no question of such a constitution being enacted by this House which does not conform to what are called the five principles. I have said repeatedly outside and inside this House that if such legislation were ever to be proposed I would not go into the Lobby in support of it.
But what possibility, what likelihood, is there that, after all that has passed, after those in charge in Rhodesia have severed one by one every link with this country—links which they treasured, links which they would fain have retained


—after they have made themselves, in form and indeed in reality, an independent republic, they would submit to have this House enact the very constitution to avoid which they have lived through these last five years and are able and prepared to go on living through the years to come? The prospect of a settlement in those terms, which are the only terms about which we in this House can talk, beggars imagination.
My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, who is a knower of men and a knower of these things as few besides, is not deceived as to what the chances are. He knows perfectly well that the chances of a settlement, thus defined and thus acceptable, are negligible—one in a hundred? one in a thousand? But people say, "What of it? It would be such a wonderful thing—would it not?—if it were possible. Why not go for the one in a hundred chance? Why not go for the one in a thousand chance?" I have heard this said by some of my hon. and right hon. Friends. They say, "What harm is there, however remote the possibility, in one last try?". There is harm; there is danger.
Sooner or later, whether we like it or not, this country will have to recognise reality, and the reality is that, against our will and against our wishes, there has come into existence, there exists and, so far as is foreseeable, there will continue to exist a sovereign, independent republic in Southern Rhodesia. Sooner or later we shall have to admit that to be fact. Of course, we shall not be required to enact the constitution of that independent republic, any more than in 1783 we wrote the constitution of the United States on to the Statute Book of the United Kingdom. All that will be required, when the moment of truth comes, will simply be that we shall have to legislate to clear up perhaps the inevitable odds and ends when such a political earthquake is recognised to have taken place.
But the danger is this. Since that must come sooner or later—and most people in the House and outside think the sooner that reality comes the better—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]—Yes, but if my right hon. Friends go for "one more try" for a just and honourable settlement—and we know what they mean; they have been clear, frank and

candid about what they mean—and in the end we settle, as we must, for a recognition of reality, which will be something quite different, quite a different meaning of "settlement"—then I very much fear that there will attach to Her Majesty's Government the sense, the misunderstanding, the imputation of a kind of dishonesty, of having promised one course and fallen back upon another, of having professed the five principles and run away from them. That will not be true, but I fear very much that, in the face of the country and of the world, there is all too much danger that it will seem to be what the Government have done.
There is indeed a danger, as there usually is in politics and in life, in attempting the remotely improbable, just because it is something that we dearly wish might happen. I believe that that is a danger which my right hon. Friends in the Government are incurring. That is why this afternoon I believe that the House, and certainly my hon. Friends, should take their resolution. When an unpleasant reality has to be recognised, when a transition has to be made from make believe to the daylight world, as we have got to make it in this matter of Southern Rhodesia, the process does not become any less painful by the lapse of time. It becomes harder, more painful, more rending and tearing when it comes about, the greater the delay that is interposed. There is now a new Parliament, a new Government. This is the time to leave behind make believe and to face the truth.

5.50 p.m.

Mr. George Cunningham: I am very pleased to be following that speech by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell). It displayed two qualities which he applies to most subjects on which he speaks. First, there was an apparently dispassionate analysis of the situation, and a recognition of the facts with which I would not at all disagree. Secondly, there was the ability to come, I would say, to precisely the wrong conclusion on the facts.
He implied that the only case for continuing sanctions against Rhodesia was the hope of achieving a settlement such as the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign


Secretary intends to attempt, a settlement which would allow us to give independence within the five or six principles. I wish to suggest in the next few minutes that there is a more important and up-to-date reason why sanctions should be continued, but I certainly agree with the right hon. Gentleman that the chances of getting any settlement which could be regarded as falling within the six principles are utterly negligible.
This debate has certainly struck a very sober note, and I think it is desirable that it should do so given the responsibility of this House for five million souls in Rhodesia. The right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith) suggested that we should bear in mind our responsibilities to our constituents in this country. I suggest that in the absence of any effective representation for the five million Africans in Rhodesia, we should do well, too, to recognise in this debate that we owe them something.
The fact is that the differences of opinion in this House matter very little to the people who are suffering now in the prisons and detention camps in Rhodesia. I have several friends who are in prison in the detention camps in Rhodesia. I have myself spent a night in one of Smith's restriction camps as they were before U.D.I., and I do not believe that to the inmates of those camps many of the debates which have taken place in this House over the past five years have mattered at all. The differences between people in this House do not matter to them, but what matters is the extent of the agreement which there has been, unfortunately, in this House not to take certain actions which alone would further the interests of those inmates of those institutions in Rhodesia.
I wish to suggest that the prevailing characteristic of debates in this House on this subject has been self-deception, and it was for the lack of self-deception that I welcomed the initial comments made by the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West. There never was a chance that guarantees would ensure the progress of Rhodesia to a democratic form of government. There never was a chance of that. It was not always clear that there was not a chance, but it is certainly clear now, and I suggest that anyone who, at this stage in the proceedings,

still believes that it is possible that the rulers of Rhodesia will give themselves over to what they believe would be a form of life which would subvert their safety and their well being has got his head thoroughly deeply in the sands. They will not agree to that. They never would have agreed with that.
The only way in which we could have compelled them to agree was by the use of direct force, and I believe that there would have been no more honourable or proper use of our military forces, at any time or any place since the war, than to ensure, in this colony for which we were legally responsible, the maintenance of the law, and it is a matter of shame that this House should have been prepared to take upon itself direct responsibility for the government of Rhodesia but not have been prepared to do what any Government must be prepared to do in the last resort—to use military means to enforce the law.
Not having been prepared to do so, then let us recognise now that sanctions are not going to work in the sense in which they were originally intended to work. The intention of sanctions was that we would bring about a new régime in Rhodesia which would be prepared to operate a different kind of government. Now that has gone; that has passed; that is certainly not going to happen.
There has been confusion between sanctions biting and sanctions working. Sanctions can bite; they can have effect, without bringing about any change in the political situation, and that is the general position with which we are faced now. Does that mean that therefore we should be prepared to withdraw sanctions? At this point I find myself in intense disagreement with those on the other side who have suggested that.
I suspect that this debate is not the end of one series of debates about achieving political change in Rhodesia. It is the beginning of a new series of debates about whether we are going to terminate sanctions, given that there is not going to be any change in the political situation in Rhodesia.
When we discuss the Republic of South Africa it is frequently pointed out that one reason why we should not take stronger actions, use stronger words, against the apartheid régime in South


Africa is our enormous economic stake in that country. At the moment we have a small economic stake in Rhodesia, albeit smaller because for the last few years there have been restrictions—they have been evaded but there have been restrictions—on the establishment of economic relations with Rhodesia.
If we decide now to restore normal relations with Rhodesia then what we shall be doing is re-establishing with Rhodesia the same kind of bilateral economic interdependence which we also have with the Republic of South Africa. An hon. Gentleman opposite says "Hear, hear". Of course, that is exactly what the hon. Member wants; he wants us to have with Rhodesia that kind of relationship; he wants it to be difficult for any British Government to apply any pressure to change the political situation within that country; but overtly, at least to voice the opinion the Government express—great abhorrence of the system of government in South Africa and Rhodesia; and they might be prepared to exercise slight pressure towards liberalisation, for what that might be worth, were it not for the fact that, in the case of South Africa, we have such an intense interest in the economic status quo.
I wish to argue that it is because we do not want now to re-establish the same interest in the status quo in Rhodesia that we should be prepared to continue sanctions despite our recognition that we are not going to change the political situation within Rhodesia.
Finally, we need to acknowledge some modesty in what we are currently likely to achieve in that area. Nothing that the Government do will change the future of central and southern Africa. They will not, in supplying arms to South Africa or in anything else, decide whether whites or blacks in the end govern that part of the world. That will be determined by far stronger forces than one or two British frigates sent for presentational purposes. What they will decide is the place where Britain's voice is heard on this kind of matter. Which side will Britain be on when the world divides, as it will, on racial lines in that area? Shall we be on the side of the Czars, because that is the equivalent today, or shall we be on the side of the future?
Hon. Gentlemen opposite should take into account another consideration, that is that they are not deciding the future of the world: they are, to a great extent, deciding the future of the Conservative Party, if nothing else. What kind of Conservative Party will it be? I have an impartial view of that subject, but I suggest that the Conservative Party has succeeded in keeping itself in being since 1832 mainly because it has been prepared to keep admittedly a good deal behind the times but not to stay static. If it insists on staying static on a great international issue like this, and falling too far behind the times, the Conservative Party will knock itself cleanly out of British politics.
For that reason, and for the other reasons I gave, hon. Gentlemen opposite should recognise that there is an important reason for continuing to apply sanctions against Rhodesia, despite our recognition that no political change is likely to result there.

6.2 p.m.

Sir Frederic Bennett: To save time, I would put only one rhetorical question to the hon. Member for White-haven (Dr. John A. Cunningham). Would he make the same speech if the present round of prospective negotiations fail, in six, seven, eight, nine or ten years—ad infinitum? As my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary intimated, there must be a point at which we know we have to face reality.
I have three small comments to make first. One is to the right hon. Member for Fulham (Mr. Michael Stewart) who, I think, spoke about stamps. In fact, the situation in Rhodesia is that a surcharge is payable in this country if the Rhodesians choose to use one of the new Republican stamps. If, at precisely the same cost of buying one of those stamps, they go to the Philatelic Agency, an agency of the Government, they can buy one of the old stamps and no surcharge is payable. This makes it even more farcical, therefore. The only person hurt is not the man over there but the person over here whose relatives may have written to him.

Mr. Michael Stewart: It is not a question of money. Is the hon. Gentleman saying it is a matter of indifference to him whether the stamp bears the Queen's


head or whether it asserts the authority of an illegal régime?

Sir F. Bennett: I never mentioned the word "indifferent". In common with other hon. Members, I am trying today to talk about facts, and I was correcting the right hon. Gentleman on facts which he had entirely wrong.
He also mentioned laws having been made which prevented the publication of economic facts about life in Rhodesia. He implied that this meant that things were much worse than the Rhodesian Government would like to admit them to be. But another reason is that, as for any Government under siege, it would be very undesirable, from the point of view of that Government's attempts to break sanctions, if they allowed full details to be published of what the present state of Rhodesian business was, and where her supplies were coming from.
The right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey)—I am sorry that he has left—attacked my right hon. Friend for not being tough with the South Africans about the unlawful presence of their troops and/or police in Rhodesia. I do not know what he means by "being tough" and what he wants our Government to do. I should have liked to ask him, had he been here, whether those police and troops were not there before 18th June, and what he did about it. In particular, I should have liked to ask whether they were there when he made arrangements for combined naval manoeuvres with the South Africans, to be started on 6th August, which would have entailed putting British sailors under the command of a South African admiral. If he calls that tough, he has a strange interpretation of events.
This debate has been different from some others on the subject in one welcome respect. Today at least we have dropped the farce of any hon. Member pretending that sanctions were having any effect so far as their original purpose went. That purpose was, in the words of the then Prime Minister:
… to induce a change of heart and mind in Salisbury towards reaching a negotiated settlement and for them to abandon U.D.I.
At least we have that one dropped today, so we have made some little progress towards reality.
One other welcome novelty is that, for the first time, hon. Members opposite

have not attacked hon. Members on this side who declare that they believe honestly that sanctions are ineffective. In the past, accusations were hurled at one that that showed that one must in some way be a semi-stooge of Mr. Smith. That was always a ridiculous accusation of hon. Members who did their best to describe what they believed to be the facts. It would be as unfair to accuse any hon. Member opposite who says that the present policy of the Americans in Vietnam is wrong—which again is what they believe to be a fact—of being Communist supporters. At least, then, today we have wandered back into reality in two respects.
I make no apology at all about my own attitude. I have been looking through my speeches from the day since U.D.I. was declared and I find that, consistently, I have said that I believe that sanctions would fail in their purpose and that there were only two options open to us. The first was force which very few have advocated, and which was abandoned shortly after it was first mentioned.
The second, the only real option, was for us to reach then the best negotiated settlement which could be obtained. There is no doubt, as right hon. Gentlemen have said from this side, that everyone believes that we could have got better terms had we gone straight into those negotiations then than can possibly be obtained now, even if the Foreign Secretary has a near-miraculous success in his coming talks, if those take place.
The proposition of sanctions was doomed to failure from the start, because it depended on South African and Portuguese support if it were to be effective. It was known to Her Majesty's Government at the time that this support by South Africa and Portugal would not be forthcoming. There is a gentleman to whom high tribute was paid by the party opposite when they were in government because he did his best to help the Government reach a negotiated arrangement—Sir Hugh Beadle, the Chief Justice, who told the Government openly that they had no chance at all of obtaining their objectives over sanctions unless they could obtain the concurrence of Portugal and South Africa in their working.
In regard to sanctions and their consequences, I also rely on the words of a much greater man than I am, my right


hon. Friend the present Home Secretary, who said:
First, there will be a loss of control by Britain. Second, they will not work unless other countries do the same. Third, they will certainly not work without South African support. Fourth, they will consolidate opinion behind the Right wing in Rhodesia and make the position of the moderates and a would-be moderate alternative government totally impossible."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 6th February, 1967; Vol. 740, c. 1225.]
Every word of that is as true today as it was when it was said.
I add two more reasons to explain why sanctions have failed, are failing, and will continue to fail. First, they have no really strong local support even among the people we are seeking to protect, the people who are hit hardest by the sanctions which we are wielding. Second, sanctions are failing because in this House of Commons, an institution of politicians, we do not yet appreciate—this is certainly true of those of us who have not lived in Africa—the wide measure of political apathy among the African populations of Central and Southern Africa as a whole.

Mr. James Johnson: When speaking of the masses of the people, is the hon. Gentleman saying that they are so apathetic, so apolitical, that they do not oppose the Smith régime as such?

Sir F. Bennett: I think that it would be better if I did not allow interventions again on this question. I am trying to be brief, and I was just coming to that point. What do I mean by apathy? The great mass of African peoples are more apathetic than we realise about the exercise of their political rights. I shall give my reasoning in a moment, and, in order to save time, I cite just one example. In Southern Rhodesia at the moment, where there is undoubtedly a full-blooded authoritarian Government in being it remains a fact that a tiny minority of white people are able to maintain order over vast tracts of country, including, in particular, the tribal areas, with far fewer troops and security forces than we need in Ulster. If there were the widespread revolutionary feeling throughout Rhodesia about which we are told, the Rhodesian army and police forces would indeed be stretched to and beyond their utmost to maintain law and order.
Again, there is an Iron Curtain across Europe to prevent people living in the Communist paradise from escaping to the West. On the other hand, along the South Africa border, the only controls are restrictions on the number of Africans who, realising where they are going, want to go into South Africa to live and work there. There is the comparison in "Iron Curtains": in one case, to prevent people leaving paradise, and in the other to prevent people going into hell. Can it be said to make sense on any logical basis whatever? If that does not show the degree of political apathy, I can only leave it to hon. Members opposite to ponder a little further.
What are the only two options which we have, or could have had? One was force, to which I have referred briefly already. I believe that, if the Prime Minister of the day, after U.D.I. was declared, had at that moment, within 12 hours of the declaration called in the name of Her Majesty upon the forces in Rhodesia, who owed allegiance to Her Majesty, to take control, there would have been a chance that it might have happened. The hon. Gentleman knows as well as I do that we have grounds for saying that.

Mr. James Johnson: For doing it?

Sir F. Bennett: We have grounds for thinking it. That is all we have. The reason why we did not do that at the time was that, apart from anything else, the Prime Minister of the day was not the sort of man to chance his arm in that way. He shelved the decision, hoping that he could find some other method to deal with it. So force was out.
Now we are left, we are told, with the only real alternative, a compromise settlement. As has been said already, the situation becomes more unfavourable every year. As the speeches from the benches opposite have admitted, this is partly because the sort of people who had ties or have ties with this country are dying or are moving out, and the people coming in have no such ties. In addition, apart from the movement in of a type of immigrant who has no close connections with this country, a younger generation is growing up and beginning to take the reins, people one generation away from parents who had deep personal connections with this country. So the


climate for reaching any form of settlement grows worse and worse from year to year. The former Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Fulham, admitted in his speech today that it is becoming worse, not better.
What part can sanctions play? It would be tempting to go into all that is happening in Southern Rhodesia in relation to sanctions. Of course, sanctions are biting. Of course, the Rhodesians would rather be without them. But that is not what it was all about. We never did it to bite or to annoy. We did it, theoretically, to try to induce a change of heart and mind. So there is nothing to be gained by saying that sanctions are annoying to Rhodesians or biting on the Rhodesians. We are talking about the facts as they are today.
In fact—this was pointed out in two leading British newspapers in the last couple of days; it is not just a Rhodesian claim—the rate of economic growth in Rhodesia in the last year, though not nearly as high as it would be had there been no sanctions, is higher than it was in this country in the last year of the last Labour Government. Who is doing the besieging, and who is being besieged? We had to devalue our currency. The Rhodesians have not. Who is the besieger, and who is the besieged?
Now, the question of petrol. All the petrol that one wants is freely available today in Salisbury. Need I remind hon. Members opposite that it is now 4d. a gallon cheaper there than it is in this country, which is applying the sanctions? In the country which is suffering sanctions, people buy it for 4d. a gallon less than we can.
Here lies the ultimate absurdity. While this situation continues, the United Kingdom, with its defence resources stretched as they have never been—this is common ground on both sides of the House—has to devote six frigates out of a total force of 29—two on, two off, and two "in the wash"—to preventing petrol reaching Rhodesia via Beira, although all the petrol that Rhodesians need is going in via Laurenço Marques. That is how matters stand today. We have produced one effect, at least. We have depressed the standard of living markedly in Beira and we have done much to create the biggest boom in African history in

Laurenço Marques, though I do not suppose that that was in the minds of right hon. Gentlemen opposite in proposing this farce.
When the farce began, there was an aircraft carrier there, with a lot of attendant escort vessels, and the air base on Madagascar for which we have to pay a fairly heavy rent. When I wrote some time ago to then responsible Ministers that with the shortage of aircraft carriers and all our other difficulties in the world, it was a pity to have one aircraft carrier carrying out the farcical operation of not preventing petrol going into Rhodesia. I was told that it was essential to have an aircraft carrier for the job. Eventually, when the phasing-out programme for aircraft carriers under the last Government began to make its impact, the aircraft carrier was withdrawn for servicing in England. I asked when it would go back. I was told that it would never go back because what was regarded as impossible a few months before was now seen to be possible and two frigates could do the job just as easily as the aircraft carrier, which I had been earlier told was indispensable, could do it.
How long are we to go on? I ask my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, when he is reviewing certain specific aspects of the sanctions situation, without abandoning the policy as a whole, to look again at this state of affairs. If we are not preventing petrol from going into Rhodesia, can we not find a rather less expensive method than six frigates for not doing it? It reminds one of the old joke about the man who was asked whether he would like his coffee without milk or cream and he said, "Without milk, because milk is cheaper". If we are not preventing petrol going in, could we not use a gunboat not to prevent it going in? This would introduce at least some element of sanity into the situation.
We are annoying Portugal, of course, but, as I say, that is not the purpose. We are maintaining a hostile blockade of Beira. A few months ago, a naval rating wrote to me—for obvious reasons, I shall not give his name—and told me of the sort of thing that can happen. A naval rating had acute appendicitis. We got in touch with the Portuguese authorities in blockaded Beira, we flew him in by helicopter, he had a very satisfactory operation which saved his life, we


thanked the Portuguese authorities, and then we flew him back to his vessel, there to carry on the blockade of the country in which he had just had his appendix out. Can any hon. Member go on much longer sustaining what is in effect a farce, which the whole world outside this House knows is a farce?
I have never objected to people who differ violently from me. What I find difficult is to sustain nonsenses. Having said all this, hon. Members now have the right to ask how I shall vote if we divide tonight. Frankly, I have not yet made up my mind. I am inclined at this stage to vote with the Government. I make this point not because of pressure from the Whips or anyone else—none has been exerted on me at any stage—but because of one sentence from the speech of my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary which I quoted earlier, and which was also referred to by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith). My right hon. Friend the present Home Secretary, discussing whether we could support sanctions or not, then said:
Only through negotiations can a tragedy of one kind or another be averted. While the negotiations continued,
—that was while they were going on—
I believe that the status quo on both sides—on sanctions, U.D.I., and so on—should be preserved. But this means that the Government themselves
—the British Government—
… must make some move and show some willingness to move in the direction of negotiations."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 17th June 1968; Vol. 766, c. 838]
That sentence, if it was true then, is probably true today. I willingly accept the points made in a remarkable speech by my right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell) when he said that we are not meeting the situation by perpetrating a nonsense any longer. But nevertheless we have perpetrated it for five years, and for my part I am certainly willing to give the Foreign Secretary a chance to see whether he can pull off something successful, whether the chances be one in a hundred, one in fifty or one in any more.
I know the arguments against it were very ably deployed by my right hon. Friend. Even if the card of maintained

sanctions is a joker rather than an ace, I still say in these circumstances, that I do not want to deny the Foreign Secretary the same freedom of manœuvre that I and others were willing to give Ministers on the other side of the House when they were in office, on the occasion I have mentioned. If tonight I do support the Government it will be for this reason—plus one other, that I fought the election in accordance with the party manifesto, to which I subscribed, and I went along with it when I spoke in favour of the Foreign Secretary having one more opportunity to try to remedy the mistakes of the past. I said that before 18th June and I do not feel inclined to run away from what I said.

6.23 p.m.

Mr. Robert Maclennan: The hon. Member for Torquay (Sir F. Bennett) said that in his view the whole world regards the maintenance of international sanctions against Rhodesia as a farce. If this is so, it is not reflected in the attitude expressed by the official representatives of countries in the United Nations. Nor is it reflected in the fact that the illegal régime has failed to attract the recognition of any country in the United Nations. I think that the hon. Gentleman's perception of the reality, as he sees it, outside Rhodesia is perhaps less penetrating than the perception of the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell) of the reality as he saw it in Rhodesia.
In a forceful speech, the right hon. Gentleman attempted to argue that, because we could not exert power on the ground, we surrendered all international responsibility. This argument is dangerous and perhaps illogical. It is dangerous because it appears to exclude the fact, as I see it, of a wider international reality than the position in terms of power inside Rhodesia itself. The wider reality which the right hon. Gentleman seems prepared to ignore is the world struggle which is developing rapidly year by year over race and over the future of the oppressed minorities in Southern Africa as a whole.
If I cannot follow the right hon. Gentleman's logic in his exclusion from our concern of the future economic sanctions and the wider question of the racial conflicts in the world, I find it easier to


accept the logic he put forward about the present negotiations, or the talks about talks, upon which the Foreign Secretary hopes to embark. As the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West said, it is plain that the implication which the right hon. Gentleman would have at least some hon. Members take from his action in initiating talks about talks, is that he is making one last try, while keeping the restive ranks in order. The implication is plain that sanctions must be maintained up to that point and that point alone.
The right hon. Gentleman has refused to answer the question of my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) as to what will be the position afterwards, and I wholly endorse what his right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton said—

Mr. Healey: Not "friend".

Mr. Maclennan: I leave that to them—about the danger of this stance of entering the conference chamber deprived of the only weapon, however weak it may be, by implying that sanctions may be removed. I question the wisdom of entering the conference chamber in any case. I cannot see what use is to be served, or what hopeful signs there are that the illegal régime is prepared meaningfully to discuss matters within the framework of the five principles to which the right hon. Gentleman has given form and frequent support, or any evidence to give one spot of hope in this situation.
The danger of misrepresenting the strength of mind of the British people on this issue is quite apparent. The hon. Member for Torquay was also, I think, mistaken when he suggested that the British public recognised what he called the farce of sanctions and the maintenance of our present position. Every public opinion poll on this issue has demonstrated that the British public considers that, if it were possible to take a stronger line than we have taken in the past, it would be prepared to support it. The opinion polls have not suggested that we should weaken our stance but rather that we should strengthen it. That would certainly be my position today. But it is understandable that a new Government feel bound to traverse the thorny path of further negotiations with the illegal régime.
In the short time available to me, I want to beg the Foreign Secretary to continue, both in private and in public, making plain his adherence to the five principles and to retaining the international instrument of sanctions to which this Government are committed. I hope that he will do so in no spirit of despair, as he seemed to suggest. He must not countenance failure. He must do so recognising the wide international reality to which right hon. and hon. Members have drawn attention throughout the debate.

6.30 p.m.

Mr. Gilbert Longden: We are debating how best to remedy the situation in what was once a British colony and is now a country which is rapidly sliding into the policy of apartheid practised by its southern neighbour, which we all abhor. Everyone in this House deplores the doctrine of apartheid: not only is it un-Christian; it is also foolish, because it is ultimately destined to fail. Worse, however, than the doctrine itself are the methods whereby it is enforced. They are Hitlerian: there is no other word for it.
What can we best do to rescue Rhodesia? The hon. Member for Portsmouth, West (Mr. Judd), whose sincerity I do not question, seems to imagine that we on this side of the House condone the force used by those Governments against their subjects. Why he should do that, I do not know. We do not condone it. Why does he, apparently, condone the force used in many other countries all over the globe? The sort of incident that he described to us happens practically daily in many other countries, but no one seems to bother about that.
The right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) did not feel it necessary to wish my right hon. Friend well in his coming negotiations. He welcomed the fact that the two sides of the House were bipartisan at the moment. But we have seen that before. For a long time British policy towards Rhodesia was bipartisan, and properly so, because U.D.I. was an illegal act and because only the British Parliament could confer independence upon a colonial territory. For generations, it has been the declared intention of successive British Governments to lead Her Majesty's subjects overseas to self-government with independent sovereign status under majority rule.
When my right hon. Friend was last Foreign Secretary, he warned the Rhodesian Government what steps would have to be taken in the event of illegal secession; so that, when that illegal secession came about and the then Labour Goverment took those steps, my right hon. Friends and I supported them. Their honourable objective was to enable us to fulfil our unquestioned responsibility to our African fellow-subjects in Rhodesia. The only other means of fulfilling that responsibility would have been force. But, though it was supported by the Archbishop and by some left-wing "pacifists", the use of force was opposed by both Government and Opposition.
My right hon. Friends and I parted company with the Labour Government when they took the matter to the United Nations because we believed that it was our responsibility and ours alone. For my part, I also believed that only if all the nations were genuinely ready to honour sanctions and, in addition, to contemplate a blockade, probably prolonged, of the whole of Southern Africa, would mandatory sanctions succeed.
As we know, neither condition was fulfilled and today, Salisbury is full of the products of all countries, except ours; and even some of ours obtain access through South Africa and we can do nothing to stop that.
For over two years, I have been on record as believing that, since responsibility without power is futile, we should, regretfully, confess failure and leave Rhodesia to pursue her own way outside the Commonwealth. The admirable prescription proposed by my right hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton) might have succeeded at one time; but owing to the disastrous way in which the whole question was handled by right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite, I fear it cannot now succeed. I do not believe that the men who lead the Rhodesian Front will agree to any solution which embraces the five principles. If, by some remote chance, they did agree to them, I do not think that they would honour them thereafter.
I hope that I may be proved wrong, but in any case, even though there is only once chance in a thousand, I believe that

the situation has been changed, because in our election manifesto, my party pledged itself to
… make a further effort to find a sensible and just solution in accordance with the five principles which we have consistently maintained.
I wish my right hon. Friend well in his honourable efforts. Certainly I agree with his argument that it would be folly to withhold support for the renewal of sanctions immediately before embarking on these final negotiations—and they must be final.
I shall support the Government tonight for that and one other reason. I believe that the reopening of negotiations will serve to tell the peoples of Rhodesia, irrespective of whether these futile sanctions are maintained, what their life will be like in future if the negotiations fail. That is what we have to get across to the peoples of Rhodesia. If they cease to be the victims of sanctions, they will be boycotted by the rest of the world. Apartheid is doomed to failure. Can they now be persuaded, even at this late hour, to return to democracy?
I wish my right hon. Friend well, and I shall certainly support him in the Division Lobby, tonight.

6.36 p.m.

Mr. George Thomson: In the short time available to me, I shall confine myself to two points only. The first concerns the prospects for negotiations. The second concerns the relationship of sanctions policy to those prospects.
The negotiations which the Foreign Secretary now seeks arise from the fact that, inevitably, the new Government want "to have a go" as they undertook to do in their election manifesto. If the Foreign Secretary is more successful than I was in my time in rescuing the five million Africans in Rhodesia from the grim situation that they face, at the same time giving them effective guarantees of unimpeded progress to majority rule, no one will applaud the right hon. Gentleman more than I shall.
However, I may be excused a personal note of pessimism and scepticism about the prospects facing the right hon. Gentleman. It is exactly two years ago, almost to the day, that I was engaged in the last round of talks between the British Government and Mr. Smith in


Salisbury. In this debate, there has been a temptation to talk of the Government "having another go", rather as if it were simply one more effort in a long series of attempts made originally by the right hon. Gentleman before U.D.I. and then by the Labour Government after U.D.I.
That is not the situation. After my last visit, Mr. Smith in effect tore up the whole basis on which all the talks between him and successive British Governments had taken place until that time. The constitution which he put in place of the "Fearless" formula was in direct contradiction to the position that he had taken up in those talks. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) said, it was a constitution which would never give the elected Africans majority rule, and by no conceivable casuistry can the five principles be reconciled with the present Rhodesian constitution. Either the principle of unimpeded progress to majority rule must go, or the principles upon which Mr. Smith's constitution are built must go.
Therefore, while I recognise the right of the Government to make this approach, with the mandate that they have following the election, I do not feel optimistic over either the timing of the approach or its prospects.
The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell), in a characteristically powerful speech, ventured the view that the Foreign Secretary was not deceived about his chances. The right hon. Gentleman said that perhaps the chances are one in a hundred or one in a thousand. He contested the view which has been expressed by the hon. Member for Hertfordshire, South-West (Mr. Longden) that there is no harm in having a try. The right hon. Gentleman thought that there was some harm because it obscured reality. I am inclined to agree with him, though I would define the reality that it obscures rather differently from the way in which he described it. I think what is at risk is that the attempt distracts the Rhodesian people, and particularly the European community, rather than the British community here, from reality.
More talks about talks about talks takes away the attention of the Rhodesians from what ought to be the

real choice which, after these long and agonising years, now faces them. The choice is between a long-term ostracism and a degree of economic stagnation going with it or a return to the decencies of progress towards majority rule together with a return to the kind of economic progress that Rhodesia enjoyed before the illegal declaration of independence.
This brings me to the efficacy of sanctions. There cannot be any doubt that sanctions are having some significant effect on the Rhodesian economy. Perhaps the most succinct piece of evidence that I can give the House is a quotation from the Rhodesian Herald of a week or two ago remarking on the present shortage of foreign exchange in Rhodesia, and saying:
This is an area in which sanctions are demonstrably succeeding. The success may not be spectacular, but it is unquestionably stinting our growth.
If the Rhodesian Herald, a courageous newspaper, says that, with all the throats of censorship in Rhodesia, we can take it that something is happening to the Rhodesian economy as a result of sanctions over the years. Therefore, if the Foreign Secretary gets any change from Mr. Smith—I do not think that he will get much change or anything which will go to fundamentals—it will be because of that background of economic pressure brought by sanctions.
I very much regret, therefore, that no assurance was given by the Foreign Secretary that, if the approaches do not produce any results, sanctions will be continued. The right hon. Gentleman was curiously ambivalent about it. He said, on the one hand, that he never contemplated failure in going into any negotiations like these; but, on the other hand, that he could not be in the least confident of success.
I suggest that failure is certain if Mr. Smith goes into these talks believing that he can have the dropping of sanctions by Britain without making any concession in return. It is only if he knows that there will be the endless vista of continued economic pressure that the right hon. Gentleman has any real leverage.
The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West, to return to his view of reality, argued that we should drop sanctions and recognise Rhodesian


independence without legislating in any way for approval of it in this House. The right hon. Gentleman has a powerful and logical mind, as the House knows. But life is not logic. I often find the right hon. Gentleman pursues logic to that logical conclusion which reduces itself to absurdity. He did so in this case, because he ignored the reality for Britain. The reality for Britain—the economic, the political and, I might venture, the moral reality—is the danger of getting on the wrong side of one of the most fundamental issues that divides the human race today. This was the fallacy of his historical comparison with the American War of Independence. In our failure to recognise the U.D.I. of American colonists and in our laggard acceptance of their sovereignty we were in those days getting on the wrong side of the great human cause of the times.
I beg the Government, in the approaches that they are now making, to watch their step very carefully in this regard. The new approach that they are making is bound to arouse suspicions. I speak perhaps from bitter experience. I ask the Minister of State, who is to wind up, on behalf of Britain, to allay these suspicions now by giving an unequivocal assurance that, if there is no successful outcome to the approach of Her Majesty's Government, they will not remove sanctions.

6.45 p.m.

The Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Joseph Godber): Unlike many hon. Members who have taken part in the debate, this is the first time that I have spoken on Rhodesia in this House. I was, however, involved in leading the delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations for at least two years in the early 1960s when I observed the increasing bitterness on this subject which, I believe, helped to drive the white minority in Rhodesia into more extreme positions. It should be recognised that this is one reason which has moved them in that way, just as I believe the attitude of one or two hon. Members opposite may also have helped.
We have had strong emotions shown in the debate, and understandably so. But we were reminded by my right hon.

Friend in his opening speech of the first step that we are proposing in our efforts to see whether there is a realistic basis for a negotiated settlement of this acute and difficult problem. This, after all, is our stated commitment, clearly put out in our manifesto at the election, and it would be wrong if we did not seek to carry it out. It will not be easy, and we are aware of the strong emotions which this long outstanding issue attracts.
Some hon. Members have said that it is wrong to approach Mr. Smith since there are no prospects of reaching agreement. But we should be failing in our responsibilities if we did not find out for ourselves whether a just settlement was still possible. However slight the possibility, we must be quite sure on this.
The previous Government were content to accept a situation which was little more than a stalemate in the latter stages of their administration. We are not. We believe that it is our duty to make this final effort.
Other hon. Members have claimed that it is unrealistic not to recognise Rhodesia's attempted independence. We did not approve of the declaration of independence five years ago. After all, it should be remembered that no other country has recognised Rhodesia. To recognise Rhodesia's independence now would, in my view, be to take a very short-sighted view. Indeed, it is not necessarily in the interests of Rhodesia itself—I emphasise that—because these interests lie in restoring legality to Rhodesia so that it can take its place among the free nations of the world; and so that it can realise the vast economic potential and the aspirations of all its people. I believe that this is not always borne in mind. If we can encourage and attract Rhodesia back into this situation, the Rhodesians themselves will benefit.
Although sanctions have not achieved their immediate political objective, no one can deny that they continue to exert pressure on the Rhodesian economy and to restrict the rate of development. Despite a good year in 1969, the available figures suggest that real income per head is no higher now than five years ago. We all know what has happened in the


tobacco industry; and recently leaders of the régime in Salisbury have, in effect, admitted increasing difficulties over such matters as foreign exchange. It has been announced that the criteria for the issue of import allocations are to be further tightened.
I do not give this catalogue of items to take pleasure in them, but merely to show that it is not true that we have no bargaining counter. This point should be borne in mind.
It is clear that the present situation benefits nobody. It certainly does not benefit the Africans in Rhodesia whose interests everyone on both sides of the House honestly believes to be advancing.
The return to legality, if it can be achieved, would enable the Africans to play a fuller part in all spheres of the life of their country. Aid from outside would again begin to flow into Rhodesia; there would be an interchange of visitors and ideas which, in present circumstances, is impossible; and a Rhodesia practising genuine multi-racial co-operation would be uniquely placed to act as a bridge between black and white in Africa. That is what is behind my right hon. Friend's feeling in deciding to make a final attempt.
Rhodesia's neighbours would also benefit. The application of sanctions has disrupted natural trading links in central and Southern Africa. Perhaps even more important, the uncertainty created by Rhodesia's position has contributed to the general tension in the area and the poisoning of relations across the Zambesi. Confrontation and the threat of violence have solved nothing, and they never will solve anything. If apartheid is to disappear and racial tolerance is to develop there must be some dialogue between black and white. Reports of recent contacts between South African and certain African leaders show that this is possible.
To argue that no good can come from dealing with Mr. Smith is in my view to encourage those who believe that violence is the only way in Southern Africa. We in the Government do not accept that, and I emphasise it strongly, because all too easily one sees among the black African states this feeling that violence is the only way out. I do not believe that that is the view on either side of the House, certainly not among

the majority of hon. Members, and I believe that we should therefore be trying to find other ways to influence and resolve this problem.
As is well known, we are committed, so far as we are able, to promote the economic and political development of all races in Rhodesia. Reference has been made this afternoon to the 1969 constitution, and that constitution fails in certain important respects to do this. It would be futile to discuss what might or might not be accepted as a settlement. Our basis for negotiation is well known, and it rests firmly on the five principles. My right hon. Friend stated that clearly in his speech today, and I think that that deals with the point raised by the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey).
The right hon. Gentleman raised two other specific points with which I shall try to deal in the short time available to me. He asked about troops and police from South Africa being in Rhodesia. There are no South African troops in Rhodesia. There is a small number of South African policemen there, very much smaller, I am assured, than the figure suggested by the right hon. Gentleman. We have made representations to the South African Government about the continued presence of these police in Southern Rhodesia, as I presume the previous Government did because the troops were there when they were in office. We have merely continued in this sense what they were doing, and we shall continue to do what we can to secure their withdrawal.
The right hon. Gentleman raised the question of the Ramotse case. We have naturally followed this with the closest attention, but the facts have not been clearly established. I am told that Ramotse claims to be a Zambian citizen, and we therefore have no locus standi to intervene with the South African Government on account of his personal status. The right hon. Gentleman referred to the action of the Botswana Government. The question whether Ramotse was arrested on Botswana territory is a matter for them, and we are not in a position to say categorically anything in relation to that. Although, in theory, we have a responsibility for the actions of the police in Rhodesia, right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite know that neither we nor


they before us have been in a position to influence those actions over the last few years. On those issues the position is as I have stated it.
On the question of the effectiveness of sanctions, we have been hearing for years—I think that the right hon. Member for Leeds, East said it today in his speech—that sanctions are beginning to bite. That is what we have heard so many times, and of course we all remember the speech made in Lagos by the present Leader of the Opposition when he talked of them being effective in "weeks rather than months". That speech was made in 1966.
The fact, as I have tried to show to the House, is that sanctions have had some real effect on the Rhodesian economy, but they have so far had no political effect. That is the difference, and that is the point which I think must be emphasised. There has not been the effect which right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite, when they were on this side of the House, so confidently predicted. What we say is that it is our belief that they are having a real effect on the economy, but that they have not persuaded the Rhodesian régime to take the steps which right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite or we wish they would.

Mr. Healey: rose—

Mr. Godber: I have very little time. I am trying to deal with some of the points raised by the right hon. Gentleman. The most important point that I want to deal with is the constant theme that it is not sufficient for us to say, as my right hon. Friend said earlier, that sanctions will be maintained during the attempted negotiations. This is the point with which I think the right hon. Gentleman wanted me to deal. The argument is that if we are to hope to succeed in negotiations we have to say quite clearly that if the negotiations fail sanctions will continue to be maintained. That is how I understand the position.
Our position on this is straightforward. It is that the Order before the House continues sanctions for one year. That is precisely what the previous Government did. That was precisely their position, and indeed it is the maximum period allowed for under the Act which they

passed. Hon. Gentlemen opposite may claim that the techniques for which they now call must be right, but I feel entitled to point out to the House that the techniques which right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite used when in office neither brought about an agreed solution, nor did they achieve a solution by coercion, so they are scarcely in a position today to tell us what is the best way to achieve a solution. I am surely entitled to say that the advice given to us by them is not necessarily the best suited to bring about a solution.
We are maintaining sanctions for one year in the Order before the House. If the negotiations should be concluded before the year is up and we should wish to amend the Order to take account of that fact, we shall have to submit an amendment to the House. It is not reasonable to expect me to go further than that tonight in regard to the Order. Right hon. Gentlemen opposite never asked for a further period, and I do not think it right that we should be told, or be expected, to ask for a further period. We have taken up a clear position in regard to this. This is a genuine attempt which we are going to make to reach a solution. We are retaining sanctions while that is on, and surely that is an honourable position, and one which deserves the support of the House.
This is a difficult subject, and it is one on which emotions are very strong on both sides of the House. This has been clearly shown in the speeches that we have heard tonight. Many issues have been raised in relation to it, but the fundamental one is whether there is a possibility of getting the present régime in Rhodesia back within the comity of nations, back within the rules which will enable us to bring them back into the Commonwealth and so enable them to enjoy recognition by other nations. That is surely a worth-while objective.
I realise the sincerity of my right hon. and hon. Friends who feel that the time has come to institute a change, but I beg them to realise the heavy responsibility that rests on the Government at this time. My right hon. Friend has promised to make one further effort, and I suggest to the House that he deserves the support of the whole House in the attempt that he is seeking to make. He


does recognise the difficulties of the problem. He has not attempted in any way to camouflage these. But one further effort is surely right. That is the promise that we made to the people of this country, and it is in accord with their wishes that the effort should be made. If it succeeds it could bring excellent benefits, not merely to Rhodesia, but to the whole of black Africa, which I believe

is important to all of us here, as well as to the British people.

Question put,
That the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 (Continuation) Order 1970, a draft of which was laid before this House on 27th October, be approved:—

The House divided: Ayes 276, Noes 21.

Division No. 20.]
AYES
[6.59 p.m.


Adley, Robert
Edwards, Robert (Bilston)
Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)


Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash)
Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)
Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)


Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)
Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)
Jones, Barry (Flint, East)


Amery, Rt. Hn. Julian
Ellis, Tom
Joseph, Rt. Hn. Sir Keith


Archer, Jeffrey (Louth)
Emery, Peter
Judd, Frank


Armstrong, Ernest
Evans, Fred
Kaufman, Gerald


Astor, John
Eyre, Reginald
Kellett, Mrs. Elaine


Atkins, Humphrey
Farr, John
Kershaw, Anthony


Atkinson, Norman
Fenner, Mrs. Peggy
King, Tom (Bridgwater)


Baker, Kenneth (St. Marylebone)
Finsberg, Geoffrey (Hampstead)
Kinsey, J. R.


Batsford, Brian
Fisher, Nigel
Kirk, Peter


Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton
Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston)
Kitson, Timothy


Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood
Fletcher-Cooke, Charles
Knox, David


Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)
Fookes, Miss Janet
Lambie, David


Benyon, W.
Ford, Ben
Lambton, Antony


Berry, Hon. Anthony
Fortescue, Tim
Lane, David


Blaker, Peter
Foster, Sir John
Latham, Arthur


Blenkinsop, Arthur
Fox, Marcus
Lawson, George


Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S. W.)
Freeson, Reginald
Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick


Booth, Albert
Fry, Peter
Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry


Boscawen, R. T.
Gardner, Edward
Le Marchant, Spencer


Bossom, Sir Clive
Garrett, W. E.
Leonard, Dick


Bowden, Andrew
Gibson-Watt, David
Lever, Rt. Hn. Harold


Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John
Ginsburg, David
Longden, Gilbert


Braine, Bernard
Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B.
Loveridge, John


Bray, Ronald
Golding, John
Lyon, Alexander W. (York)


Brown, Ronald (Shoreditch &amp; F'bury)
Goodhew, Victor
MacArthur, Ian


Buchan, Norman
Gower, Raymond
McBride, Neil


Buchanan-Smith, Alick (Angus, N &amp; M)
Grant, Anthony (Harrow, C.)
McCrindle, R. A.


Buck, Antony
Grant, George (Morpeth)
McGuire, Michael


Butler, Adam (Bosworth)
Green, Alan
McLaren, Martin


Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James
Grieve, Percy
Maclennan, Robert


Campbell, Rt. Hn. G. (Moray &amp; Nairn)
Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds)



Campbell, I. (Dunbartonshire, West)
Grimond, Rt. Hn. J.
Macmillan, Maurice (Farnham)


Carlisle, Mark
Grylls, Michael
McNair-Wilson, Michael


Carr, Rt. Hn. Robert
Cummer, Selwyn
Maddan, Martin


Carter, Ray (Birmingh'm, Northfield)
Hamilton, James (Bothwell)
Madel, David


Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara
Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)
Marten, Neil


Channon, Paul
Hamling, William
Mason, Rt. Hn. Roy


Chapman, Sydney
Hannam, John (Exeter)
Maude, Angus


Churchill, W. S.
Hardy, Peter
Maudling, Rt. Hn. Reginald


Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)
Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)
Mawby, Ray


Cockeram, Eric
Haselhurst, Alan
Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.


Coleman, Donald
Hattersley, Roy
Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert


Coombs, Derek
Havers, Michael
Meyer, Sir Anthony


Cooper, A. E.
Hawkins, Paul
Mikardo, Ian


Cordle, John
Hayhoe, Barney
Miller, Dr. M. S.


Cormack, Patrick
Healey, Rt. Hn. Denis
Mills, Peter (Torrington)


Costain, A. P.
Heseltine, Michael
Moate, Roger


Critchley, Julian
Higgins, Terence L.
Monks, Mrs. Connie


Crosland, Rt. Hn. Anthony
Hill, James (Southampton, Test)
More, Jasper


Cunningham, G. (Islington, S. W.)
Holland, Philip
Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)


Dalyell, Tam
Hordern, Peter
Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)


d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Maj.-Gen. Jack
Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas
Morrison, Charles (Devizes)


Davis, Clinton (Hackney, Central)
Howe, Hn. Sir Geoffrey (Reigate)
Murray, Hn. Ronald King


Dean, Paul
Howell, David (Guildford)
Murton, Oscar


Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F.
Howell, Ralph (Norfolk, North)
Normanton, Tom


Dell, Rt. Hn. Edmund
Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen, North)
Onslow, Cranley


Dixon, Piers
Hunt, John
Oppenheim, Mrs. Sally


Doig, Peter
Hutchison, Michael Clark
Orme, Stanley


Douglas, Dick (Stirlingshire, E.)
Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)
Oswald, Thomas


Douglas-Home, Rt. Hn. Sir Alec
Jeger, Mrs. Lena (H'b'n &amp; St. P'cras, S.)
Owen, Idris (Stockport, North)


Driberg, Tom
Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford)
Page, Graham (Crosby)


Duffy, A. E. P.
Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)
Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles


Eadie, Alex
Jenkins, Rt. Hn. Roy (Stechford)
Parker, John (Dagenham)


Eden, Sir John
Jessel, Toby
Pavitt, Laurie




Peart, Bt. Hn. Fred
Scott-Hopkins, James
Tilney, John


Pendry, Tom
Sharples, Richard
Tomney, Frank


Percival, Ian
Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh &amp; Whitby)
Trafford, Dr. Anthony


Perry, Ernest G.
Shelton, William (Clapham)
Trew, Peter


Peyton, Rt. Hn. John
Short, Rt. Hn. Edward (N'c'tle-u-Tyne)
Vaughan, Dr. Gerard


Pink, R. Bonner
Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)
Waddington, David


Pounder, Rafton
Silkin, Hn. S. C. (Dulwich)
Wainwright, Edwin


Prescott, John
Sillars, James
Walden, Brian (B'm'ham, All Saints)


Price, David (Eastleigh)
Silverman, Julius
Walker, Harold (Doncaster)


Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)
Simeons, Charles
Walker, Rt. Hn. Peter (Worcester)


Prior, Rt. Hn. J. M. L.
Sinclair, Sir George
Wallace, George


Pym, Rt. Hn. Francis
Small, William
Ward, Dame Irene


Raison, Timothy
Spearing, Nigel
Warren, Kenneth


Rankin, John
Speed, Keith
Weatherill, Bernard


Rawlinson, Rt. Hn. Sir Peter
Spriggs, Leslie
Wells, William (Walsall, N.)


Redmond, Robert
Sproat, Iain
White, Roger (Gravesend)


Rees, Hn. Peter (Dover)
Stallard, A. W.
Whitehead, Phillip


Rees-Davies, W. R.
Stanbrook, Ivor
Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William


Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David
Stewart, Rt. Hn. Michael (Fulham)
Wilkinson, John


Richard, Ivor
Stodart, Anthony (Edinburgh, W.)
Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)


Ridley, Hn. Nicholas
Tapsell, Peter
Wilson, Rt. Hn. Harold (Huyton)


Roberts, Wyn (Conway)
Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)
Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard


Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)
Taylor, Edward M. (G'gow, Cathcart)
Worsley, Marcus


Roper, John
Tebbit, Norman
Wylie, Rt. Hn. N. R.


Rose, Paul B.
Thatcher, Rt. Hn. Mrs. Margaret



Ross, Rt. Hn. William (Kilmarnock)
Thomas, John Stradling (Monmouth)
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)
Thomas, Rt. Hn. Peter (Hendon, S.)
Mr. Hector Monro and


Russell, Sir Ronald
Thomson, Rt. Hn. G. (Dundee, E.)
Mr. Walter Clegg.


NOES


Baker, W. H. K. (Banff)
Kerby, Capt. Henry
Stokes, John


Bell, Ronald
King, Evelyn (Dorset, South)
Taylor, Robert (Croydon, N. W.)


Biff en, John
Mitchell, Lt.-Col. C. (Aberdeenshire, W.)
Turton, Rt. Hn. R. H.


Biggs-Davison, John
Molyneaux, James
Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek


Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)
Montgomery, Fergus



Fell, Anthony
Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Fraser, Rt. Hn. Hugh (St'fford &amp; Stone)
Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon
Mr. Stephen Hastings and


Hay, John
Soref, Harold
Rear-Admiral Morgan-Giles.


Hiley, Joseph

Resolved,

That the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 (Continuation) Order 1970, a draft of which was laid before this House on 27th October, be approved.

PRIVATE BUSINESS

GREATER LONDON COUNCIL (GENERAL POWERS) BILL (By Order)

Order for consideration, as amended, read.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Bill, as amended, be now considered.

7.12 p.m.

Mr. Ronald Brown: I am glad to have been called at this stage to speak because there is an important question which I should like to have resolved and have in the open before the discussion of the Bill begins.
It might be thought that the association representing borough councils is in a position to ask the G.L.C. to spend money on behalf of the borough councils. I gather, however, that according to Clause 14(1)(a) there must be a vote by each of the borough councils concerned so that the association representing them has a mandate, as it were, from three-quarters of the borough councils.
I understand that originally the idea of the London Boroughs Association was that there should be a simple vote at a meeting of the Association among the councils represented there. I am advised, however, by certain people who claim to know the law that Clause 14(1)(a) may preclude that from happening and that, in fact, this greater number of councils will have to vote and that that vote will, in due course, have to be conveyed to the Association. It is important that the position is made clear because, to my knowledge, the Association was under the impression that only a simple vote among the council representatives was necessary.

7.14 p.m.

Mr. Kenneth Baker: I will not comment on the point raised by the hon. Member for Shoreditch and Finsbury (Mr. Ronald Brown).
I commend the Bill, as amended at the consideration stage, to the House. Several Amendments were made at that stage, mostly of a minor and drafting nature, though material changes occurred in Part IV of the Bill, which deals with walkways.
Walkways are basically of two sorts, those at ground level, which hon. Members will probably know as pedestrian precincts, and those at an elevated level, on the first or second floor level—for example the walkways in the Barbican scheme or the Shell Centre. When these sorts of buildings are constructed there is a conflict of interest between the developers, private owners or property users and the statutory undertaking authorities that must provide certain public services, like gas and water. This could also affect the electricity and Post Office authorities, but to all practical ends it is gas and water undertakings with which we are concerned tonight.
The G.L.C. is trying in this Bill, as it tried at the consideration stage, to hold the ring between, on the one side, the property owners, shop owners and developers and, on the other side, the gas and water undertakings. The G.L.C. has tried to strike a fair balance between the rights of developers and the needs of the gas and water authorities.
For example, if the gas and water authorities are required, as part of their statutory undertakings, to provide gas and water to a building, the best way for that to be done might be by taking the necessary pipes and cables underneath or along a walkway. If that is an open thoroughfare there may not be very much to object to, but it may form part of a building or a shopping development, in which case the Multiple Shops Federation and the National Association of Property Owners both felt that their interests had to be protected in this matter.
The Committee decided, after a lengthy discussion—indeed, the discussion went on for nine days—first, that the apparatus of the statutory undertakings should be installed in a walkway only if no practical alternative was possible, and secondly, that every case must be referred to the Ministry, whether or not a practical alternative was possible.
As this was not entirely a matter which concerned London—because authorities and private developers are building these sort of constructions in growing numbers—the Committee also said:
Your Committee have carefully considered this Bill, which was introduced into Parliament mainly in accordance with an undertaking given by the Promoters during the passage of the


Greater London Council (General Powers) Bill of last Session.
This is the material passage:
They are of the opinion that the matters dealt with in Part IV of the Bill are more properly a matter for public legislation. While they have therefore agreed to the Bill, subject to certain amendments"—
to which I have referred
they consider these provisions to be of a purely temporary nature, and they recommend that the Government should bring forward legislation at an early date in the next Session to provide a comprehensive code for Walkways".
Obviously this is a matter which must be cleared up, for it is bound to arise throughout the country. I hope that the Minister will give an indication of the Government's intentions.

7.18 p.m.

The Minister for Local Government and Development (Mr. Graham Page): The House is acquainted with the provisions of the Bill, which is, of course, a carry over from the previous Parliament where, in addition to being debated on Second Reading on the Floor of the House, it occupied, as my hon. Friend the Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Kenneth Baker) said, nine days in Select Committee. Those deliberations before the Select Committee have been of great assistance to the Government.
Private Bills are frequently the pioneers of reforms in the general law and this Bill has undoubtedly been such a pioneer, particularly in relation to the subject of walkways, to which my hon. Friend referred.
The first private Measure to include statutory provisions for walkways was the City of London (Various Powers) Act, 1967 and since then the Newcastle-upon-Tyne Corporation Act, 1968, the Liverpool Corporation Act, 1967 and the Greater London Council (General Powers) Act, 1969, have each included walkway provisions.
In February, 1968, an advisory group was set up to consider the problems raised by the increasing provision of walkways and, in particular, to consider whether this matter should be left to private Bill legislation or whether there should be general legislation on the subject. Its report was produced in February, 1969, and had quite a limited circulation at that time.

Copies were sent to interested associations, hon. Members who had asked to see it, local authorities, parliamentary agents and so on. Because of the interest in the report, however, I have arranged for copies to be available for hon. Members in the Library.
The Greater London Council's walkway powers were first taken in the 1969 Act. Unfortunately, the advisory groups report on walkways was too late to influence the drafting of that Measure.
During its passage, however, the Bill was amended so that statutory undertakers would be able not only to use their existing powers to place their apparatus at ground level where there happen to be walkways at ground level, but to place apparatus on elevated walkways with the agreement, in this case, of the Greater London Council or of the borough councils. In case of disagreement, an arbitration procedure was laid down in the 1969 Act, but the details of that procedure were open to criticism and the Greater London Council gave an undertaking during the passage of the Bill that led to that 1969 Act to introduce amendments. Those amendments now appear in Part IV.
The amendments led to a long discussion in the Select Committee, which amended the Bill to require the Minister of Housing and Local Government, first, to determine disputes over whether or not a proposed walkway was similar to a normal street, and therefore one where statutory undertakers might exercise their existing powers and, secondly, to give a right to statutory undertakers to install their apparatus in an elevated walkway only if the Minister was satisfied that there was no satisfactory practical alternative. In that case, the Minister may specify an apparatus and the manner in which it will be installed.
The Select Committee also submitted to the House a special report, which has been quoted by my hon. Friend the Member for St. Marylebone recommending general legislation on walkways in this present Session. I need not repeat that recommendation, but I hope that hon. and right hon. Members will be glad to know that the Government have accepted the Select Committee's recommendations that there should be general legislation on the subject of walkways. Work is in hand on


this legislation and a Bill will be introduced—not, I fear, in this Session, but certainly as soon as possible having regard to the legislative programme. As is apparent from the advisory group's report, legislation on the subject is bound to be complex. It involves such matters as planning, highways, compensation, public utilities, safety, policing, fire precautions, building regulations, and so on.
Not surprisingly, perhaps, the walkway provisions in the current Greater London Council Bill and in the 1969 Act do not in a number of respects follow the recommendations of the advisory group, nor, indeed, do the other local Acts which I have mentioned obtained by Newcastle-upon-Tyne and Liverpool, and it will be necessary to reconsider the provisions applying to these three cities—Greater London, Liverpool and Newcastle-upon-Tyne.
The general legislation may not in all respects follow in detail the report of the advisory group, but the report provides a very valuable starting-point from which to consider the complex issues involved. Bearing in mind this complexity and the views of the Select Committee on the need for general legislation, it would clearly be undesirable for Private Acts to proliferate these walkways powers. It would, however, be unreasonable to oppose the present Bill on those grounds. I would be happy to see the Bill passed with its present provisions relating to walkways and, perhaps, for those provisions to be overtaken in due course by general legislation.
I want to reserve the position of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State on the general legislation as regards, in particular, the arbitration jurisdiction placed on the Minister by the amendment proposed by the Select Committee. I am not at all sure that to require the Minister to arbitrate is in this case the correct procedure for arbitrating. It may be proper to set up some other form of arbitration between the owners, the local authority and the statutory undertakers. However, this aspect is receiving careful considerating, and in due course we shall lay the proposals before the House.
There will, of course, be the usual discussions with interested parties when work on the general legislation has gone far enough. But, pending the introduction of legislation, if any hon. or right hon.

Member is moved on reading the report—copies of which, as I have said, I have had placed in the Library—wants to bring any matters to my attention for consideration in the drafting of the legislation, I hope that he will do so.
Another matter that I wish to mention—

Mr. Ronald Brown: Before the Minister leaves that point, he will recall that I asked the Attorney-General of the time whether he would examine whether or not in any claim against statutory undertakers or borough councils responsible for walkways, the judgment made in 1968 on an application under the 1961 Highways Act—which failed because the distances between the paving stones were very great—would still hold in regard to damage sustained by any person walking on a walkway. It is not clear here, although the matter has been closely examined, whether or not the 1961 Act in respect of nonfeasance will be applicable, and whether the 1968 High Court judgment invalidates Section 1 of the 1961 Act.

Mr. Page: The position is that in the City of London, the Newcastle-upon-Tyne and the Greater London Council Measures walkways are not highways, so that the misfeasance or nonfeasance rule does not apply. In the Newcastle Measure, walkways are highways and it may well be that the misfeasance and nonfeasance rule does apply. I am speaking without a note in choosing in which city it is a highway and in which cities it is not a highway, but in that case the walkway is a highway and in the others it is not. This is a subject to which we are giving very considerable study in preparing the coming Bill: whether these walkways should be highways and one then subtracts certain rights and duties from them, or whether one makes walkways ordinary rights of way and adds certain highway duties to them. I ask the hon. Gentleman to await our proposals on legislation, but I assure him that the point he makes will be carefully borne in mind.
Since the hon. Gentleman has intervened, perhaps I might deal with his question on Clause 14. I understand that this Clause has arisen from an arrangement between the Greater London Council and the London Boroughs Association by reason of certain contributions


to voluntary organisations providing services, mainly health and welfare, for London as a whole. Those contributions are at present made by the Council on behalf of the London boroughs and recovered by the Council by means of the rates precept. The London Boroughs Association requested the Council to promote this Clause in place of the existing arrangement so that there would be a statutory basis that would enable the boroughs to control their own communal expenditure on such contributions, and on the provision and maintenance of hostels for drug addicts. That would relieve the council of the need to cater for this in its precept. I think that what the hon. Gentleman was concerned with was whether this would need some request from the London Boroughs Association. I do not think that follows. It would require some request from the borough council concerned. Once it is included in this Private Bill, it is within the power of the Greater London Council and of the borough council concerned.

Mr. Ronald Brown: This is the point I was questioning. I believe that the London Boroughs Association believes that all that it was doing was ratifying something which it had normally done, on voting, by simple majority—that is, by two-thirds majority—of the total number voting in favour of any distribution of funds. We understood that by this method we were making it statutory that we did not have to oblige ourselves to the G.L.C. but that we would increase the voting to a three-quarters majority.
As I read it and as I understand the hon. Gentleman, he is now saying that the borough council would have to vote separately before the Association could accept it as a part of the three-quarters vote that is necessary. If this is true, it means that all the voluntary bodies would have to make their applications to the Association much earlier so that the Order would go out to the councils to determine their attitude to it and then be received back by the Association before it could decide

whether there was a three-quarters majority. Then it would have to ask the G.L.C. to pay. If this is not clear, we could be getting what we did not want, mainly, a delay in helping the voluntary organisations.

Mr. Page: I will look into the matter again and let the hon. Gentleman know if I am wrong in what I said. We wish to avoid any delays such as that which he has referred to.
The third matter arises out of Part III, which deals with superannuation. These are some small amendments to the superannuation scheme. It is rather urgent that they be provided in the Bill, because certain individuals are losing by the present law. Therefore, I would not want to delay Private Bill legislation on this subject, but this is a matter upon which general legislation is necessary and, indeed, the contents of such legislation has been fully agreed between all the parties concerned. The legislation will make general provision concerning superannuation for local government employees and will simplify the procedure, particularly with regard to the amendment of the rules relating to superannuation. It will avoid the necessity for Private Bills on these subjects in future. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State will introduce this legislation as soon as possible, but again, because of the parliamentary timetable, I cannot yet say when that will be.
I commend the Bill to the House and hope that it receives the approval of the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill, as amended, considered.

Bill to be read the third time.

CITY OF LONDON (VARIOUS POWERS) BILL (By Order)

BRITISH RAILWAYS BILL (By Order)

Read the Third time and passed.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA

7.34 p.m.

The Attorney-General (Sir Peter Rawlinson): I beg to move,
That the Southern Rhodesia (Matrimonial Jurisdiction) Order 1970 (S.I., 1970, No. 1540), dated 19th October 1970, a copy of which was laid before this House on 23rd October, be approved.
The effect of the Order, if it is approved by the House, will be to confer extended matrimonial jurisdiction cm the United Kingdom courts. Its purpose is to mitigate personal hardship arising from the invalidity of appointments to the High Court of Rhodesia. In using the words "mitigate hardship" I must make it clear that the Order will provide only limited relief and only to some people. It does so firmly by dealing with the juridiction of the United Kingdom courts.
The effect of judgments by the Rhodesian courts or by Rhodesian judges in United Kingdom law has recently been reviewed and adjudged in the case of Adams v. Adams, in which my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Wimbledon (Mr. Havers) was a counsel. That case illustrated the hardship. Though the Order may be of limited help to that petitioner, the facts of the case illustrate the need for the Order, if the House accepts it.
Mrs. Adams in February, 1970, secured an order from the High Court of Rhodesia for the restitution of conjugal rights against her husband, the respondent. That order was made by Mr. Justice Goldin, who had been appointed to the Rhodesian High Court bench before 11th November, 1965, the date of the declaration of illegal independence.
In April, 1970, Mrs. Adams petitioned for and was granted a decree of divorce, but that divorce was made by Mr. Justice Macaulay, who had been appointed to the Rhodesian bench in November, 1968, which was after the declaration of illegal independence.
Mrs. Adams wished to re-marry. She applied to the Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages saying that she had a decree of divorce. She was informed by the Registrar that the purported decree would not be recognised by English law as validly terminating her marriage. Accordingly, she petitioned

the High Court in England for a declaration that her marriage had been validly dissolved by the High Court of Rhodesia.
In July, 1970, the High Court dismissed Mrs. Adams's petition for such a declaration. The grounds for the dismissing of that declaration were that the person purporting to grant the divorce decree in Rhodesia—Mr. Macaulay—was not a judge de jure of the High Court of Rhodesia. The lawful Constitution—the legal Constitution—of Southern Rhodesia is the Southern Rhodesian (Constitution) Order in Council, 1961, as amended by the Constitution Amendment Act, 1964.
As the House will be well aware, the régime purported to promulgate a new Constitution in 1965 and Mr. Macaulay has been ostensibly appointed under this Constitution. However, the Southern Rhodesia Constitution Order, 1965, made under the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965, declared void any new Constitution not authorised by Parliament.
In giving that judgment, the President of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division gave some guidance to marriage officers, when he said this:
Apart from Mr. Justice Greenfield and Mr. Justice Macaulay, the judges of the High Court of Rhodesia were all validly appointed under the 1961–64 Constitution. In the eyes of English law, in my judgment, they can only cease to be judges of the High Court of Rhodesia in accordance with the machinery of the 1961–64 Constitution. A mere declaration by a judge that he is not sitting under the 1961–64 Constitution does not satisfy such machinery. The possible effect of a renunciation of allegiance was not argued before me—presumably because it did not affect any issue in the instant case: it must await decision in a case in which the issue arises.
The effect of the court's judgment was, first, that a judge purporting to be appointed to the bench in Southern Rhodesia under a constitution promulgated by the régime was not valid and any judicial act done by him could not be recognised in this country; and, second, that judges of the High Court appointed before the declaration of independence could still perform valid judicial acts at least up to the date when the régime purported to institute a republic.
Though, as I indicated, the President said that it had not been argued in the Adams case, as it certainly was not argued, there must, I should point out


to the House, be very considerable doubt whether judges could be held to be performing functions lawfully as Her Majesty's judges holding office under the 1961–64 Constitution once they accept service under an ostensibly republican machine which disowns the Crown's authority.
This being the law, as set out by the President, it is to help individuals that this Order is introduced. I am well aware that, because of the passage of time, it is not a complete remedy for individual problems.
There are approximately 20 to 25 cases notified annually by the Registrar-General in which people wish to re-marry on the strength of Southern Rhodesian divorce decrees. There are also cases in which married couples from Rhodesia who have not been divorced there would wish to obtain a valid decree. Hardship arises because there is no court to which they can go to obtain an effective decree.
The United Kingdom jurisdiction which the Order seeks to extend is based upon the principles of domicile and, in certain cases, of residence. The general scheme of the Order is to give the same jurisdiction to the courts of each part of the United Kingdom—England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland; my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Advocate is with me here this evening—to entertain proceedings for divorce or nullity of marriage of a person domiciled or resident in Southern Rhodesia as if that person had been domiciled or resident in that part of this country—whether England, Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland.
I turn shortly to the articles in the Order. Paragraph (1) of Article 1 confers jurisdiction on the United Kingdom courts, first where either party to a marriage is domiciled in Southern Rhodesia. This will then confer the basic jurisdiction of the United Kingdom court to entertain proceedings for divorce or nullity. That is where domicile founds jurisdiction. Proceedings then by either party can be entertained.

Mr. S. C. Silkin: Is the divorce law according to the Rhodesian decrees the same as or different from the divorce law according to the laws of England and also of Scotland?

The Attorney-General: I understand that it is the same. I will come to the Divorce Reform Act, 1969, which will by 1st January, 1971, be in force in this country. In Rhodesia the grounds of and the law of divorce are the same as they are in the United Kingdom, as I understand it.
First, then, there will be jurisdiction where either party is domiciled in Southern Rhodesia. Second, there will be jurisdiction if a party was at any time domiciled in Southern Rhodesia. This relates to the jurisdiction under Section 40(1)(a) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965. That provides for the case where the husband has a foreign domicile but had a Rhodesian domicile immediately before he deserted his wife. Third, jurisdiction is conferred if a party is resident in Southern Rhodesia. This will give the United Kingdom courts jurisdiction when it cannot be founded on domicile but can be founded on residence—that is, if the petitioner is resident in England and the respondent is resident in Southern Rhodesia.
Fourth, it confers jurisdiction if a party has for any period been resident in Southern Rhodesia. This relates to the provisions of Section 40(1)(b) of the Matrimonial Causes Act. It confers jurisdiction in cases where a husband does not have a Rhodesian domicile or a United Kingdom domicile, and the wife has a period of residence in Southern Rhodesia to be taken into account in calculating the three-year period of residence under Section 40(1)(b).
The effect of the proviso to Article 1 which appears at the bottom of the page is that if there is a break between periods of residence and the petitioner has been residing in some country other than the United Kingdom and Rhodesia, that will be disregarded in calculating any period of residence required under the law here—for instance, the three years under Section 40(1)(b). That takes into account the fact that some of the parties who left Southern Rhodesia after the illegal declaration of independence may well have spent some time in other countries before deciding to come to this country.
Paragraph (2) of the article requires that a party shall have six months ordinary residence in the part of the United Kingdom concerned before he can institute proceedings here. Paragraph (3)


of Article 1 provides for the same law to be applied as if the parties had been domiciled in a part of the United Kingdom where the proceedings are brought.
Article 2 provides for decrees granted in the United Kingdom under the Order to have effect in the law of Southern Rhodesia as well as in the law of the part of the United Kingdom where it is granted. It is necessary to legislate in terms which make decrees of United Kingdom courts effective in relation to parties in Southern Rhodesia, and it may also facilitate recognition of decrees by third countries because they take effect in the law of the domicile.
If the House approves this Order, persons who have grounds for divorce or nullity under the law in this country will be able to apply to the United Kingdom courts for divorce or nullity. Since the grounds for divorce under the law of Southern Rhodesia are not dissimilar from those here, the party who obtained a decree in Southern Rhodesia will be able to institute fresh proceedings in this country. But the House must accept that those who were guilty in proceedings in Southern Rhodesia will benefit from the provisions of the Order only if they have grounds for divorce or nullity under the law of this country, and, as the law stands at the present time, the Order may not relieve the situation of the guilty parties to an invalid Rhodesian proceeding.
The Divorce Reform Act, 1969 will assist such a person because the position of the guilty party will be improved; I use the words "guilty party" in the sense in which it is used under the present law. But that position will be improved under the Divorce Reform Act, 1969 which comes into force at the beginning of 1971; irretrievable breakdown of marriage will then become the sole ground for divorce. But the guilty party will have to petition under Section 2 of the Divorce Reform Act, 1969 if there is consent and the parties have been living apart for at least two years, or alternatively the parties have been living apart for a period of five years.
The general object of the Order, as I hope I have made clear, is to take immediate action to help individuals whose personal status has been affected by the

consequences of the constitutional dispute and who are clearly suffering hardship. It is recognised that there are some cases in which the Order does not and will not enable persons affected to obtain relief—some of those persons against whom an invalid decree has been granted.
I would remind the House of what has been said on the earlier Order by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary that the Government are proposing negotiations to see whether a negotiated settlement is possible. If this were to come about, the difficulties—and, of course, there are difficulties—arising from the present invalidity of judicial acts in Rhodesia would disappear. But I again remind the House that this Order is firmly based on the extension of the jurisdiction of the courts of this country, and I hope that it will be generally acceptable as mitigating in part some of the individual cases of hardship, while retaining the extension of jurisdiction for the lawful and legal courts of this country.

7.50 p.m.

Sir Elwyn Jones: As the right hon. and learned Attorney-General has helpfully explained to this House, this Order follows the decision of the learned President of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division in the case of Adams v. Adams in which the President concluded that he found with reluctance that the law enjoined him to dismiss the wife's petition in that case.
Now that the President has pronounced authoritatively on this difficult subject, it is right that cases of hardship resulting from the present position should be sympathetically considered. On the other hand, nothing must be done to indicate either de facto or de jure the recognition of the Rhodesian régime or its institutions, or to infringe the resolutions of the Security Council on Rhodesia to which, of course, we as a country are a party. Happily it does not seem to me that the Order has either of those effects. If it had, we on this side of the House would oppose the Order. It appears to do nothing to detract from the obligations of the United Kingdom to abide by the relevant United Nations resolutions which call on all States not to recognise any of the institutions of the rebel régime.
As I understand it, it gives no sort of recognition to any decree or order of the Rhodesian courts but simply gives Rhodesian residents who have left Rhodesia and settled here for at least six months the right to petition for divorce or nullity of marriage in this country for a shorter period than would otherwise be required by virtue of the provisions of Section 40 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965. In other words, they will be able now to take proceeding after six months' residence here instead of having to wait for three years.
As the right hon. and learned Gentleman has pointed out, the effect of this Order is not very great either in numbers or its impact on the present legal position. It does not, as he indicated, deal with other kinds of Rhodesian judicial decisions like those concerning wills, guardianship, adoption and legitimacy, and clearly problems will continue to arise in that sphere as part of the inevitable and unhappy consequences of U.D.I.
I hope that I have properly interpreted the Order in terms of our international obligations. Having said that, we shall certainly not oppose it.

7.54 p.m.

Mr. Michael Havers: I was the person referred to by my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General as "the counsel in the case" and, therefore, I shall seek to avoid any direct reference to that case.
The Order, in my view, does not go far enough. It does not deal with any of those people who have obtained a decree of divorce in Rhodesia. They were the people described by the President of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division as innocent bystanders or victims of political circumstances over which they had no control. There are probably only about 30 of these people, but, as I understand it, this House protects a minority, however small. I was reassured in that view by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary when he said in the earlier debate that anything such as surcharges on mail which involve inhumanity or injustice, however small, will be looked at.
There are probably 30 people who have already been granted decrees of divorce in Southern Rhodesia. They are decrees

which all countries except this one up to now have recognised. They are decrees which might also be valid or invalid almost by a lottery. If one looks at the President's decision, one sees that it is a sheer piece of luck as to whether the person who finally grants the decree was a judge appointed before U.D.I. or after. In this case one might have had the work done originally by a judge who was pre-U.D.I., but had been recognised by the President's decision, but the final decree granted by a post-U.D.I. judge, and therefore invalid.
The divorce system in Rhodesia is different. In that country the proceedings are started by a petition for restitution of conjugal rights. That is heard and adjudged. If found proved, an order is made against the offending person. If that order is not complied with, a month or so afterwards the petitioner can go back to the court and virtually automatically a decree is then made. This creates a different foundation for decrees from that in this country.
The question which was raised from the benches apposite was one which creates a difficulty. The law in Rhodesia on divorce does not have a parallel jurisdiction with this country. One or two of the pending cases which are awaiting the decision of the President were cases in which the jurisdiction in Southern Rhodesia was fully satisfied and the decrees were properly granted, but those petitioners would not yet be entitled to sue for a decree of divorce in this country because in this country a three-year period for desertion was necessary but it was not necessary in Rhodesia.
In those circumstances, one gets this ridiculous situation where one spouse living in Southern Rhodesia is validly divorced and perhaps remarries. The other spouse in this country, believing up to that time that the decree was valid, has probably got engaged, has sought to obtain a marriage licence, probably has obtained a house and gone to a great deal of expense, and suddenly finds that the whole thing has to be put back. It will be put back not only for the delay that inevitably follows any application to a court for a decree—a delay of at least six months or perhaps a year—but in this case, where the foundation of jurisdiction between Southern Rhodesia and this country is not similar, there may


be a further delay particularly in cases where this country requires three years for a period of desertion, and Southern Rhodesia does not.
One knows of cases—I do not wish to cite any particular cases—where the delay may be quite considerable, where children will be affected and the whole happiness of two people has been thrown into total disarray by circumstances absolutely outside their control. I ask my right hon. and learned Friend to reconsider the position with regard to these very few people—probably 30 in all—who, in my submission, are entitled to have these special circumstances resolved to get them out of that difficulty.

8.0 p.m.

Mr. S. C. Silkin: Like my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for West Ham, South (Sir Elwyn Jones), I welcome the Order because it enables people who have left Rhodesia and have come to settle in this country to take steps to dissolve marriages which they would otherwise not be in a position to dissolve if they remained in Rhodesia.
The point which the hon. and learned Member for Wimbledon (Mr. Havers) made indicates that there are people who, despite the Order, will suffer hardship. Nonetheless, I welcome the Order and the fact that the Government have stood firm by the principle that they cannot recognise as being valid according to the law of this country acts done by the illegal régime or by persons appointed by the illegal régime. There is a cardinal principle which must be followed even though inevitably it will create hardship for some people, not only in the respect referred to by the hon. and learned Member for Wimbledon, but no doubt in many other respects.
There are one or two points about the Order which I find it a little difficult to understand and which I hope the Attorney-General or Lord Advocate will be able to explain. As I understand, before any person who has come to this country can take advantage of the facilities afforded by the Order he or she must fall within paragraph 2 of Article 1—that is, he or she must have been "ordinarily resident" in England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland for at least six months. The wording of the paragraph is "ordinarily resident" as

distinct from "resident" in the rest of the Order. I wonder whether that distinction is intended and, if so, what the reason for it is.
The more important aspect of the Order which seems to create an anomaly which I find it difficult to understand is this: the Attorney-General drew attention to the amendment to the law made shortly after the last war for the benefit of what were called G.I. wives, which enabled a wife to sue her husband for divorce notwithstanding that she was not domiciled in this country but providing she had been resident in this country for three continuous years. For example, when an English woman married an American Service man and became American by domicile, notwithstanding that American domicile she could obtain a divorce in this country once she had been resident here for at least three years. That facility was extremely valuable.
The concepts of domicile and residence are I think being investigated in this connection, and there is much to be said for a test of residence rather than domicile. This facility exists, for example, for immigrants to this country from the dominions when the wife remains in this country and has been in this country for more than three years and the husband may be domiciled elsewhere, having left this country.
In the Order the three-year test appears to have gone for people from Rhodesia. The primary test is that in paragraph (2) of Article 1—ordinary residence here for six months—and in order to make up the three years which may be required when the domicile is not an English or Scottish domicile, apparently the person in question, by virtue of the proviso to Article 1, is entitled to count a period in Rhodesia notwithstanding that there may have been a break between the residence in Rhodesia and the residence in this country.
In other words, if a resident of Rhodesia lived in Rhodesia between 11th November, 1965, and the end of 1968 and then went to live in Afghanistan and comes to this country in the spring of 1970 and is resident here for six months, the period between 11th November, 1965, and the time when she left Rhodesia to go to Afghanistan will be treated as though it had immediately preceded the


period of residence in this country so as to make up the necessary three years.
That is a privilege given to people who come from Rhodesia which is not given to English women married to American Service men or immigrants from the dominions who have been settled in this country for many years. I wonder why those who come from Rhodesia should be given this special advantage which is not given to our fellow countrymen or people who have adopted this country as their place of residence over a prolonged period. I hope that the Government spokesman will be able to explain the principle which appears to give this special advantage in these cases.
Subject to that, it seems to me right that those who suffer a disadvantage because of the existence of the illegal régime in Rhodesia should, when they come to this country, have that disadvantage mitigated as far as possible. For that reason, I welcome the Order.

8.9 p.m.

Mr. Ronald King Murray: I rise not to criticise the Order itself. I see the Lord Advocate is sitting opposite, and I hasten to assure him that I do not intend to raise any subject peculiarly relating to Scottish jurisdiction. It seems to me that this Order has been drafted with subtlety with the desirable result of providing a British remedy rather than recognising an illegal Rhodesian one.
The point which I want to make is that it is desirable and right that it should mitigate human hardship and personal injustice which refusal to recognise an illegal Rhodesian régime causes, and causes in particular to private persons, and therefore I am only too glad to join with other Members who have already done so in welcoming the Order.
I want, however, to raise the question whether the remedy provided goes far enough and whether there are not injustices which ought to be covered by the same type of remedy. The remedy proposed applies only to divorces and nullity proceedings and, in effect, as has already been pointed out, gives relief to Rhodesians who are seeking divorce, which would be recognised in this country, by means of the fiction that domicile or residence in Rhodesia is

domicile or residence in this country for the purpose of attracting the necessary domicile which will create jurisdiction to pronounce a valid decree. It would be difficult or impossible, it seems to me, to justify this course as a matter of legal principle; it seems to me to fly in the face of what is best in the law of domicile, and some of the anomalies which that Order introduces have already been pointed out. One of the advantages of the law of domicile is that it is based on something real and not on a fiction. But this step can be justified on the practical and temporary grounds of remedying severe personal injustice.
The defect, then, in my view, is that the Order is too narrow. It does not give a remedy for other legal ills which go with the principle of domicile—for matters of family law other than divorce, which have not yet been the subject of adverse legal decision such as the case of Adams; and it does not refer to a number of matters such as the legality of Rhodesian marriages, the legitimacy of children of such marriages, the validity of wills made according to the forms and formalities of the Rhodesian régime.
One might have expected that the cohesive principles of family law would have had priority of attention over the divisive principle of divorce. It might be that marriages before illegally appointed Rhodesian registrars would be invalid in this country. I think the possibility is real, and that children born of such marriages would be held by a British court, perhaps years from now, to be illegitimate; and that Rhodesian wills executed under the illegal régime's practice and forms might not be recognised as legally effective in this country. It seems to me that the human hardship and personal injustice caused thereby would be of at least as much concern as the anxiety of divorcees to get valid decrees. The remedies which I have suggested are necessary, to correct the evils to which I have pointed, seem to me to relate to situations which would cause more cruel injustice than anything which is remedied by the Order.
It may be that these fears are groundless, but are we certain? Are the Government certain that they are groundless? If they are not, I would urge them most earnestly to look into these additional matters and, if necessary, follow up this


Order with further orders directed to providing similar remedies against those private injustices.

8.13 p.m.

The Attorney-General: By leave of the House I would say that I am glad that both sides of the House have welcomed this Order, though I well appreciate the points which have been made by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Wimbledon (Mr. Havers) and the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Edinburgh, Leith (Mr. Murray). Of course, it is, as I have said right from the beginning, only limited in the mitigation of hardship, but I must tell the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Leith that the hardship which has been brought to the attention of this Government and their predecessors over the past years has been in this field rather than in the other matters which he brought to the attention of the House. I appreciate that those situations could arise, and it may be that sympathetic consideration will have to be given to them at some future time, provided that they can be dealt with in a way which is, as it were, within the jurisdictions of the courts of this country to be able to deal with them. That, of course, has to be my answer to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Wimbledon, too.
What the Government have been seeking to do is this. For good reasons set out by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary earlier this afternoon, though other hardship might well have been mitigated, what has had to be avoided is any recognition of the validity of the orders of the Government in Salisbury. Our policy is that that should happen only if and when there is a settlement of the whole of the constitutional dispute. Moreover, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for West Ham, South (Sir Elwyn Jones) pointed out, we have to take into account, of course, the Security Council's resolution which calls upon member States to take appropriate measures to ensure that any act performed by officials and institutions of the illegal régime shall not be accorded any recognition, official or otherwise, including judicial notices. So my answer to hon. and learned Gentlemen is that the hardship is certainly appreciated, and I can well understand when the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Leith

says that the Order does not go far enough. It must be for the reasons which I have stated that the Government are unable to go as far as hon. and learned Gentlemen would like.
To turn, if I may, to the points raised by the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Dulwich (Mr. S. C. Silkin), first of all he spoke about "ordinarily resident". As he will probably recollect, residence is a test for a decree of nullity, but there are special residence provisions that will apply to a decree of divorce, and that is the reason for using the "ordinarily" in Article 1(2). This lays down six months residence immediately preceding the institution of proceedings for nullity or divorce; "ordinarily resident" there is to deal with the matter of the cutting down of the three-year period compared with the six-months period which is the purpose of Article 1(2).
He was right to point out to the House that the effect of this Order, though, is to give a special advantage which may be in one way—

Sir Elwyn Jones: Before the right hon. and learned Gentleman leaves the point of ordinary residence, is there not a further implication in the words "ordinarily resident", that the party concerned must become ordinarily resident here and have quitted Rhodesia and, in a sense, deserted the rebellion? And that, if my interpretation of the words is right, makes this Order additionally attractive.

The Attorney-General: Yes that is certainly so, though of course, there is the provision, as has been pointed out, that a person may have quitted Southern Rhodesia and gone to another place as well; but eventually, before the person can take advantage of the Order, he has to have his qualifying period of residence here for six months, which must be that of ordinary residence.
If I may turn to the second point of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Dulwich, of course it is right, as I was saying, that we should recognise that, therefore, a person who is able now to rely upon this Order for bringing proceedings is in the position of having only six months' residence compared with three years' residence which, as he said, an Englishwoman married to


a United States serviceman would require, or in other circumstances, other persons. But the justification for that, surely, is that such a person, if he or she came from Rhodesia, may not have a court which can exercise a valid jurisdiction to terminate the marriage. The difficulty which would not be experienced by others is that there are, and may be, orders or decrees of the court in Southern Rhodesia which could not terminate the marriage. Though this was not decided in the Adams case, I have suggested that it would be a powerful argument that for judges to affirm allegiance to a republican constitution may mean that all such judges, irrespective of when they were appointed, may not now be able validly to make a decree of divorce, for instance.

Mr. S. C. Silkin: I do not think that so far, at any rate, the right hon. and learned Gentleman has dealt with my point, though perhaps he is coming to it. I would in no way criticism the Order were it not for the proviso. In other words, if the period of residence in Southern Rhodesia were immediately before the period of residence in this country, and between them they made up not less than the three years, that would put such people on a par with, for example, the English woman married to an American. What I do not understand is this. As I understand the law, if the English woman married to an American goes to America she must serve, as it were, three years in this country before she can get her divorce, whereas the Rhodesian woman who goes to America from Rhodesia has only to serve six months.

The Attorney-General: The hon. and learned Gentleman's criticism now seems

to be that we are being too generous, too kindly, to the Rhodesians in that position. I do not believe that that is so when we look at the reality of these cases, of which there are only about 20 or 25 in any year.
We have said in the proviso that there can be the termination of residence in Rhodesia and then the going elsewhere, to take into account that this did happen in certain cases, that after the declaration of independence people did leave and go somewhere else. Then to expect them have to come to this country and establish a three-year period, knowing that the courts of the country where they were married or domiciled, or where one of the parties was domiciled, are unable ever validly to terminate a marriage, would be unreasonable and would put upon them a burden even greater than that of being a person who is married and unable to terminate the marriage, if he or she so wishes, because there is no court that can do it. It is right to make this provision for those people.
We have done what we have set out to do. As has been recognised by the House, and as the hon. and learned Gentleman has said, we have carefully put the change that we make, this small but important relief of hardship, within the framework of the courts of this country. It is for those reasons that I hope that the House will generally accept the Order.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,
That the Southern Rhodesia (Matrimonial Jurisdiction) Order 1970 (S.I., 1970, No. 1540), dated 19th October, 1970, a copy of which was laid before this House on 23rd October, be approved.

Motion made and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Goodhew.]

TEESSIDE (UNIVERSITY PROVISION)

8.24 p.m.

Mr. William Rodgers: Yesterday afternoon I stood in bright autumn sunshine on the edge of the Cleveland Hills with Teesside behind me, looking towards Roseberry Topping and the North Yorkshire Moors—a very fine part of England in a number of ways. I was standing on what I believe to be the site of the new University of Teesside.
I know that the Under-Secretary of State for Education and Science visited the site a fortnight or so ago. He is a sympathetic and discerning man, and I am glad that he is here tonight. I have no complaint to make, and I shall certainly not embarrass him by making unreasonable requests. I shall not ask him, for example, to do what he has no power to do—to announce that Teesside is designated as the site of the next new university. Nor, through him, shall I ask the University Grants Committee to do what I cannot ask it to do under our rules of order—to declare its intention of making an early recommendation to the Secretary of State that there shall be a new university on Teesside.
What I shall do is to put on record the events of the past seven years since this first became a serious proposition, and review the present situation against both the recent projection of university needs in the 1980's and wider regional development considerations. I hope that the Under-Secretary, in taking note of our endeavours and giving us his blessing, will be able to give us a little guidance about the timetable and what further he expects from us so that our expectations will be fulfilled soon.
The possibility of creating a university on Teesside had been canvassed for a number of years, but only in a desultory fashion until the early 1960's. Accordingly, we missed out on the new wave of what have since been called the glass-plate universities—Sussex, Essex, York, Canterbury and the rest. I have no complaint about that either. I am a very reasonable man this evening in that respect. Given the haphazard way in which these new universities came into

being, the absence of a positive initiative on Teesside was to blame.
It was for this reason that in March, 1963, Dr. Jeremy Bray, then our colleague in the House, and I published a memorandum, of which I have a copy here, setting out the case for such a university. Our aim was to test opinion in the hope that others would adopt and promote the idea. We drew attention to the fact that Teesside was the only major industrial conurbation in the country without a university, and we saw it as the natural location within the northern region, which was well below the national average in university places, for the university expansion upon which everyone was agreed.
I should like to pay a special tribute to Jeremy Bray for the time and devotion he has given to this project. Teesside is greatly in his debt, and I am sure that everyone, irrespective of party, agrees. This is in no sense a party matter. Although he no longer sits with us for Middlesbrough, West, he is as concerned as ever that we should succeed.
Our memorandum received a widespread and enthusiastic welcome. To use the current jargon, I think that we clearly articulated the felt need. In July 1963, the then mayor of Middlesbrough called a meeting of interested bodies and individuals to consider possibilities, and an investigating committee representative of the whole community was set up. The University Grants Committee was informed, and, in December 1963, Dr. Bray and I had preliminary discussions with the then Minister, now Lord Boyle.
By April 1964, a promotion committee was at work, sites were being examined, Sir James Duff had become head of the project, and the present Prime Minister, then Secretary of State for Industry, Trade and Regional Development, had been brought into the picture. Thus, in December 1964, we were able to wait upon the U.G.C., and we delivered a full statement of our case. In January 1965, the responsible Minister, the present Under-Secretary's predecessor by several, I think, in the person of my hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland (Mr. Boyden), visited Teesside for discussion.
Then, on 24th February 1965, the Secretary of State, my right hon. Friend the Member for Grimsby (Mr. Crosland), made a statement in the House on the


development of higher education in the light of the Robbins Report. He said that no new universities were likely to be needed for 10 years, with one exception. The Government, he said, were
actively considering the possibility of creating within that period a completely new technological university institution in the North-East".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 24th February, 1965; Vol. 707, c. 391.]
On Teesside, we rejoiced that we had kept open an otherwise closing door, and we redoubled our efforts to show that we meant business.
Alas, we were to be disappointed. In a letter to Dr. Bray in October 1965, the door was banged shut. The Secretary of State paid tribute to the "enormous amount of work" which Teesside had put into its plan and said that he had been "greatly impressed by the enthusiasm and determination" committed to it. However, he said, given current projections of student numbers, restrictions on funds to the U.G.C. meant that he was forced to rule out the possibility of launching a new university institution, that is, any university, in the years immediately ahead. Our plan had to go into cold storage.
This was undoubtedly a blow. For my part—I say this frankly—I thought that local interest might be killed, or at least that the files would be closed and put away for the duration. But this was not to be. The groundwork went on. Meetings were held. Our excellent local newspapers, the Evening Gazette and the Northern Echo, continued to publish encouraging leading articles and, I may add, encouraging letters from representatives of the whole community. I think that we proved to be a typically resilient northern lot in refusing to take "No" for an answer.
Sooner than we expected, our faith was justified, for towards the end of last year we became aware that the Robbins projections for university places were being widely challenged, and from many different directions. It began to look as though new institutions would be needed much sooner than previously expected. We took it for granted—I am sure that we were right in this—that the Government of the day would seek to provide the places which ability and demand required in the 1980s. We could not see

how existing institutions could be expanded far and fast enough, and this was our opportunity; we were sure that we were at the head of the queue. So, in April this year, a representative meeting gave the project a new momentum, and, with Lord Fulton now as chairman of the executive committee, we are all ready to go.
I have told that story at some length so that no one will think that this is a half-baked scheme, the project more of enthusiasm than of careful research and study. The practical work has been well done, mature choices have been made, and we are not embarking in blinkers on a prestige project. We are fully aware, and we are in earnest.
We come, then, to the present situation, indeed, the present crisis, in higher education. On 15th July last, on the initiative of Lord Robbins, there was an important debate in another place. Then, a fortnight ago, we had the Education Planning Paper No. 2 on Student Numbers. The position is simple. Despite the much fiercer admission standards we are operating, we must provide many more places than previously anticipated if we are to meet the needs of the 1980s. That is the position in a nutshell. I am sure that the Under-Secretary would not seek to challenge it.
Estimates vary, but I should be content to accept the figure in the Planning Paper of 460,000 by 1981, that is, university places, out of 835,000 in full-time higher education as a whole in England, Scotland and Wales. I should be content to accept also Lord Aberdare's judgment on behalf of the Government that about 400,000 to 430,000 of these could be accommodated by the expansion of existing institutions. This leads a short fall of 30,000 to 60,000 places, which means, at a minimum, between four and seven new universities to be started in the 1970's.
Lord Robbins made his own expert view known in the debate in the other place, saying that, whatever was done—this is important—by way of expanding and ungrading other institutions, we should still need some new universities if the proportion of the university population was not to be seriously diminished. He made another closely relevant point, saying that the recent wave of new universities had been immensely beneficial


to the system of higher education as a whole. They have added to the variety and quality of higher education. I am sure that new creations can do the same. I hope that there will be a good deal more originality and experiment than in the past.
If there is a criticism to be made it is that we on Teesside were too cautious and conservative in establishing the form of the universities of the plate-glass generation. Our first proposal on Teesside was for a special institution for scientific and technological education and research, a so-called "sister" as described by the Robbins Report. There may be reason for looking at a formula rather differently now. We are undogmatic, and I know that our Chairman, Lord Fulton, has some interesting ideas with international overtones. We see a new situation from four years ago, when the door banged shut; new universities will he needed and needed soon.
There is another important point related less to educational need than to employment and environment. In our memorandum over seven years ago, we referred to a university contributing fully to the prosperity and growth of the area. We said that university education was itself a major industry, and that a university would create one new permanent job for every student enrolled, quite apart from large numbers employed on construction. That is a most important consideration. A university would provide a diversity of new jobs, which Teesside sorely needs. The figure for new jobs might build up over a period to provide as many as 10,000 by the 1980's, and this ignores the jobs in new industries that may well be attracted to Teesside by the existence of a university.
As for the quality of life, there is no doubt that a university provides a cultural spin-off for the neighbourhood. It creates new opportunities and broadens horizons. I would particularly expect this on Teesside, because we have in mind no ivory tower of gowns and mortar boards cut off from the community; we see an integrated university with close links with industry, part of our whole life, enriching it.
We are told that the new emphasis in the Government's regional policies is towards the improvement of infrastructure. So be it. I am not here to quarrel

tonight. But in this case, investment in a university on Teesside is wholly consistent with the Government's declared policy and would be the biggest single contribution to our future prosperity that any Government could make. I say that with the most careful consideration. It would bring Teesside enormous benefits. I should add that it would not be a rival to our fine polytechnic or a substitute for the improvement of its facilities. On the contrary, far from its challenging what we already have, I see great scope here for a unique and fruitful relationship, as part of the experiment in devising a university of rare originality.
Birmingham, Manchester, Glasgow and Edinburgh are cities with two universities already. There may be others. Leicester, Nottingham, Coventry and Newcastle—and there may be others—are cities with a smaller population than Teesside, but with both a university and a polytechnic. As higher education expands, two or more major institutions of higher education are likely to be the rule in most conurbations.
I hope very much—and this is a specific request—that the hon. Gentleman will draw to the attention of his right hon. Friend, especially the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry who is the responsible Minister, the strong case in favour of unequivocal support for our university on regional development grounds. If they look at the matter objectively and with the best interests of Teesside and the Northern Region at heart, I cannot think that they will come to any other conclusion.
On Teesside, we have a determined local authority a fully committed local industry, energetic individuals and an enthusiastic local community. If any further initiative, any greater practical contribution or any wider demonstration of faith is needed, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will tell me tonight. We shall have a university on Teesside. The only question is whether it will be sooner or later.

8.40 p.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for Education and Science (Mr. William van Straubenzee): I wish to respond firmly in the spirit in which the hon. Member for Stockton-on-Tees (Mr. William Rodgers) has addressed the


House and to thank him for his typically kindly references to me by saying that most certainly I will accede to his specific request and draw the attention of my right hon. Friend appropriately involved to the arguments that he has adduced on regional development grounds. I will do that with pleasure.
The hon. Gentleman has served in government and therefore understands that I have certain limitations in the sense that I have only certain responsibilities. Clearly, I must not stray outside them. However, within those limits, I will attempt to respond to his arguments. I will begin by saying a few words about the general question of university expansion, because it is the nub of the problem.
We are in regular informal contact with the University Grants Committee on the matter, and we expect to be receiving the Committee's formal advice in due course. Obviously university expansion is only one aspect of the wider question of future opportunities for higher education, which was the subject of a debate in another place as recently as 15th July. As we were then, we are considering now the pattern for the 1970s. In due course, we shall be making our decision.
I am glad that the hon. Gentleman drew specific attention to the publication, since that debate, of Education Planning Paper No. 2. The House will recall that that paper sets out in detail the projections made by my Department of numbers and costs of students in higher education in England and Wales up to 1981. It does so on certain specific assumptions. A similar paper has been produced for Scotland by the Scottish Education Department.
It is important to emphasise that neither the Government nor any other body concerned has either accepted or rejected those projections as a basis for action.
The purpose of the two papers is simply to encourage and assist the widest possible public discussion. I have ventured to call Paper No. 2 a "half-green" paper. It happens to be printed in that way. I am very anxious that the widest possible public discussion shall now take place upon the figures which have been published, because obviously that will lead

to one of the most important questions in education on which this Government will have to take decisions.
I turn next to the specific question of Teesside. Like the hon. Gentleman, I feel that it may help if I set on record one or two of the background facts.
The idea of a technological university in the North-East was first raised as long ago as 1962. No doubt it was in the minds of the members of the Robbins Committee when, in the following year, they recommended that five Special Institutions for Scientific and Technological Education and Research—a massively long title—known as SISTERS should be created and that one of these should be a completely new foundation.
In 1965 the previous Government rejected the recommendation for the five SISTERS. However, they added that the creation of a new technological university in the North-East was being urgently examined. The idea was that it would be a completely new foundation and that there would be no question of the promotion to university status of one or other of the major technical colleges in the region. This was, of course, a year before the then Government published their White Paper proposing the establishment of polytechnics as a distinctive sector of higher education complementary with the universities. I emphasise "complementary with the universities".
So far as I can judge, all this must have seemed reasonably encouraging. But after 1965 the then Government seem to have been assailed by doubts, for the prospects of any developments began to recede. In 1966 they announced that, in the light of the current financial situation, they could not approve the launching of the university in the years immediately ahead.
A year later the most that the Government could say was that the proposals for a technological institution in the North-East would be carefully considered when it became possible to contemplate the establishment of further new universities, but that this was unlikely to be for some years. Finally, in 1968, the Government said that they could not contemplate the establishment of any new universities—I underline the words "any new universities"—in the years immediately ahead.
I appreciate that the hon. Gentleman's purpose tonight is to show that the Teesside project is still very much alive, and he has done so with customary skill. I know, from my recent visit, that the project enjoys strong support in the North-East. I was not so lucky as to see the proposed site in the idyllic circumstances that he described so poetically, because I saw it in drizzling rain. But I want the hon. Gentleman to understand that I have taken on board the strong support for the project in the North-East, and I take note of all the points that he made. Incidentally, I am grateful for the moderate and reasonable way that they were expressed.
However—and this is the nub of the problem—for reasons that I have explained, we have not yet reached the point of taking decisions on university expansion as such. Before doing so, we shall look to the University Grants Committee to advise us whether any new foundations at all should form part of the expansion of the universities in the 1970's and, if so, where they should be. Clearly I cannot predict what that advice will be, but I am sure that the Committee will examine fairly and impartially the claims of Teesside for a new university along with any others which may have been submitted from any part of the country.
It is right to mention that in the past other locations in the North-East have been suggested in addition to Teesside. Therefore, what I have said, and what I am about to say, would apply equally to them if they were put forward again.
In the hope that I may be helpful to the hon. Gentleman and to all those whom he represents I propose to select and comment briefly upon four general considerations which will be very relevant when the time for decision-making arrives. The Government will have strong regard to them, and, though I obviously cannot speak for the U.G.C., it is reasonable to assume that the Committee will have regard to them before tendering its advice.
The first of these is the growth of existing universities. I imagine that nobody would think it sensible if existing universities were prevented from developing into institutions which were not only strong academically but were also of an economic size purely so that resources

should be diverted into entirely new foundations. There are already 45 institutions on the U.G.C.'s grant list, and in 1969–70 as many as 16 of them had fewer than 2,500 students. Of the 16, six are former colleges of advanced technology and they, as we know, are heavily biased towards pure and applied science.
The second consideration is a financial one. It will be obvious from the education planning paper to which both the hon. Gentleman and I have referred that, whatever the precise extent of the expansion of higher education in the 'seventies, it will cost the country a great deal of money. Clearly we must use this money as wisely as we can. The establishment of entirely new universities is likely to be more expensive than providing the same number of places at existing ones, because clearly a new university has to start from scratch.
It is therefore highly relevant that the Vice-Chancellors' Committee has already estimated—though it should be said clearly that this is only an estimate—that existing universities could be expanded to take a total of about 400,000 students on their present sites. I understand that the U.G.C. is carrying out a detailed survey to establish the maximum potential capacity of the sites which the universities already have or expect to have by 1980. It will be very interesting to see what the total arising out of a detailed survey will be, but a capacity of 400,000 is nearly 175,000 above the number of students in the universities today.
The third consideration is the establishment of the polytechnics since the technological university was first proposed. In the North-Eastern Region there are three polytechnics, formed from technical colleges with national reputations, which have now been designated, at Newcastle, Sunderland and on Teesside itself. As I think the hon. Gentleman knows, I have recently had the privilege of visiting those at Sunderland and at Teesside and, as all visitors must be, I was enormously impressed with the progress being made at both. Between them they had 4,600 full-time and sandwich course students taking advanced courses in 1969–70. The Teesside polytechnic, with fewer than 1,000 such students, is the smallest of the three, and is at present one of the smallest polytechnics in the country. Plans for a substantial expansion which would


greatly strengthen it are now being considered.
Two questions which must therefore be faced are whether the growth of the polytechnic ought to be limited to make way for a university, or whether it would make sense to build up an existing small institution of higher education and to establish an entirely new one in the same county borough at one and the same time. In this connection let me say how grateful I was for the assurance of the hon. Gentleman, speaking with great knowledge of those who are of the same view as himself, that nothing in their proposals would be designed to be harmful in any way to the building up of the polytechnics. I know that he has the same interest as I have in the success of that great institution on Teesside.
The fourth consideration is the likely future requirement for university places in pure and applied sciences. I think that it is generally accepted that, following the building up of science departments in universities, including those of the former colleges of advanced technology, it is easier nowadays to obtain a place for a science course than for an arts course. Therefore, in considering the possibility of a new university exclusively devoted to science, as was originally proposed, or one which would have a science bias, the Government would have to look for evidence that additional science places were required over and above any provided to build up existing universities, and particularly those whose work is concentrated on science and technology.
I hope that the hon. Gentleman will recognise that I have made these four points in the hope that they will be helpful to him as illustrations of some of the major considerations which must be borne in mind in establishing the principle before one moved on to establishing the case for a location. But we are not yet ready to take a decision on this expansion. I doubt whether the hon. Gentleman, with his experience, would have expected a decision of this kind to be announced in answer to an Adjournment debate. We shall make a decision on the expansion of the universities as a whole at the right time, bearing in mind some of the criteria which I have placed before the House.

THAMES FLOOD BARRIER

8.57 p.m.

Mr. James Wellbeloved: I consider myself exceedingly fortunate that the business of the House has allowed me this opportunity of raising an issue of fundamental importance, not only to my constituency, but to the whole of the great Metropolis of London. The decision announced last week by the Secretary of State for the Environment that the Government have accepted the Greater London Council's recommendation to site the Thames flood barrier at Silvertown has been received with alarm and dismay by those in the London areas which lay below the site chosen.
Over the weekend I took the opportunity to visit the Greater London Council's massive housing development at Thamesmead, in my constituency. This development is taking place on the Plumstead and Erith marshes, an area which has been subject over the centuries to flooding from the River Thames. As I stood on the marshlands and looked at the houses, flats and maisonettes which are now occupied, my mind was taken back to 1953, which was the last occasion when the River Thames breached the flood defences and swept across the marshland in a solid wall at a height of approximately six feet, like a tidal wave engulfing all that stood in its path. I was horrified by the thought that the people living on the marshes were being denied the protection which they had been promised.
The G.L.C. is to be congratulated on the speed with which it pursued its investigations into London's flood protection. On 20th February, 1968, the then Minister of Housing and Local Government, now my noble Friend Lord Greenwood, requested the G.L.C. to investigate the protection of London from flooding by the Thames. The G.L.C. was able, by October, 1969, to report its findings, in which it mentioned a number of possible sites which should, it said, be subject to further investigation. In addition to the Silvertown site, which has been recommended and approved by the Secretary of State, the G.L.C. referred to Crossness, which is on the very borders of Greater London, on the edge of my constituency.
Had this site been chosen, it would have given protection to the whole of the area which is the responsibility of the G.L.C. This site was the subject of previous investigations by people conducting similar inquiries in recent years. For example, in 1965 two firms of consulting engineers put forward two different sets of proposals for a flood barrier at Long-reach, which is past Crayfordness. I criticised the Minister of the day because he did not appoint them as joint consultants but independent of each other to provide independent schemes.
The result was that they produced schemes which were in absolute conflict with each other. This enabled the Minister to escape his responsibility, of taking a positive decision, by being able to pray in aid the conflict which was in evidence in those consulting engineers' reports.
Following that, the Government of the day commissioned Professor Bondi to carry out an investigation. In due course he reported, and it is on the basis of his report that the Minister then asked the G.L.C. to do the studies which it has recently completed.
Some unfortunate things have happened since October, 1969. Having presented its report and the Crayfordness site as being a viable and feasible proposition for the siting of a barrier, the G.L.C. then changed its mind. It has now gone against the very evidence it presented in its report, and has chosen Silvertown.
A significant fact has emerged. On 31st December, 1969, the committee of the G.L.C. responsible for making the recommendation, the Public Services Committee, received a report from the Treasurer of the G.L.C. indicating that no further research into the feasibility of Crayfordness should, on financial grounds, proceed. The recommendation on which the Minister made his announcement last week is, therefore, feared by many people to have been based more on financial than on technical grounds.
The two consulting engineers who were commissioned by the Greater London Council to prepare the evidence for the 1969 Report acted in a joint capacity. From a letter dated 19th September, 1969, sent with their report they made their view quite clear. The letter reads:

We find that such a barrier is feasible and may be constructed to meet the requirements of reliability in service if of the drum gate type and constructed in a coffer-dam …. We are of the opinion that Long Reach"—
the Crayfordness site:
is the most favourable site because the various aspects of this location have been studied and discussed for some 15 years and no equally satisfactory site from all points of view has been put forward.
Despite that quite conclusive recommendation from the joint consulting engineers, the G.L.C., and subsequently the Minister, have ditched, if I may use the word, the Crayfordness site.
We are told by spokesmen for the Greater London Council that Crayfordness has not been recommended, because it would involve the creation of a massive retractable barrier which they describe as being of the length of Whitehall and almost as high as Nelson's Column. If that were the case I would be the first to say that Crayfordness was not a feasible engineering possibility, but that is a sort of red herring now being produced to confuse the arguments on the issue, because that sort of barrier would have been required had the 1965 report been implemented. I therefore ask the Under-Secretary to direct his attention not to the 1965 Report and this massive retractable structure, but to the 1969 Report of the joint consulting engineers, who suggest that it is no longer necessary to have a retractable barrier at Crayfordness and that it is engineeringly feasible to have a drum gate rising barrier on that site. Many of the arguments which the Greater London Council and, perhaps, the Under-Secretary of State will produce in defence of the decision do not, therefore, stand up to examination.
Thamesmead is a development designed by the Greater London Council and approved by the Minister to provide homes for 60,000 Londoners who are desperately in need of housing. It is a marshy area, and was formerly known as the Plumstead and Erith marshes. That is the area, upon which I stood at the weekend, that was flooded so severely in 1953 and is still exposed to the calamity of the river banks being breached in another disastrous flood.
A scheme of this magnitude did not pass without a public inquiry, and in October, 1967, a three-week public inquiry took place under an inspector


appointed by the Minister. Much evidence was presented, and there was a great deal of cross-examination of expert witnesses put up by the Greater London Council on this very question of flood protection for the Thamesmead housing development. At the inquiry the council's expert officials solemnly gave evidence to the effect that the flood protection for Thamesmead, for those 60,000 people, could best be provided by a Thames flood barrier downstream from Thamesmead development.
Now the proposal is to betray those who are to be put at risk on the Thames-mead marshes. Those who solemnly recommended that the barrier should go downstream are now recommending that it should go upstream. I cannot say that it is the same Minister, but it is the same Department. The same officials who advised the then Minister of Housing and Local Government—my noble Friend Lord Greenwood—are now advising the Secretary of State for the Environment. The same officials who no doubt advised the Minister to approve the Thamesmead development with a barrier downstream have now probably advised the Secretary of State to approve the siting of the barrier upstream.
I have thought much about those 60,000 people, 20,000 of whom will be constituents of mine and 40,000 of whom will be constituents of my hon. Friend the Member for Woolwich, East (Mr. Mayhew). I have thought of the dangers to which they might be exposed. It will be no satisfaction to them to be told, "You do not need a flood barrier across the river to protect you. We will ensure that the banks are strengthened, that they are raised and thickened, and that all the precautions are taken to make things safe for you."
Such solemn technical assurances have been given many times by experts. I am certain that at Ronan Point similar solemn assurances would have been given about the safety of those living in the flats. I am sure that similar solemn technical assurances were given to the unfortunate workers in Melbourne on the new design of bridge building who now know to their cost that the solemn words of experts cannot always be relied on.
My constituents will draw little comfort from the solemn assurance that they

are given that the raising and thickening of the river bank will protect them. When looking at the river bank, perhaps raised to 24 feet above ordnance datum, they will be reminded that while they are standing on the ground with the bank in front of them just across that bank is a wall of water twice my height, and I am six feet tall. If the subsoil should collapse, if the banks through any weakness should collapse, that wall of water will again sweep over the Thamesmead marshes but, unlike in 1953—if it occurs again by the collapse of a river bank there will be 60,000 human souls at risk. They will be at risk, not by an accident of development over the centuries, but because of the deliberate decision of the planners, the G.L.C., and the Minister who approved the Thamesmead development on that marsh land.
Such a collapse is more likely to occur with a barrier upstream than if it were downstream. I do not use these words lightly: if that calamity occurs and if one resident of Thamesmead loses his life as a result of Thames flooding because of the decision to put the barrier upstream, it will not be accidental death. It will not be an act of God. It will be as the result of the deliberate decision to put those houses and those people at risk on a flood plain and then to deny them the protection that the flood barrier downstream at Crayfordness, as promised by the G.L.C. in its evidence to Inquiry would have afforded them.
I have referred to the report in which Professor Bondi rightly drew attention to the very grave risk to which Londoners are exposed from the danger of Thames flood. The professor said that one of the most serious risks facing Londoners is the danger to the underground system. He said that, if there is a flood before the barrier is built or the banks raised, that flood could enter the underground system and in a very short time completely flood it and that, if it occurred during a rush hour, there would be very heavy casualties.
The professor went on to make a very strong recommendation to the Government. This was not to the Tory Government. I do not hold the Under-Secretary responsible for this. There are no party politics in this issue. I am a critic of both the Labour-controlled G.L.C. and the Conservative-controlled G.L.C. and of


the Labour Government and the Conservative Government in respect of flood protection. The professor recommended to my noble Friend Lord Greenwood that there should be a trial evacuation of London's underground system because he thought that the risk was so grave that it was not right to rely upon the plans for quick evacuation: something might not work at the very moment that it was needed. He recommended that there should be a proper trial in normal circumstances of the evacuation of the underground system to ensure that everything that is planned to work works efficiently and effectively if life was not to be put at risk. I regret that my noble Friend did not accept Professor Bondi's strong recommendation, but things have now changed. They have changed in a number of respects. The Greater London Council is now the authority responsible for London's transport, including the underground system, and another Party sits on the Government benches. I am reminding them tonight of the professor's strong recommendation, and I am asking the Under-Secretary to give consideration—I can do no more—to this recommendation and to discuss with the Greater London Council the urgent need for carrying out this trial evacuation. It would be a tragedy if, because of the non-fulfilment of that recommendation for a trial evacuation, the unspeakable should happen and we should have another flood before London's defences are reinforced and lives were lost in the underground.
I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Acton (Mr. Spearing) wishes to contribute to this debate and there may be other hon. Members who wish to speak, so I will take up no more time except to say this. I plead with the Under-Secretary on behalf of the people downstream of Silvertown, where the barrier has been recommended, to think again, to re-read the evidence in the October. 1969, report, to satisfy himself absolutely on the technical grounds for leaving the Crayfordness site out of the calculations, and to ensure that it is not Treasury influence which has led to the decision to site the barrier upstream, because of cost. We cannot protect Londoners on the cheap. It would be a disgrace if the decision to put the barrier at Silvertown was primarily taken on financial and not on technical grounds.

I see that the Under-Secretary shakes his head. I hope the evidence will be published. If there is in existence a carefully documented evaluation of the Crayfordness site, I hope it will be published.
My constituents—indeed, all the people of London downstream of Silvertownare entitled to know precisely what are the technical arguments which have led the G.L.C. to abandon Crayfordness. I plead with the Under-Secretary to reexamine the decision and to bear in mind the danger of disaster that could well threaten the 60,000 people at Thames-mead who have been put at risk by his Ministry and by the G.L.C.

9.20 p.m.

Mr. Peter Trew: I am grateful for this unexpected opportunity to speak on this subject and I commend the initiative of the hon. Member for Erith and Crayford (Mr. Wellbeloved) for having raised the matter.
Both as a civil engineer and as a member for a Thamesside constituency, the question of a Thames barrier is of great interest to me, and I welcome in principle the decision to go ahead with the construction of the barrier. I have always felt that there was merit in the even more ambitious scheme of a Thames barrage, but financial reasons, no doubt, make that impossible.
There are implications in any sort of barrier for constituencies downstream of the Thames barrier. The hon. Member for Erith and Crayford has spoken eloquently of the dangers which face his own constituency and other Greater London constituencies, and I should like to say something about the fears in areas outside Greater London, in Essex and Kent, and particularly in my own constituency of Dartford. Dartford has been subject to severe flooding. There have been three almost catastrophic floods in the last 40 years, the most recent of which was in 1968.
I should like to say something of the reasons why Dartford is to subject to flooding. The River Darenth, which flows into the Thames through Dartford, collects the water from a natural watershed and in times of heavy rainfall becomes extremely swollen. If, at the same time, because of wind conditions in


the North Sea and because of tidal conditions, the level of the Thames is high, it becomes impossible for the swollen waters of the Darenth to discharge into the Thames and they back up, causing severe flooding in Dartford.
Should these conditions arise—and I am told they are very apt to arise in February of any year—when there is a barrier further upstream, it follows that the water which tries to make its way up the Thames and is unable to do so, coupled with the swollen River Darenth trying to discharge into the Thames, must cause flooding of an even greater magnitude than we have had in the past.
There are, I believe, three things which people who live in downstream constituencies are entitled to ask of the Government. I hope that my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary will feel able to accede to my requests. The first is that the question of downstream flooding should be thoroughly studied. We know that the barrier can cause flooding downstream. What the public do not yet know is the exact extent and way in which flooding can be caused. My first request, therefore, is that the possible effects of the barrier on downstream flooding should be studied in considerable detail. If the Greater London Council feels that, for financial reasons, it cannot afford the scale and depth of investigation needed for this problem, we are entitled to ask the Government, who are ultimately responsible for the safety of people living on Thamesside, to be prepared to assist with it. If and when the investigations are completed, it is reasonable to expect that they should be published. That is my first request.
My second request is that when the effects of downstream flooding have been fully studied an estimate is made of the cost of the necessary downstream flood defences. I do not share the pessimism of the hon. Member for Erith and Cray-ford that it is not possible to protect people living downstream of the barrier. It is possible to protect them, but at a cost. The cost could well prove to be prohibitive. Having ascertained the extent of the possible flooding, we must translate it into what is required in terms of flood defences and cost it. The cost could be considerable. I hope that the cost estimates will be published.
It is not widely known that in the studies into a Thames barrage carried out between the wars Gravesend was suggested as a possible site. If it transpires that the cost of the flood defences made necessary by the barrier is so high as to make the scheme at Silvertown Reach or even Crayfordness prohibitive, we should not completely rule out the possibility of again considering Gravesend. Therefore, my second request is that the estimates of cost of the necessary downstream flood defences are published and a decision taken, according to how high they are, on whether the whole project must be rethought.
My third request concerns how the cost of the downstream flood defences is to be met. Constituencies outside the Greater London area—indeed all areas and local authorities downstream of the barrier—would be right in saying that they would derive no benefits from the barrier these would accrue to areas and local authorities upstream. If areas downstream of the barrier are expected to contribute to the cost of what may be substantial flood defences made necessary by the barrier, they will be justified in regarding it as completely inequitable.
Therefore, my third request to my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State is that he publishes, not only the results of the studies into downstream flooding and the estimates of the cost of the necessary flood defences, but the Government's proposals for financing the cost of the barrier itself and any necessary downstream flood defences.
All my requests to my hon. Friend are for the publication of information, and I hope that for the sake of the people living downstream he will find it possible to accede to them.

9.28 p.m.

Mr. Nigel Spearing: I am glad to be able to take part in this debate. I speak with a number of qualifications. Unlike the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Erith and Cray-ford (Mr. Wellbeloved), my constituency is not below but above the site of the barrier. I speak as a London Member. I should also mention that I speak as vice-chairman of the River Thames Society whose former president, the late hon. Member for Twickenham, Mr. Roger Gresham Cooke, contributed so


greatly to the debates in this House, particularly on River Thames matters. I am also a co-opted member of the Environmental Planning Committee of the Greater London Council, but I hasten to add that it is not the committee which has responsibility for the proposed barrier.
I echo the concern of my hon. Friend the Member for Erith and Crayford about the dangers which London faces. The Thamesmead situation is of public importance, although the people there could well be protected in a number of ways. However, even if the proposal for a barrier goes ahead almost at once, it may be seven to ten years before London is secure from a tidal surge. It is during that time that the greatest danger may well arise. I will not go so far as to say that Professor Bondi's recommendations are thoroughly justified, but he certainly has a point, and I think it is a pity that that report was not made more widely known at the time.
One of the greatest dangers we have is not from over-topping of any flood walls, but their possible collapse. I hasten to add that in the London County Council area, which is the greater part of Greater London today, these walls have withstood the tidal surges we have had, particularly in 1963 and 1968, but there is a danger of undermining and possible collapse, with a wall of water four or five feet high which the lower lying areas of London might have to face. We know that the Ministries of Agriculture and Housing and Local Government have their flood warning system, but we must do everything possible to prevent the collapse of walls, particularly in those areas not previously under the jurisdiction of the London County Council.
There are other lessons which must be pointed out at this stage. It so happens that I have made a quite extensive study of this matter, which has grave implications in other directions. We had our first catastrophic flood in 1953. That is a good many years ago—17 years ago—and it has taken those 17 years until a decision has been reached on how London can be protected. In that year, and again in 1968, the tide in London reached a height of approximately 18 feet above the Ordnance Survey datum—18 feet above the average level of the sea as at Newlyn in Cornwall. As a result of the 1953

floods there was a very considerable loss of life along the east coast, and the Government initiated an inquiry, initially under the late Lord Waverley.
Lord Waverley's Committee came up with a recommendation very soon, and that was for an investigation of a barrier or barrage, such has been suggested and virtually agreed on. However, the terms of reference which were given to the technical committee to look at this were, in my view, far too narrow. Instead of being given a remit to look at the problem as a whole the committee was given a remit to look at a specific solution, suggested more or less en passant by the Waverley Committee. Because of this the whole issue was not looked at, just one specific solution was looked at, and there was a great deal of disagreement about that particular technical response.
As a result, statutory bodies quite properly pursuing their functions which Parliament had placed upon them, danced around one another for several years, like people in a ballroom. The result was that report after report came out, some of them, as my hon. Friend mentioned, contradictory, and all the time London was at risk. For some reason of which I am not quite sure, the Government seemed to accept this situation and not to cut the Gordian knot.
This has very important implications, because had the terms of reference been a little wider, had the original committee been asked to look at a specific solution and at any other matter pertaining to this problem, perhaps we would not have had the serious delay which has occurred. It is a very serious matter, which we shall all understand, if tragedy ensues in the next ten years. We can look back further than that. Had the requests which were made by Sir Alan Herbert, who at that time was Member of Parliament for Oxford University, been heeded by responsible bodies, even if his exact solution was wrong, nevertheless if those pleas had been heeded, and responsible answers been given to the questions which were asked, we would not perhaps have had the delays which have occurred.
Reference has been made to the report of Professor Bondi. He again made a rather narrow recommendation for investigation of certain sites, but it was not until the Greater London Council insisted


that the investigation should be a much wider one, and went further than the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, not until then, and relatively recently—was the total problem looked at for the first time, despite the fact that the Thames barrage had been in the air for well over a century. I should add that that debate in the Greater London Council, in the autumn I think of 1967, was an all-party matter. Once the go-ahead was given by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government the G.L.C. went at it with great speed.
I wish to conclude by looking at five points which have come out of this: first, the question of site; second, the type of barrier recommended; third, amenity; fourth, cost; and, fifth, the way in which the Government go about making an announcement.
My hon. Friend the Member for Erith and Crayford is concerned with the site. It may or may not be the site which has been recommended. It is important that the public be given the information on which they can judge. I hope that when the Minister replies he will not only make this clear but will say that later there will be a public document, perhaps a popular rather than a technical document, by which ordinary people with but little understanding of the great technicalities of the matter can be assured that whatever decision is taken is taken in their interests, particularly on the question of site.
Second, there is the question of the type of barrier, about which there has been a great deal of debate. As Professor Bondi and others have pointed out, reliability is the absolute "must". There must be no doubt about it. If any type of barrier has to work once in a century, it is essential that every effort shall be made to make it 100 per cent. reliable. There have been objections to a barrier with towers. It is thought by some, including, I think, my hon. Friend the Member for Woolwich, East (Mr. Mayhew), that that would upset the amenities of the area, but one of the bridges on the Thames with towers, Tower Bridge, is a noted additional amenity.
On the third point, amenity, it has been pointed out that a barrier could conceivably act as a tide-control barrier as well. False hopes may have been raised by this

possibility. More tests must be carried out. But it could be that the tide control structure, which would be the barrier, could not only keep high tides out of London but could maintain a higher low-water level than we now have. It would not necessarily create the artificial lake about which many people talk enthusiastically, but it could perhaps increase the area of low-water level. I will not say that it is definitely possible, but it may be in 10 years' time.
If that can be done, the environment of the Thames in London will be transformed. The whole of the environment can become greater than the total of the parts. If that is a possibility, there needs to be a wide-ranging authority which can take responsibility for co-ordinating the whole Thamesside environment. Both the P.L.A. and the Greater London Council have ideas about future legislation that would make that possible.
I come to the question of cost. The Greater London Council has made it quite clear that this is not just a London matter but a national matter, and I thoroughly support it on this. I believe that the financial responsibility is far more a national matter than a London matter. Central London is the great nerve centre of the nation. I do not pretend that it produces a great deal in tangible form, but it is a very important part of our economic structure, and therefore I press the Minister to say something about cost. It is not London's fault that the North Sea is rising a bit or that there is a particular type of depression in the North Sea which produces the phenomena responsible for higher tides.
Finally, and perhaps the most important for the future, is the question of Government announcements on the matter. It has been the Government's practice to make announcements about the Thames barrage in reply to Written Questions. The Secretary of State for the Environment answered a Question about it earlier in the Session, and there was another last week. It was perhaps with some regret that London Members noticed that an announcement about another project in London, concerning transport to London Airport, which was not even made to the House. The Government made known their financial intentions, not to make a 75 per cent. grant, and could not be questioned on it.
I hope that the hon. Gentleman, in replying to the present debate, will give an assurance that, when the Government make an announcement about the financing of this project, their spokesman will do so in the House and in such a way that he can be questioned afterwards. It should not be a matter for Written Answer; it is only right that there should be a Government statement, made with reasonable notice.
This is an important project for London, and it is only right, in a democratic society, that the Government should proceed in that way. If they do, a great deal will have been done to redeem the delays and muddle which we have had, and there can be a seemly conclusion reached in a manner of which we can all approve.

9.41 p.m.

Dr. Gerard Vaughan: The hon. Member for Erith and Crayford (Mr. Wellbeloved) has already stressed—I join him in this—the importance which we attach to this matter in London. He has paid tribute to what the Greater London Council has done. I cannot emphasise too much the importance which the G.L.C. attaches to the barrier project. Its view is based not only on grounds of safety, although these are of tremendous significance for London. It is not sufficient to say that, because we have managed successfully in the past, we shall necessarily manage successfully in the next few years.
The situation on the river is changing steadily. One knows that the river is silting up, the tides are rising higher, and the odds against our having a major flood disaster in London are steadily shortening. I do not mean in any way to be alarmist, but it is not appreciated by many how much of the lower reaches of the Thames lies below a safety level in relation to the river banks. From a London point of view, we have asked about this matter over and over again.
I speak a little from the London end because I have the honour to be chairman of the strategic planning committee of the Greater London Council, and in that réle I have had a lengthy hand in the production of the Development Plan for London, in which we were very much aware of the dangers and problems asso

ciated with the rising levels of the Thames.
We should like to see a barrier on safety grounds. That must come first. But we should like to see it, also, because with a barrier can come considerable advantages for amenity on those parts of the Thames lying above where the barrier is set. I realise that it is fashionable nowadays to push the cause of recreational facilities and amenity, but this project could mean a great deal to a highly developed and closely populated centre such as ours. One has only to think for a moment about the various advantages in terms of recreation and sport which could flow from a development of this kind on the Thames to realise how much it could mean not just to the adults of London but to the children, too.
The Greater London Council has been conscious of the need to develop the docks, those 1,000 acres in the centre of London which are rapidly falling idle. Within that context also, we should like to see the development of a barrier. Unfortunately, on technical grounds, we do not yet know whether the best form of barrier would be a fixed barrier, a drop gate, or some sort of shelf or gate rising up from the river bed. Investigations by the G.L.C. are going on, but this is an area in which the Government could greatly help by giving us a lead.
More than that, there is the question of finance. I press upon the House that this is a national need, and the financing of projects to meet national needs by the ratepayers of London has reached a point at which a small section of the community cannot be expected indefiniately to keep putting its hand in its pocket for what is an all-London need and a national need. I hope that the Government will help us on the G.L.C. to find some way round the problem of financing these major projects.
If we are to keep London as a viable entity and as a great commercial capital, as we all agree we should, we must see to it that it is a place which can be worked in with safety and which has the requisite tools and facilities to that end. This is part of the problem of financing London today. I ask the Minister to treat this question of the barrier-cum-barrage, whichever it finally is, as a most


urgent matter, to confirm with the G.L.C. as soon as possible where the site should be, and the kind of barrier most suited, and lastly, to consider supporting the G.L.C. financially, because the basic cost of this must be in the region of £50 million.
On the question of improving the river wall below wherever the barrier is, this, I suggest, will cost in the region of another £20 million to £30 million. That is too much to come from one even large regional local authority. I hope the Minister will consider seriously what sort of help he can give London in this matter.

Mr. George Lawson: rose—

Mr. Geoffrey Finsberg: rose—

Mr. Speaker: Does the hon. Member for Motherwell (Mr. Lawson) wish to intervene in this debate?

Mr. Lawson: It is not this topic that I wish to raise, but this is the Adjournment and this is the second topic that has been raised. I am sure you would agree, Mr. Speaker, that when a Member has advised the Minister in good time that he hopes to raise a question, on this basis he is entitled to raise that question if there is time. I gave notice to the Department for Trade and Industry that I hoped, if there was time, to raise a question for which it was responsible. There was due warning. The Whips opposite were warned of this; your predecessor, Mr. Deputy Speaker, was advised of this.
There have been various comings and goings, and I am putting it to you that there is quite clearly a ploy on to prevent me from speaking. Hon. Members opposite have been dragged in. None of them had any knowledge that this matter was to be raised. My hon. Friend gave notice around six o'clock that this was to be raised. Hon. Gentlemen on the other side have been brought in deliberately with the intention of preventing me from speaking.

Mr. Jeffrey Archer: On a point of order.

Mr. Speaker: Order. I am being addressed on a point of order. Mr. Lawson.

Mr. Lawson: On this point, Mr. Speaker, since I have given notice and since there can be no question but that the Department was duly informed of what is intended, and since my point is a very simple one that could be replied to very shortly, I take it that you will permit me to make my point, in the hope that what I have to say will be conveyed to the Minister, who has not yet arrived, and I might, before half-past 10 tonight, get a reply to the point I wish to put.

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Gentleman cannot put his point now. I must finish this debate. I am not responsible for ploys or anything like that. The second debate for which notice has been given has not been completed. The Minister must reply. After that, we will deal with the third topic, of which the hon. Gentleman has given notice.

Mr. Lawson: I am sure, Mr. Speaker, you will tell us on what basis it is the case that when we are dealing with the Adjournment, hon. Gentlemen are not permitted to raise any matter for which there is Ministerial responsibility. I am not asking anything in terms of legislation. I am asking here entirely a question regarding Ministerial responsibility. I know as well as you that when we are on the Adjournment, there is nothing for which a Department is responsible that we cannot raise. There is an inconvenience, I know, in that there may not be a Minister present to reply. But that is not my responsibility. The Department concerned has been advised. If no one is prepared to turn up, I submit that discourtesy is being shown to this House. I put it to you, Mr. Speaker, that clearly on the benches opposite the intention is to prevent me from speaking. On that basis, despite the fact that there is no Minister present, I propose to go ahead and say what I have to say.

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman has raised a point of order with me. The duty of the Chair is to protect the Adjournment debate. I cannot call the hon. Gentleman to speak until the second Adjournment debate has been completed.

Mr. Lawson: I am sorry, Mr. Speaker, but I cannot understand why you are unable to call me. If it can be shown to me that I am wrong, I will apologise and be happy to sit down. I have no knowledge of any rule concerning our


debates which says that, when we are on the Adjournment, hon. Members must stick to a particular subject. I have gained a great deal of experience of this House over a number of years. I believe that hon. Members may raise on the Adjournment any matter for which there is governmental responsibility. I put this to you.
If I am not permitted to speak tonight, it is not because I am out of order but because I am being deliberately kept out by a conspiracy on the benches opposite, presumably because the Minister for Trade and Industry has engagements outside which do not permit him to attend to his duties here. I put it to you that I am not out of order in raising any matter, now that I have the floor, for which a Government Department has responsibility—

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman is not out of order in raising any such matter on the Adjournment. He is quite right. He has long experience of this House. However, he has to be called in order to do so.

Mr. Jeffrey Archer: On a point of order.

Mr. Lawson: Further to that point of order—

Mr. Speaker: Order. One point of order at a time. Mr. Archer.

Mr. Archer: I might point out to the hon. Member for Motherwell (Mr. Lawson), for whom I have great respect, that we have sat through speeches from the hon. Member for Erith and Crayford (Mr. Wellbeloved) and the hon. Member for Acton (Mr. Spearing). Presumably they have not been included in any conspiracy to take up time. In addition, it is, in my opinion, a gross insult to the Chairman of the Strategic Planning Committee of the Greater London Council and the man who wrote the London Development Plan to suggest that he was dragged in to spend time on a very important point.

Mr. Speaker: Order. That is not a point of order. That is a point of opinion.

Mr. Lawson: Further to my point of order. I ask for a Ruling. Quite apart from any question of courtesy to the House, my question is whether I am out

of order in proceeding with a short speech on the subject matter which I informed the Department of Trade and Industry that I wished to raise. If I am out of order, I will sit down. If I am not, perhaps I might—

Mr. Speaker: Order. I am grateful for the courtesy and persistence of the hon. Gentleman. I have not called him to speak in this debate yet, Mr. Finsberg.

Mr. Lawson: Further to that point. Is it not the case that, when there is a debate of this kind, it is customary to call an hon. Member from each side of the House in turn? Is not that my position?

Mr. Speaker: It is for the Chair to see one Adjournment debate completed before another starts. Mr. Finsberg.

9.54 p.m.

Mr. Geoffrey Finsberg: Let me at once make it clear that I was not dragged into this debate. If anyone was alleging a conspiracy, I might feel that the hon. Member for Mother-well (Mr. Lawson) has tried to prevent me from speaking.
My hon. Friend the Member for Reading (Dr. Vaughan) is Chairman of the Strategic Planning Committee of the G.L.C. My interest in this matter is both as Vice-Chairman of the General Purposes Committee of the London Boroughs Association, which is just as interested in this problem as the G.L.C., and because my constituency is affected.
Even as a new Member, I know that when the hon. Member for Erith and Crayford (Mr. Wellbeloved) raises matters, they are usually somewhat lengthy. However, I will not pursue that point because the hon. Gentleman has left the Chamber and courtesy demands that I should not discuss what he has said.
According to several articles, particularly in the London newspapers, if we have a major flood of the River Thames, many areas of Greater London, not merely in the south but also in the northwest, will be inundated. I am not fortunate enough to live in the higher part of Hampstead. However, several hon. Members, including the former Minister of Housing and Local Government, now translated to another place, live above the


possible flood level as far as I can see from the map. Certainly the part of the borough in which I live would be inundated, and I have no desire to see that.
I should like to take up the point raised by the hon. Member for Acton (Mr. Spearing). He hoped that the Government would not, when they came to make a statement on the barrage, make it in the form of an Answer to a Written Question. I submit that it is very much a matter of luck whether or not one gets a Written Answer. I put down what I thought was a most important Question today dealing with the Crowther Commission. I had no desire for the Written Answer, which I have now received. It is the luck of the draw, the length of supplementary questions, the length of odd points of order which occasionally arise, and certainly the position in which the Question is placed.

Mr. Spearing: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that in a matter of this weight such a statement should not be made in response to a Written or, indeed, to an Oral Question, or to the Press, but should be a Government statement in this House?

Mr. Finsberg: It would be difficult for me to agree or disagree, as it would for the hon. Gentleman, as neither of us hold Ministerial office. Clearly, it is up to a Minister to decide how best to deal with these important matters. It might be decided that the Greater London Council and the London Boroughs Association should take part in a joint Press conference with someone from the Ministry. I do not think that it necessarily falls to us to query the method by which the announcement is made. The important point is what announcement is made.
The chairman of the Greater London Strategic Planning Committee raised the question of finance. He is perfectly right. He said that it would cost approximately £70 million. That is £50 million for the barrier and £20 million for the ancillaries. Judging, for example, by Concorde or anything else, that figure is likely to escalate to, say, £80 million. So let us consider £80 million. Here I may diverge slightly from my hon. Friend. Although he was arguing that it is the Greater London Council's problem to raise the money and it

therefore requires a Government grant, nonetheless, however the money is raised, it is not called for upon individuals in Dartford, Erith and Crayford or Hampstead, but through the rates and the precept upon the 32 London boroughs. Therefore, the 32 London boroughs have an interest in how this money is raised.
When we are satisfied that the scheme placed before the country either in this House or at a Press conference is workable, I submit that the decision needs to be taken at that stage how the money to meet the bill should be found. Perhaps this might be found by the G.L.C. precepting on the boroughs, or it might be an ideal opportunity for a Greater London lottery, of which my hon. Friends, in Opposition, were very much in favour. I hope that the civil servants have not now convinced them that they were wrong.

Mr. Denis Howell: The hon. Gentleman will be aware that we brought in such a proposal in one of our Finance Bills, but his hon. Friends, when they were on this side of the House, then proceeded to vote against it.

Mr. Finsberg: That may be true, but it was in somewhat different terms from those originally suggested.

It being Ten o'clock, the Motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Hawkins.]

Mr. Finsberg: It might be in the form of a lottery, or in the form of a toll on ships. What is certain is that the money cannot be found solely from the ratepayers of Greater London.

10.1 p.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for the Environment (Mr. Eldon Griffiths): This is a time when we speak widely of mini-Budgets and many such things, and this evening we have had a mini-debate, one to which many hon. Members have contributed with eloquence, with passion and, on occasion, with great concern.
The last occasion on which the hon. Member for Erith and Crayford (Mr. Wellbeloved), who made an excellent


speech, but who has now departed from the Chamber, raised this matter was on 19th March this year when, with his colleague the hon. Member for Woolwich, East (Mr. Mayhew) he was very critical of my predecessor, on two grounds. First, that there had not been adequate consultation with the London authorities. Second, that the Government could not make up their minds to provide the necessary defences for London.
I am glad to tell the hon. Gentleman that the present Administration has met both those points. I had hoped that he would have given my right hon. Friend proper credit for doing so, but instead he told us that he had reacted with alarm and some despondency to the decision that had been made. He also spoke with proper feeling and sincerity on behalf of his constituents.
I must reject the hon. Gentleman's alarm and despondency. I must tell him that there have been consultations with the relevant authorities and, most important, that the Government have made a decision, to use the words of his hon. Friend, to cut the Gordian knot. We have made a decision, and therefore we are now embarked on what may well prove to be one of the most exciting and advanced engineering projects anywhere in the world.

Mr. Wellbeloved: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the London Borough of Bexley is a relevant authority? Is he able to confirm that that authority was consulted by his Department and by the Greater London Council before the decision was taken?

Mr. Griffiths: I am advised that the G.L.C. had discussions with the London boroughs a few weeks ago, and I have every reason to believe that those boroughs would have included Bexley.
I think that it would be right for me to sketch in the general background of this matter before dealing with the various points that have been raised. The crucial point is that London at the moment is in danger from severe flooding. During any period of any year from about September until April the eastern seaboard of our country is liable to be effected by a tidal surge. This could start in the Atlantic or in the northern part of the North Sea and it would take the form of a wave which within about 10 hours,

could travel down our east coast from Aberdeen to Southend.
The last of these great surges was in 1953, when the predicted tide levels between the Humber and the Thames were exceeded by 8 ft. As a result there was widespread flooding and loss of life, particularly at Canvey Island, and minor flooding occurred in Greater London. Again in 1965—and the hon. Gentleman will remember this well—London had a near miss. The tide rose to within a few inches of the tops of the present defences. Therefore, to stave off future threats the east coast and the Thames Estuary defences have been raised and strengthened so as to withstand a recurrence of a surge of 1953 poportions.
But very little has been done to defend Central London. It is now estimated that the probability in any one year of a surge over-topping the embankments in Central London by one foot is not less than 34 to 1—one chance in 34. Those odds are shortening all the time because the height of the Thames tides in relation to the level of the land is rising by about 2·8 ft. a century—that is, by one-third of an inch every year. So, sooner or later, a potentially disastrous flood could hit London, and we must reckon with it. If that were to happen, an area of about 45 square miles would be vulnerable, and included in that area are a number of pockets of land at least 14 ft. below the ordinary river level.
It is difficult to quantify the physical damage, the disruption and the social effects that could be expected in those circumstances, but the bill in human as financial terms would inevitably be unacceptably high. Therefore, in early 1968 the G.L.C. was requested by our predecessors to undertake a comprehensive study of the danger and to recommend a site on the Thames for either a movable barrier or a permanent barrage to protect the area upstream. The first and major part of the study was published early in 1970.
First, it ruled out the idea of a permanent barrage, because of the risk of siltation, and because, owing to the existing danger, it would take too long to build. Second, the report recommended that further detailed investigation should continue into the relative advantages of two types of movable barrier, either a


rising sector barrier at Crayfordness, or a drop gate—a portcullis type of barrier—at a suitable site in the Woolwich Reach. The Crayfordness proposal has been found to be undesirable. The hon. Member for Erith and Crayford has referred to it on a number of occasions, so I shall tell him some of the reasons why we believe that Crayfordness is not the right answer. First, it would be too expensive. But I assure him that finance was by no means the whole reason that led to its rejection. Second, and more important, perhaps, it would take far too long to construct a satisfactory and reliable protection at that point. As has been pointed out by every hon. Member who has spoken tonight, urgency is something we must reckon with.
Third, the closure of such a barrier at Crayfordness would involve a great deal more interference with shipping than would a barrier in the Woolwich Reach, because the site would be downstream of the Royal Docks. The P.L.A. and the other shipping interests have made quite clear their views about that.
Fourth, and I think conclusive, we are advised that the reliability of a submerged barrier of the dimensions that would be required at Crayfordness, where the river is much wider, would be open to doubt. It is not within the present state of the art of construction. No Government confronted with the urgency of the problem could possibly put their money and their judgment on something which we are advised might not be reliable in the event.
So, with Crayfordness out of the way, three sites remained to be considered for a movable barrier. They were Silvertown, in the Woolwich Reach, the Woolwich Dockyard and the Blackwall Reach. Each of those sites has been examined in the greatest detail. As chairman, on behalf of my right hon. Friend, of the policy group that has been concerned with the project, I have visited all three by boat to see them for myself. Our conclusion is clear. It is that of these three sites—and we have examined each in the greatest detail—the merits of Silvertown seem to be overwhelmingly strong.
Silvertown succeeds on grounds of relative cost, which is an important

factor. It succeeds on grounds of the relative ease and safety of construction, a factor which I put very high. It succeeds on the present availability of land for the necessary works; the land can be obtained now. It succeeds on grounds of the relative safety to shipping afforded by a site in a straight, open length of river where navigational interests can be taken into account. I have examined this personally and I am satisfied that this is right.
It is only fair to say that the Port of London Authority preferred, and still prefers, the Blackwall site, which is even further up river than Silvertown. However, while reserving its position on detailed points, such as navigation and siltation, Lord Simon, speaking on behalf of the Port of London Authority, has agreed not to stand in the way of the further investigation that now needs to be done to go forward on the basis of Silvertown.
I come to the question of the type of barrier. Obviously here one must consider the question of cost, speed of construction, width of opening and, therefore perhaps the safety of shipping. The type of barrier could also affect the amenities of the river.
The field of choice here extends from a structure containing drop gates, one of which might have a span of 450 ft., to a structure containing a number of gates each with a maximum span of 200 ft., and such gates would be of the rising sector pattern, which is a drum-like structure rising from the river bed.
Some of the navigational interests are at present disposed to favour the drop gate on the ground that the greater width of opening would be safer for the passage of shipping, particularly in fog or difficult weather. But in favour of the rising sector are the lower cost, the less time that would be required for completion and the fact that the rising sector gates would be less conspicuous than a drop gate barrier, which would have twin towers rising from the river perhaps 220 ft. high with a main sluice gate 450 ft. long and 55 ft. deep. Whichever design is chosen, on cost or technical grounds, my right hon. Friend and I are anxious that it should conflict as little as possible with the amenities and attractiveness of the river.

Mr. Denis Howell: I am obliged to the Minister for the extremely interesting information which he is giving the House. Indeed, he is making a major policy announcement. In all my experience in this place, I have never before heard a major policy pronouncement of this sort given in reply to a second Adjournment debate without prior notice having been given to the Opposition. I therefore wonder whether the hon. Gentleman intends to repeat this policy pronouncement at a time when we shall have an opportunity to cross-examine him. I trust that he appreciates that we shall need carefully to examine the remarks he is making tonight.

Mr. Griffiths: The hon. Gentleman flatters me in suggesting that I am making such a pronouncement. My right hon. Friend made a perfectly clear announcement of his choice of site and his decision that the G.L.C. should go ahead. I am glad to elaborate some of the points he made, but I assure the hon. Gentleman that if he had read my right hon. Friend's statement the other day he would have seen that the Government have made their decision and announcement in the proper way and proper place.

Mr. Howell: Is it not a fact that that statement was made in the form of a Written Answer to a Question—made that way because the hon. Member who had tabled the Question was not in the House to ask it, so that the reply was given in written form?

Mr. Griffiths: I assure the hon. Gentleman that there has been not just that one Answer to which he has referred. A fuller statement has been made by my right hon. Friend since that Answer was given, and I have no doubt that the hon. Gentleman will be interested to look up the fuller statement that was made.
I want to deal with the subject of closure of the barrier because, obviously, when one closes such a barrier one interferes, or can interfere, with shipping. The Port of London Authority and the shipping interests are concerned about the number of times the barrier might have to be closed, thereby preventing or delaying a ship's passage.
On the approach of a very major surge tide, which would be known well in

advance, the barrier would normally be closed at low water; that is to say, six hours before high water. But if the downstream walls and embankments are built to high standards—that is to say, to provide safe protection at Thamesmead and many other places against a tide likely to occur once in 1,000 years—it may be possible to delay closure of the barrier on the surge tides, showing only a marginal risk to London. We could delay that closure until three hours before high water, and the advice available to me is that the average number of closures per year at the present time would not be at all numerous, though clearly the frequency of closure would increase over the years in the expectation that the present rise in sea level relative to the land goes on.
I am advised that, even with the utmost speed, it will take about two more years to complete the studies, to acquire the necessary riparian land and to design this very big project. The Government have therefore agreed—and my right hon. Friend has announced more than once—that this process should now begin. For the edification of the hon. Member for Birmingham, Small Heath (Mr. Denis Howell) I quote what my right hon. Friend said last week in the House:
The Government consider that the need to construct a moveable barrier to be urgent and agree … that the right site is at Silver-town in Woolwich Reach".
My right hon. Friend went on:
The Greater London Council is therefore being advised to press ahead both with the detailed site investigation and also with the completion of their remaining studies. Detailed design work will begin as soon as a decision can be taken on the type of barrier."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th November, 1970; Vol. 805, c. 352.]

Mr. Spearing: I raised this very point on the relative merits of the drop gate and rising drum type of barrier. The hon. Gentleman has not mentioned the question of the power to close the barrier. For reliability it is obviously necessary that such a mechanism should close without power. Can the hon. Gentleman enlighten us on this point?

Mr. Griffiths: I can only assure the hon. Gentleman that the engineering advisers available to the G.L.C. and to the Government are perfectly well aware of that problem.

Mr. Wellbeloved: I am sure that the hon. Gentleman does not wish to mislead the House. The statement he alleges the Minister made to the House last week was in reality a Written Answer published in HANSARD, and not a statement made to the House. The Scottish Member who put down the Question did not turn up to ask it.

Mr. Griffiths: That is different from the point made by the hon. Member for Small Heath, which was that I was disclosing something for the first time.
The position is that there is a danger to London. We have recognised that. We have taken the best advice. We have made a decision that required to be made, and we have now set in train the action that is required to safeguard London. All else—Crayfordness and the rest—is secondary to that major point that the decision required has been made.
I will deal very briefly with the questions that have been put by various hon. Members. First, I must deal with one point made by the hon. Member for Erith and Crayford. Recognising the hon. Gentleman's sincerity, I say that he does no service to those who may come to live in that area if he uses the kind of language that speaks of some 60,000 human souls being put in peril. The Greater London Council, whatever its political complexion, is a responsible body which will accept the responsibility of ensuring that adequate protection is available to those—his own constituents and others—who live in Thamesmead.
The hon. Gentleman said that not too much notice should be taken of solemn technical assurances by experts. Who else does the hon. Gentleman want us to rely upon? When dealing with matters of this magnitude—the construction of a barrier larger than anything ever undertaken before—does the hon. Gentleman expect that we should rely upon him? The right answer is that any Government must turn to the best available advice. That is precisely what our predecessors, the G.L.C., and now this Government, have done. I am not prepared to accept from the hon. Gentleman, for whom I have great affection, any of the strictures on the impartial technical advice that has been made available to me, to my Com

mittee, and to my right hon. Friend, while we have considered this subject.

Mr. Wellbeloved: Will the hon. Gentleman also bear in mind that I said that at the 1967 Thamesmead public inquiry solemn technical evidence was given on behalf of the Greater London Council that to protect Thamesmead the barrier should be downstream, not upstream? if that technical evidence has been overridden, I cannot put much faith in the present evidence the hon. Gentleman is adducing.

Mr. Denis Howell: Before the Under-Secretary—

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Robert Grant-Ferris): Order. We cannot have an intervention upon an intervention.

Mr. Griffiths: I rise for the purpose of allowing the hon. Member for Small Heath to intervene.

Mr. Denis Howell: I am much obliged to the hon. Gentleman. I was about to say that, great as is the confidence that we may have in him, we on this side of the House greatly prefer the advice of his experts to anything based on his own personal visit to the site, which is what he seemed to rely on earlier in his speech.

Mr. Griffiths: I suspect that if the hon. Gentleman had been in this position he would have done exactly the same. I hope that he will agree that it is desirable, whenever one is taking a Committee, to try as far as possible to see the situation for oneself.
In the few minutes remaining for this debate, I wish to deal with the questions which have been put to me. My hon. Friend the Member for Dartford (Mr. Trew) made three main points. He spoke of the danger of downstream flooding. Of course he did, as the Member for Dartford. He said that the most thorough examination of the possible risks and dangers would be required. I assure him that the most thorough examination is under way.
Then my hon. Friend said that there would need to be some estimate of the cost of downstream flood defences and that this matter, too, would need to be very carefully examined. I assure my hon. Friend that the cost and the construction of adequate downstream


defences would be an integral part of the project, properly costed and built into the scheme as it progressed.
Third, my hon. Friend and other hon. Members raised the question of overall cost. This was a matter of concern to my hon. Friend the Member for Hampstead (Mr. Geoffrey Finsberg). The Government and the G.L.C. are naturally very conscious of the cost of the scheme and, if it had not been for the great urgency confronting London, it would have been so easy to postpone a decision, as our predecessors did. We have made a decision, and we accept that it will be necessary with the G.L.C. to work out the exact division of costs. This is a matter on which consultations will be required. Indeed, they are now proceeding. I am certain that my right hon. Friend will be taking into account the views of the G.L.C. and of the other riparian authorities in Kent, Essex, and the rest, before reaching any conclusion as to precisely how the costs are to be divided.
The hon. Gentleman the Member for Acton, whose knowledge in this field is great, raised five points. He spoke first of the site. My answer to him on this point is simple. The decision is made. My right hon. Friend has announced it. The hon. Gentleman then spoke of reliability. The reason Crayfordness did not succeed is that it was not reliable. The hon. Gentleman spoke of amenity, as did my hon. Friend the Member for Reading (Dr. Vaughan). We accept that the amenity aspects are of great importance, and I have given the assurance that in selecting the type of barrier we shall be very much guided by amenity considerations.
The hon. Gentleman also spoke of tide control. This is a controversial and difficult matter, for the importance of the navigational interests and the free movement of sizeable ships has to be borne in mind, and the Government certainly intend to do that. All I can say in answer to his question is that the type of barrier constructed, depending on what is chosen, will certainly not exclude the possibility of tide control in the future, but for the time being I think this is a matter for consultation with the G.L.C. and the Port of London authority.
He mentioned cost, as did so many others. I recognise the point that he made, that this is a national scheme and not simply a London scheme. It is a proper matter for discussion as to how the costs shall be borne.
I come to one other point that has been touched on by hon. Members but not developed, namely that if a start were made in 1972 the construction of a barrier could be substantially completed by 1976 in the case of a rising sector gate, or by 1977 in the case of a drop gate barrier. The associated river defences would need to be very carefully phased in so as not to create greater danger before the completion of the barrier and the chances also of some degree of flooding during the construction period itself. They, too, cannot be overlooked.
There is, therefore, a strong case for providing some protection during this interim period of construction either generally by means of the temporary raising of existing walls or selectively in areas by installations which are particularly at risk. An example might be the Underground access points. The hon. Member has advised a trial evacuation system and he has quoted Professor Bondi. I will certainly look at this proposal, which he is making tonight not for the first time, but I am somewhat sceptical of the necessity for it.
The provision of this kind of interim protection is beset with difficulties, including the extent of the work that may be necessary to ensure the stability of higher walls, and also aesthetic objections against raising the height of the river embankments in Central London. But these possibilities are being investigated by the G.L.C. which will be reporting to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Environment very shortly.
As to the Kent and Essex riparian areas, the G.L.C. is also in close touch with the Kent and Essex river authorities. These are responsible for the estuarial sea defences. The purpose in all these matters is that the best possible schemes for the protection of the areas downstream shall be worked out. There will be the fullest consultation, and my right hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture as well as my right hon. Friend


the Secretary of State for the Environment will both be working here in conjunction with the authorities concerned and with the P.L.A.
The Greater London Council and the Kent and Essex river authorities will determine what raising of riparian banks and walls will be required downstream at the barrier site, and the necessary works will form an integral part of the whole project. What I am saying is that flooding downstream will not be allowed to take place.
Therefore, I hope that I have been able to point to the Government's having made a decision on what can be a very exciting project. Further investigation will be required in respect of a site. More discussions are needed in respect of the money. Full consultations will be required at all stages, but nevertheless the decision has been made. The action can now begin.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at twenty-nine minutes past Ten o'clock.